United States v. Dienst
This text of 16 M.J. 727 (United States v. Dienst) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Military Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
DECISION
Contrary to his pleas, the accused was convicted of desertion in violation of Article 85, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 885. His approved sentence includes a dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures, reduction to airman basic and admonishment.
The accused was charged with deserting his unit in the Republic of Vietnam on 11 December 1967 and remaining in a desertion status until his apprehension on 13 March 1982.
After leaving his unit, on the date alleged, the accused remained in Saigon. For a period of time following his desertion, the accused was employed as a guard at the International House, a social club at the United States Embassy in Saigon. On 31 March 1971, the accused was arrested by Vietnamese and American military police for not having proper identification papers and placed in a Vietnamese immigration jail. Following this arrest, the U.S. State Department arranged for the accused’s return to the United States. By appropriate exceptions and substitutions, the court-martial found the accused’s desertion terminated on 31 March 1971.
The accused, at trial and now on appeal,1 contends that the prosecution of his offense was barred by the statute of limitations. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 43, 10 U.S.C. § 843. The pertinent portions of Article 43 provide:
(a) A person charged with desertion or absence without leave in time of war, or with aiding the enemy, mutiny, or murder, may be tried and punished at any time without limitation.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this article, a person charged with desertion in time of peace or any of the offenses punishable under sections 919-932 of this title (article 119-132) is not liable to be tried by court-martial if the offense was committed more than three years before the receipt of sworn charges and specifications by an officer exercising summary court-martial jurisdiction over the command.
The accused asserts that a “time of war” did not exist at the time of his offense and since sworn charges against the accused were not received by an officer exercising summary court-martial jurisdiction within three years of his desertion, the charge and specification should be dismissed. We disagree. It is well settled that desertion and absence without leave offenses which occurred during the Vietnam conflict, occurred “in time of war.” United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968); see also, United States v. Reyes, 48 C.M.R. 832 (A.C.M.R.1974).
The accused also contends he was denied a fair trial because the trial judge denied his motion for discovery. We find to the contrary.
The accused made two discovery requests, one consisting of 110 separately enumerated paragraphs and another containing 112 separately enumerated paragraphs. The two requests, which were substantially the [729]*729same, each stated that they were “necessary in the complete and proper defense” of the accused. During a pretrial hearing, the individual defense counsel advised the military judge that without the information requested, it was doubtful whether an adequate defense could be provided the accused. A review of these discovery requests and the record indicates otherwise.
Military accused generally enjoy considerable discovery rights, in many instances broader than those found in civilian jurisdictions.
But the availability of the machinery for extensive discovery and production of evidence does not entitle the accused to use the machinery for improper purposes. If discovery of documentary evidence is sought, it must appear that the documents are relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry and that the request is reasonable.
Relevance and reasonableness of request necessarily depend upon the facts of each case, especially in considering the impact of the trial court’s ruling upon the rights of the accused, (citations omitted) United States v. Franchia, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 315, 32 C.M.R. 315 (1962).
Representative samples of the accused’s discovery requests are set out in the margin.2 Most of the requests made by the [730]*730defense, as exemplified by those set out herein, are either irrelevant or unreasonable or both. It appears that the accused exceeded the scope of legitimate discovery and engaged in a general fishing expedition. Our review of the record convinces us that the accused was provided with that reasonable and relevant information which was necessary to conduct a proper defense. The military judge’s denial of the discovery request was not an abuse of discretion and did not deny the accused a fair trial.
We have considered the remaining assignments of error and resolved them adversely to the accused.
One further matter merits our attention. In his action, the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction attempted to apply the forfeitures to pay and allowances accruing on and after the date of his action. This was error. “If a sentence as approved by the convening authority does not include confinement or if the sentence to confinement is to be suspended, any approved forfeitures may not be applied until the sentence is ordered into execution.” M.C.M., 1969 (Rev.), paragraph 88 d(3). (emphasis added).
The findings of guilty and the approved sentence are affirmed, but the application of forfeitures is deferred until the sentence is ordered into execution.
CANELLOS and RAICHLE, Judges, concur.
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16 M.J. 727, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-dienst-cma-1983.