NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 24-1558 _______________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DESHAUN CURTIS JONES, Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania District Court No. 2:21-cr-00017-001 District Judge: The Honorable William S. Stickman, IV __________________________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 24, 2025
Before: HARDIMAN, AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 21, 2025)
__________________________
OPINION* __________________________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. SMITH, Circuit Judge I.
While driving, Deshaun Jones was stopped by police for a suspected window tint
violation. After a subsequent dog sniff indicated the presence of narcotics, officers
searched the vehicle and seized drugs and a firearm. Jones moved to suppress the fruits of
the search, which the District Court denied. He entered a conditional plea of guilty to
possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Jones now challenges the District Court’s denial
of his suppression motion. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
II.
At the suppression hearing, Detective Shane Rebel testified that he was sitting in a
police car on the side of State Route 30 with his high-beams on when he observed a BMW
with heavily tinted windows pass by. According to Detective Rebel, the tint was such that
it prevented the detective from seeing the vehicle’s occupants. Detective Rebel followed
the BMW, which did not immediately pull over, activated his emergency lights, and
initiated a traffic stop. He testified during the suppression hearing that Jones was the driver,
and that after he knocked on the vehicle’s passenger window it was lowered. Detective
Rebel said he was immediately met with the odor of raw marijuana.
Detective Rebel asked Jones for his license, registration, and proof of insurance.
Jones handed him a Pennsylvania identification card, rather than a valid driver’s license.
The passenger, who identified herself as Keyoka Akins, began to retrieve the vehicle
2 registration from the glove box. While waiting for the requested documents, Detective
Rebel noticed that Jones was unusually nervous. After Akins closed the glove box,
Detective Rebel saw packaging paper he recognized as a “brick wrapper” for heroin
between Akins’s feet on the floor of the vehicle. The item resembled packaging he had
seen just weeks before while investigating a case involving a fatal overdose. While
Detective Rebel spoke with Jones at the rear of the vehicle, police dispatch advised the
detective that Jones’s license was both “expired” and “suspended.” SA87.
In the meantime, Detective Rebel’s supervisor, Sergeant Justin Wardman, arrived
on scene with his K-9 partner. Sergeant Wardman had heard Detective Rebel advise
dispatch that he was not certain the driver intended to pull over. Sergeant Wardman also
noted that he saw Detective Rebel pursuing Jones’s vehicle, and that he observed that the
vehicle’s windows were “pretty much blacked out.” SA 48.
Detective Rebel returned to the passenger-side window and asked Akins if there
was marijuana in the vehicle. She replied there was not, and Jones agreed. When Jones
refused to consent to a search of the vehicle, Sergeant Wardman conducted a dog sniff
around the vehicle. The K-9 alerted, after which Detective Rebel handcuffed Jones and
Akins. At that point, Akins provided verbal and written consent to search the vehicle.
Detective Rebel found a partially opened bag, wrapped in a garbage bag, located in the
back seat. It contained 342 grams of marijuana. He also found what he believed to be
heroin, cocaine, and a firearm in the vehicle. Jones admitted to Officer Rebel that the
contraband belonged to him, not Akins.
3 Facing federal drug and firearms charges, Jones moved to suppress the contraband
seized from the vehicle. The District Court denied Jones’s motion, concluding that the
traffic stop was valid and that Detective Rebel had reasonable suspicion to extend the
traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff. Jones timely appealed. His plea agreement preserved his
right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.
III.1
We review the District Court’s factual findings underlying its denial of a
suppression motion for clear error, and we exercise plenary review of the District Court’s
legal conclusions. United States v. Kramer, 75 F.4th 339, 342 (3d Cir. 2023). “Because the
District Court denied the suppression motion, we view the facts in the light most favorable
to the Government.” Id.
Jones argues that Detective Rebel stopped him illegally and then unreasonably
extended the stop. He further claims that the District Court erred in crediting Detective
Rebel’s testimony that he was unable to see through the vehicle’s windows and that he
smelled raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle. We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment protects the public from “unreasonable searches and
seizures[,]” including traffic stops. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653 (1979). The Supreme Court has explained that “an officer may, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231; we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 4 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). To meet this “generally
undemanding” reasonable suspicion standard, an officer must point to specific, articulable
facts that reasonably support a suspicion “that an individual has violated the traffic laws.”
