United States v. Desmond Hines

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: January 13, 2026
• Docket: 24-4574
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4574

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DESMOND ANTONIO HINES, a/k/a Head,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Richard E. Myers, II, Chief District Judge. (7:22-cr-00036-M-1)

Submitted: December 11, 2025 Decided: January 13, 2026

Before GREGORY, WYNN, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMPSON, STYERS & MAY, PLLC, Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. Daniel P. Bubar, Acting United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Katherine S. Englander, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

In 2022, a federal grand jury charged Desmond Antonio Hines with possession with

intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine base (Count 1), in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon (Count 2),

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924. The charges were based on a November 2020

search of Hines’s person following a traffic stop and a March 2022 search of Hines’s

girlfriend’s residence. After unsuccessfully moving to suppress the evidence, Hines pled

guilty without a plea agreement to Count 1, and a jury found Hines guilty of Count 2,

following a two-day trial. The district court sentenced Hines to a total term of 196 months’

imprisonment.

On appeal, Hines argues that (1) the warrantless search of his person in November

2020 was unreasonable, (2) the search warrant authorizing the March 2022 search was not

supported by probable cause, and (3) his sentence is unreasonable. The Government

responds that Hines waived the right to challenge the November 2020 search because he

pled guilty to the related charge without a conditional plea agreement. The Government

also contends that the March 2022 search warrant established adequate probable cause and

that, regardless, the evidence recovered pursuant to the warrant was admissible under the

good faith exception to the warrant requirement. Finally, the Government argues that the

court committed no reversible sentencing errors. For the following reasons, we affirm.

A valid guilty plea prevents a defendant from appealing “the constitutionality of

case-related government conduct that takes place before the plea is entered,” including the

validity of seizures and searches under the Fourth Amendment. Class v. United States, 583

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U.S. 174, 182 (2018). An exception to that rule is available to a defendant who preserves

his right to appeal an adverse ruling on a pretrial motion by entering a conditional guilty

plea. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); United States v. Fitzgerald, 820 F.3d 108, 110-11 (4th

Cir. 2016). Here, however, Hines’s guilty plea to Count 1 was unconditional, and he does

not contest the validity of his plea. By entering his valid unconditional guilty plea, Hines

waived his right to contest the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during

the November 2020 searches. See United States v. Buster, 26 F.4th 627, 631 (4th Cir.

2022) (“The general rule is that a valid guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects in

the proceedings conducted prior to entry of the plea.” (citation modified)). Therefore, “the

question of whether the district court erred in denying [Hines’s] suppression motion is not

properly before us.” Fitzgerald, 820 F.3d at 113.

Hines next argues that the March 2022 search warrant was not supported by

probable cause. Below, the district court rejected this argument and, in the alternative, held

that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. See United States v. Brunson,

968 F.3d 325, 334 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[E]vidence ‘seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance

on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective’ is not subject to suppression,

despite the existence of a constitutional violation.” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468

U.S. 897, 905 (1984)). On appeal, Hines neglects to challenge the court’s application of

the good faith exception; consequently, he has waived appellate review of this issue, United

States v. Ebert, 61 F.4th 394, 402 (4th Cir. 2023), so we need not consider the validity of

the warrant.

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Lastly, we turn to the reasonableness of Hines’s sentence. Where, as here, a party

preserves his claim of sentencing error by arguing for a sentence lower than the one the

district court imposed, “we review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) using an abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204,

212 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation modified)); see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578 (4th

Cir. 2010).

We first “evaluate procedural reasonableness, determining whether the district court

committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the [Sentencing]

Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain

the chosen sentence.” Nance, 957 F.3d at 212 (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007)). If “the district court has not committed procedural error,” we then assess the

substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Substantive reasonableness review “takes

into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court

abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth

in § 3553(a).” Id. (citation modified). Any sentence below or within “a properly calculated

Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable. Such a presumption can

only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the

. . . § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014)

(citation modified).

As to the procedural reasonableness of Hines’s sentence, we discern no abuse of

discretion by the district court. The court correctly calculated Hines’s Guidelines range,

considered the § 3553(a) factors, provided a meaningful explanation for the sentence that

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it chose, and thoroughly addressed Hines’s arguments for a lower sentence. See Gall, 552

U.S. at 49-51. Specifically, in explaining the sentence, the court addressed each party’s

arguments about the propriety of applying the Guidelines career offender enhancement to

Hines’s case, discussed the § 3353(a) factors, and noted various other evidence in the

record that affected its view of the appropriate sentence. Based on its balancing of the

circumstances of Hines’s case and its desire to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities,

the court then reasonably determined that a slight downward variance was appropriate.

Finally, as for the substantive reasonableness of Hines’s sentence, Hines has not

rebutted the presumption of substantive reasonableness afforded to his below-Guidelines

sentence. As stated, the district court assessed the various circumstances of Hines’s case

and reasonably arrived at a sentence of 196-months’ imprisonment.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED