United States v. Destin

255 F. App'x 809
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedNovember 13, 2007
Docket06-20847
StatusUnpublished

This text of 255 F. App'x 809 (United States v. Destin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Destin, 255 F. App'x 809 (5th Cir. 2007).

Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

Defendants-Appellants Lajuana Destín and Denetra McElroy appeal from final judgments of conviction for their participation in a scheme to fraudulently obtain unemployment benefits from the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC). Destín and McElroy challenge their convictions on the ground that the government presented insufficient evidence to support their respective convictions. Finding no error, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND .

A.

On December 29, 2004, Destín, McElroy, and four others — John Slaughter, Jacqueline Ligón, Brenda Bowers, and Shalanda Nichols — were indicted by a grand jury in the Southern District of Texas on forty-four separate counts relating to a scheme to defraud the TWC from November 1996 through August 2001. All of the defendants were charged in Count One with conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. 1 McElroy, along with Slaughter, was charged in Counts Two through Seven with mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Destín, along with Slaughter, was charged in Counts Forty-Two through Forty-Four, also under the mail fraud statute. A bench trial commenced before United States District Judge Melinda Harmon on March 27, 2006. At the close of the government’s case, on March 30, 2006, Destín and McElroy moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. On April 3, 2006, following the close of both defendants’ cases, the district court found McElroy guilty on Counts One through Seven and Destín guilty on Counts One, Forty-Two and Forty-Four. 2 McElroy was sentenced on October 6, 2006 to five years of probation on each of Counts One through Seven, with the sentences to run concurrently. She was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $20,545. Destín was likewise sentenced on October 6, 2006 to five years of probation on Counts One, Forty-Two, and Forty-Four, with the sentences to run concurrently. She was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $33,418.

B.

The instant convictions arise from a scheme to defraud the TWC through the disbursement of unemployment benefits to persons who were not qualified to receive them. The TWC is the Texas state agency in charge of administering the federal government’s unemployment insurance *811 system, which was created by the Social Security Act of 1935 to provide monetary benefits through the states to persons who are unemployed due to no fault of their own. Under this program, state-levied employer taxes, occasionally supplemented by federal funds, finance the benefits paid to unemployed persons in the private sector. In addition, federal grants cover all costs incurred by the relevant state agency in the course of administering the unemployment benefits program so long as the state meets certain statutory and regulatory requirements.

According to a TWC representative who testified at trial, in order to qualify for and receive unemployment benefits from the TWC, a person must satisfy three eligibility criteria. First, the person must have had sufficient earnings during the “base period,” which consists of the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters. Second, the person’s last employment must have terminated under appropriate circumstances, which include being laid off for a lack of work. If a person was fired or quit her job, then TWC conducts an investigation to determine the person’s eligibility under this criterion. Finally, the claimant must be “able to work,” “available for work,” and “looking for work.”

Beginning in late 1996 and continuing through the entire period of time relevant to the Destín and McElroy convictions, persons seeking unemployment benefits were required to visit a TWC office in order to initiate their claims. During that visit, according to the TWC representative, prospective recipients “would be directed to a claims taker who would ask a series of questions ... to identify the person and next to determine what type of claim for unemployment was needed. And then they would be questioned about who their last employer was and their reason for separation from that work.” The elaimstakers then entered this information directly into the TWC computer system, which it referred to as an “online application.” The TWC did not require claimants to fill out a paper application, and there was generally no paper record of these visits. After the person submitted the online application for unemployment benefits, the TWC provided the claimant with information on how to use its Tele-Serve system, which was the mechanism by which the TWC disbursed benefits to eligible recipients. Under the Tele-Serve system, payments of unemployment benefits were not automatically generated as a result of the filing of an application, but rather claimants were required to access the Tele-Serve system by phone every two weeks to request payments. While using the Tele-Serve system, a claimant was required to answer a series of “yes or no” questions using a touch-tone phone and then, at the end of the call, to certify that those answers were true and correct. The questions focused on the claimant’s ongoing eligibility for receipt of unemployment benefits, including whether the person was able to work, available to work, and looking for work during the relevant two-week period.

The Government contends that Slaughter, with the help of Destín and McElroy, knowingly and illegally manipulated TWC’s system for administering unemployment benefits so as to provide ineligible persons with payments from the unemployment insurance program. Slaughter, who began his employ with TWC in 1982, was at all relevant times in this matter a claims-taker for TWC. In that capacity, Slaughter met with prospective unemployment insurance recipients at a TWC office in Houston and assisted them in filling out and processing their applications for unemployment benefits. He testified that, beginning in about 1996, he learned that he could obtain benefits for persons who were otherwise ineligible through a loop *812 hole in the system known as the “one-day rule.” In other words, if a person had been fired from or quit her last job, she could not receive unemployment benefits; however, if that person then went to work for any entity for one day, and did not quit or get fired, she would be eligible for unemployment benefits. To exploit this loophole, Slaughter would input a fictitious employer as the claimant’s employer for one day, thereby making the claimant eligible to receive benefits. Slaughter testified that he started this scheme because “there was [sic] a lot of people that were not receiving their benefits who I knew could get their benefits through a loophole .... ” He further testified that applicants would complain to him that they were entitled to receive benefits from the program because they had paid money into the unemployment insurance system, even though their beliefs were inaccurate. Slaughter initially aided claimants in obtaining benefits through this loophole for free because he “wanted to help people get their benefits.

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Bluebook (online)
255 F. App'x 809, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-destin-ca5-2007.