United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 397 (2006). “[A]ny technical violation of a
traffic code legitimizes a stop[.]” United States v. Mosely, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).
We agree with the District Court that Detective Rebel reasonably suspected a
violation of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4524(e)(1). That provision prohibits “any sun screening
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 24-1558 _______________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DESHAUN CURTIS JONES, Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania District Court No. 2:21-cr-00017-001 District Judge: The Honorable William S. Stickman, IV __________________________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 24, 2025
Before: HARDIMAN, AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 21, 2025)
__________________________
OPINION* __________________________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. SMITH, Circuit Judge I.
While driving, Deshaun Jones was stopped by police for a suspected window tint
violation. After a subsequent dog sniff indicated the presence of narcotics, officers
searched the vehicle and seized drugs and a firearm. Jones moved to suppress the fruits of
the search, which the District Court denied. He entered a conditional plea of guilty to
possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Jones now challenges the District Court’s denial
of his suppression motion. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
II.
At the suppression hearing, Detective Shane Rebel testified that he was sitting in a
police car on the side of State Route 30 with his high-beams on when he observed a BMW
with heavily tinted windows pass by. According to Detective Rebel, the tint was such that
it prevented the detective from seeing the vehicle’s occupants. Detective Rebel followed
the BMW, which did not immediately pull over, activated his emergency lights, and
initiated a traffic stop. He testified during the suppression hearing that Jones was the driver,
and that after he knocked on the vehicle’s passenger window it was lowered. Detective
Rebel said he was immediately met with the odor of raw marijuana.
Detective Rebel asked Jones for his license, registration, and proof of insurance.
Jones handed him a Pennsylvania identification card, rather than a valid driver’s license.
The passenger, who identified herself as Keyoka Akins, began to retrieve the vehicle
2 registration from the glove box. While waiting for the requested documents, Detective
Rebel noticed that Jones was unusually nervous. After Akins closed the glove box,
Detective Rebel saw packaging paper he recognized as a “brick wrapper” for heroin
between Akins’s feet on the floor of the vehicle. The item resembled packaging he had
seen just weeks before while investigating a case involving a fatal overdose. While
Detective Rebel spoke with Jones at the rear of the vehicle, police dispatch advised the
detective that Jones’s license was both “expired” and “suspended.” SA87.
In the meantime, Detective Rebel’s supervisor, Sergeant Justin Wardman, arrived
on scene with his K-9 partner. Sergeant Wardman had heard Detective Rebel advise
dispatch that he was not certain the driver intended to pull over. Sergeant Wardman also
noted that he saw Detective Rebel pursuing Jones’s vehicle, and that he observed that the
vehicle’s windows were “pretty much blacked out.” SA 48.
Detective Rebel returned to the passenger-side window and asked Akins if there
was marijuana in the vehicle. She replied there was not, and Jones agreed. When Jones
refused to consent to a search of the vehicle, Sergeant Wardman conducted a dog sniff
around the vehicle. The K-9 alerted, after which Detective Rebel handcuffed Jones and
Akins. At that point, Akins provided verbal and written consent to search the vehicle.
Detective Rebel found a partially opened bag, wrapped in a garbage bag, located in the
back seat. It contained 342 grams of marijuana. He also found what he believed to be
heroin, cocaine, and a firearm in the vehicle. Jones admitted to Officer Rebel that the
contraband belonged to him, not Akins.
3 Facing federal drug and firearms charges, Jones moved to suppress the contraband
seized from the vehicle. The District Court denied Jones’s motion, concluding that the
traffic stop was valid and that Detective Rebel had reasonable suspicion to extend the
traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff. Jones timely appealed. His plea agreement preserved his
right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.
III.1
We review the District Court’s factual findings underlying its denial of a
suppression motion for clear error, and we exercise plenary review of the District Court’s
legal conclusions. United States v. Kramer, 75 F.4th 339, 342 (3d Cir. 2023). “Because the
District Court denied the suppression motion, we view the facts in the light most favorable
to the Government.” Id.
Jones argues that Detective Rebel stopped him illegally and then unreasonably
extended the stop. He further claims that the District Court erred in crediting Detective
Rebel’s testimony that he was unable to see through the vehicle’s windows and that he
smelled raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle. We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment protects the public from “unreasonable searches and
seizures[,]” including traffic stops. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653 (1979). The Supreme Court has explained that “an officer may, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231; we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 4 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). To meet this “generally
undemanding” reasonable suspicion standard, an officer must point to specific, articulable
facts that reasonably support a suspicion “that an individual has violated the traffic laws.”
United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 397 (2006). “[A]ny technical violation of a
traffic code legitimizes a stop[.]” United States v. Mosely, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).
We agree with the District Court that Detective Rebel reasonably suspected a
violation of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4524(e)(1). That provision prohibits “any sun screening
device or other material which does not permit a person to see or view the inside of the
vehicle[.]” The District Court noted both Detective Rebel’s testimony that he was unable
to see the vehicle’s occupants when Jones drove by and Sergeant Wardman’s observation
that the vehicle’s windows were “‘pretty much blacked out[.]’” A30 (quoting Tr. 7
(SA48)). In addition to this testimony, the District Court stated that the dash cam videos of
the two law enforcement officers “captured the blacked-out state of the front passenger
window” and that even in the photographs of the vehicle taken in a “well-lit police garage,
it was nearly impossible to see through” the vehicle’s windows. A31.
We conclude that the District Court did not err by crediting Detective Rebel’s
testimony. And we will not disturb the District Court’s determination that Detective
Rebel’s initiation of the traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Delfin-
Colina, 464 F.3d at 396; United States v. Harrell, 268 F.3d 141, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2001).
We further conclude that Detective Rebel did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop.
A lawful traffic stop can be unreasonably extended in violation of the Fourth Amendment 5 if an officer prolongs the stop “‘beyond the time reasonably required’” to complete its
traffic-related mission in order to investigate other crimes. Rodriguez v. United States, 575
U.S. 348, 350, 355–57 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). Our
analysis proceeds in two steps. We must first determine if and when the stop was
extended—i.e., the “Rodriguez moment[.]” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d
Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). If we conclude the stop was extended, we then
assess whether the facts available to the officer “at that time were sufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion[.]” Id. If the officer has reasonable suspicion of other criminal
wrongdoing before “engag[ing] in any unrelated investigation[,]” “there is no Fourth
Amendment violation.” United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 271 (3d Cir. 2020).
Here, the earliest plausible “Rodriguez moment” occurred when Detective Rebel
asked Akins if there was marijuana in the vehicle. Before that inquiry, however, Detective
Rebel had sufficient reasonable suspicion of separate criminal activity when he smelled
raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle immediately after the vehicle’s window was
lowered.2 See United States v. Ramos, 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006). Moreover, as the
District Court noted, in response to Officer Rebel’s request for driver’s license, registration,
and proof of insurance, Jones did not produce a valid driver’s license, but only a
Pennsylvania identification card. The Court also noted Officer Rebel’s belief that Jones
2 We reject Jones’s assertion that the District Court clearly erred in crediting Detective Rebel’s testimony that he was able to smell the 342 grams of marijuana in the bag on the back seat from the passenger window. The District Court specifically noted Detective Rebel’s testimony that he recognized the odor because he had smelled it thousands of times both as a youth and in the course of his duties conducting narcotics investigations. See United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1997). 6 was very nervous. And there is the fact that Officer Rebel observed what he knew to be
packaging paper for heroin in the vehicle, prompting reasonable suspicion of a violation of
Pennsylvania’s drug paraphernalia statute. See 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(32). These
observations provided reasonable suspicion not just for Detective Rebel’s marijuana-
related questions, but also for the subsequent dog sniff. See Green, 897 F.3d at 186–87.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.