United States v. Derrick Simpson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: October 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-4160
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-4160 Doc: 51 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 1 of 8

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4160

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DERRICK SIMPSON, a/k/a Red,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge. (2:20-cr-00778-DCN-1)

Submitted: October 1, 2025 Decided: October 17, 2025

Before KING and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Jonathan M. Milling, MILLING LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Bryan P. Stirling, United States Attorney, John W. Sowards, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4160 Doc: 51 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 2 of 8

PER CURIAM:

Derrick Simpson pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy

to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A), 846. The district court sentenced Simpson to 336 months’ imprisonment. On

appeal, Simpson contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable on three grounds.

First, Simpson asserts that the district court violated his due process rights at sentencing by

not allowing Simpson to challenge witnesses’ statements regarding the drug weight

attributed to him and the court’s imposition of an enhancement his knowing use of a minor

in the offense under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(16)(B)(i) (2018).

Second, he argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for

possessing a dangerous weapon under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) because there was no evidence

connecting him to the firearm. Lastly, Simpson argues that the district court failed to

address his nonfrivolous argument for a downward variance based on sentencing disparities

for defendants with similar total offense levels and criminal history scores.

The Government moved to dismiss the appeal based on the appeal waiver in

Simpson’s plea agreement. Simpson opposed the Government’s motion, arguing that he

did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal and that there was no

consideration to support the appeal waiver, rendering the waiver unenforceable. We

ordered supplemental briefing to address whether consideration is required to support an

appeal waiver, and if so, whether Simpson’s appeal waiver was supported by adequate

consideration. The Government filed a response conceding that Simpson’s appeal waiver

was not supported by consideration and requesting that we deny its motion to dismiss and

2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4160 Doc: 51 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 3 of 8

consider Simpson’s appeal on the merits. Finding no reversible error, we deny the

Government’s motion to dismiss and affirm.

We review the reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),

applying a deferential “abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,

51 (2007). We must “evaluate procedural reasonableness, determining whether the district

court committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range,

failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain the chosen

sentence,” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020).

Simpson argues that the district court violated his due process rights because his

guilty plea was conditioned upon the court’s promise that Simpson would be able to

challenge witnesses’ testimony at sentencing, but the court deprived him of a meaningful

opportunity to do so. Specifically, Simpson argues that his base offense level and attributed

drug weight were improperly calculated based on unverified information in the presentence

report (“PSR”), in which Simpson’s coconspirators reported that Simpson distributed

methamphetamine and transported large amounts of drug money. Simpson also argues that

the district court denied him the opportunity to challenge the testimony regarding the

enhancement for use of a minor.

The Fifth Amendment requires that no person be deprived of liberty without due

process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is well established that a court may, for purposes

of sentencing, consider any relevant information before it, including uncorroborated

hearsay, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its

accuracy.” United States v. Mondragon, 860 F.3d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal

3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4160 Doc: 51 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 4 of 8

quotation marks omitted). “[T]he defendant bears an affirmative duty to show that the

information in the [PSR] is unreliable, and articulate the reasons why the facts contained

therein are untrue or inaccurate.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A “district court’s

determination that evidence is sufficiently reliable to be considered at sentencing is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Pineda, 770 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir.

2014). “For sentencing purposes, the government must prove the drug quantity attributable

to a particular defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Bell, 667

F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2011).

Here, Simpson fails to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion when

it found that the information in the PSR regarding the drug quantity was sufficiently

reliable. In its sentencing order, the court acknowledged that certain drug quantity was

attributed to Simpson based on the statement of a coconspirator, but it found that that status

alone did not render the coconspirator unreliable. The court found that the coconspirator

provided reliable information that was corroborated by law enforcement and that led to the

seizure of drugs and drug proceeds. United States v. Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 393-94 (4th

Cir. 2011) (holding that at sentencing due process requires evidence have “sufficient

indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy”). Similarly, our review confirms that

the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found reliable the testimony supporting

the enhancement for use of a minor under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(16)(B)(i). Further, Simpson

had several opportunities to meaningfully object to the attributable drug weight and the

enhancement for use of a minor in his objections to the PSR, in his sentencing

memorandum, and at the sentencing hearing. We conclude that the district court satisfied

4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4160 Doc: 51 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 5 of 8

due process requirements and did not abuse its discretion in finding that there existed

sufficient indicia of reliability to support the challenged statements in the PSR and the

testimony supporting the enhancement for use of a minor.

Next, Simpson argues that the district court improperly enhanced his Guidelines

offense level for possessing a dangerous weapon during a drug trafficking conspiracy under

USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). The gravamen of Simpson’s argument is that there was insufficient

evidence connecting the firearm and the drugs to Simpson.

We review the district court’s factual findings in relation to the firearm enhancement

for clear error. United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 2011). “Under this

standard of review, [we] will only reverse if left with the definite and firm conviction that

a mistake has been committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Guidelines

prescribe a two-level enhancement if the defendant possesses “a dangerous weapon

(including a firearm)” during the drug trafficking offense. USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). This

enhancement “reflects the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers possess

weapons” and “should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable

that the weapon was connected with the offense.” USSG § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A).

To apply the firearm enhancement, “[t]he government bears the initial burden of

proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the weapon was possessed in connection

with the relevant illegal drug activity.” Mondragon, 860 F.3d at 231. The government,

however, “need not prove precisely concurrent acts, such as a gun in hand while in the act

of storing drugs or drugs in hand while in the act of retrieving a gun.” Id. (citation

modified). Instead, “the government need prove only that the weapon was present, which

5 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4160 Doc: 51 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 6 of 8

it may do by establishing a temporal and spatial relation linking the weapon, the drug

trafficking activity, and the defendant.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court properly found that there was sufficient evidence to support

Simpson’s knowledge and control of the firearm. First, the firearm was readily accessible

to Simpson underneath the driver’s seat as he drove to the drug transaction. Manigan, 592

F.3d at 629. Second, Simpson possessed the firearm “in connection with drug activity that

was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as the offense of conviction.”

Slade, 631 F.3d at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that

the imposition of the dangerous weapon enhancement was not clearly erroneous.

Lastly, Simpson argues that the district court imposed a procedurally unreasonable

sentence by failing to address his argument regarding sentencing disparities and by failing

to provide an individualized assessment when denying his motion for a downward variant

sentence. For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, “a district court must conduct an

individualized assessment of the facts and arguments presented and impose an appropriate

sentence, and it must explain the sentence chosen.” Nance, 957 F.3d at 212 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Important here, “a district court must address or consider all

non-frivolous reasons presented for imposing a different sentence and explain why [it] has

rejected those arguments.” United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 744 (4th Cir. 2019). A

district court satisfies this requirement “if it, although somewhat briefly, outlines the

defendant’s particular history and characteristics not merely in passing or after the fact, but

as part of its analysis of the statutory factors and in response to defense counsel’s arguments

6 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4160 Doc: 51 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 7 of 8

for a [lower sentence].” United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 782 (4th Cir. 2020)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court adequately explained its decision to impose the 336-month

sentence and thoroughly addressed the 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a) factors. The district court

considered the serious nature and circumstances of the offense, noting the large quantity of

drugs involved in the conspiracy, Simpson’s possession of a firearm, and Simpson’s central

role in the conspiracy—especially that Simpson was involved in both the procurement and

distribution of the drugs. Considering Simpson’s lengthy, and at times violent, criminal

history, the court found that serving a nearly nine-year sentence for armed robbery had not

deterred Simpson from criminal conduct—further demonstrating Simpson’s propensity to

engage in criminal activity and his disrespect for the law. The district court also expressed

hope that Simpson would start using his intelligence for good, instead of using it to run a

“multi-thousand or multi-million-dollar drug ring” to bring cocaine and methamphetamine

from Mexico.

Although the district court did not address Simpson’s sentencing disparity argument

in depth at the sentencing hearing, it acknowledged his argument and rejected it because

defense counsel did not explain the relevance of the Judiciary Sentencing Information

statistics to Simpson’s case. See Lozano, 962 F.3d at 782. In its sentencing order, the

district court expressed that it was “difficult to make apples-to-apples sentencing

comparisons under § 3553(a)(6)” but ultimately found no unwarranted sentencing

disparities in Simpson’s case. Further, the district court also explained that imposing a

sentence below Simpson’s Guidelines range would contravene § 3553(a)’s goals—namely,

7 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4160 Doc: 51 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 8 of 8

the need for just punishment and to protect the public—and would minimize the

seriousness of Simpson’s offense. We conclude that Simpson’s sentence is procedurally

reasonable.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED