USCA4 Appeal: 19-4812 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/25/2022 Pg: 1 of 6
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4812
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DERRICK ALAN DANIELS, JR.,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:17-cr-00124-RJC-DSC-1)
Argued: December 9, 2021 Decided: July 25, 2022
Before RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion in which Judge Rushing and Senior Judge Traxler joined.
ARGUED: Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anthony Joseph Enright, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anthony Martinez, Federal Public Defender, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. William T. Stetzer, Acting United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 19-4812 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/25/2022 Pg: 2 of 6
RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:
Derrick Daniels challenges the admissibility of a handgun found in a rental car he
had been driving that was parked outside of his hotel. But Daniels lacked a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the car because he introduced no evidence that he was in lawful
possession of the car. So he could not challenge the search. We thus affirm the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress the handgun.
I. Background
Derrick Daniels had multiple outstanding arrest warrants, and police were actively
searching for him. So they obtained search warrants to track him using his cell-phone
location data. After using that data to find him, officers saw Daniels driving a gray Dodge
Charger with a Florida license tag. Running the license plate on the vehicle revealed that
the Charger was an Enterprise rental car.
The next morning, officers tracked Daniels to a Baymont Inn & Suites and found
the Charger parked out front. The desk clerk directed the officers to Daniels’ hotel room,
where they arrested Daniels based on the outstanding arrest warrants.
As Daniels was walked out of the hotel, he passed the Charger. An officer asked
Daniels if he knew anything about the vehicle without having provided a Miranda warning.
Daniels responded that “he didn’t know anything about a Dodge Charger.” J.A. 142.
Knowing the Charger was a rental vehicle, an officer called Enterprise about the
car. The officer spoke with an Enterprise risk manager. The risk manager testified that the
officer told her “they were making an arrest of the person who had [Enterprise’s] vehicle
and asked what [she] would like to do with the vehicle.” J.A. 217. Upon checking the
2 USCA4 Appeal: 19-4812 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/25/2022 Pg: 3 of 6
rental agreement, the risk manager discovered that Daniels did not rent the car and was not
listed as an authorized driver. 1 Instead, the authorized renter was Erica Baldwin. Under
the rental agreement, Enterprise had the right to seize the car without notice to the renter
whenever it discovered that an unauthorized person drove the vehicle. So the risk manager
sent a tow truck to return the vehicle to Enterprise’s service center.
Officers followed the tow truck to Enterprise to be present if an Enterprise employee
discovered contraband. At the service center, Enterprise’s employees consented to a search
of the vehicle. 2 After a handgun was discovered under the driver’s side floor mat, a team
of crime-scene specialists arrived to collect the firearm, and DNA analysis on the gun
revealed Daniels’ DNA.
Based on the gun recovered from the Charger, a grand jury indicted Daniels for
possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Daniels moved to suppress
the evidence from the Charger on the theory that it was obtained from an unlawful search
1 In briefing below, Daniels’ counsel alleged that Daniels paid the deposit for the rental car, but no evidence was introduced to support that claim. 2 The officers and Enterprise employees offered somewhat different, and at times contradictory, accounts of the sequence of events at Enterprise’s service center and exactly when consent was given. But acknowledging the “discrepancy between the witnesses as to how that search transpired, [and] the mechanics of the search” the district court still made a factual finding that “Enterprise had the authority to give consent and gave valid consent.” J.A. 264–65. So we defer to the district court’s factual finding. And although Daniels argues that Enterprise’s consent was not valid, he does not argue that Enterprise did not give consent.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 19-4812 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/25/2022 Pg: 4 of 6
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A suppression hearing followed. 3 Finding that
Daniels had abandoned any legitimate expectation of privacy in the Charger, that
Enterprise had given valid third-party consent to the search, and that the Government
would have inevitably discovered the gun in the Charger, the district court denied Daniels’
motion to suppress. Daniels then entered a conditional plea, preserving his right to appeal
the adverse ruling on his suppression motion.
II. Discussion
The Fourth Amendment guards “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. To challenge the legality of a search under the Fourth Amendment, a
criminal defendant must prove that he has a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in the item
or area searched. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). “A person who is
aggrieved by an illegal search . . . of a third person’s premises or property has not had any
of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978).
To determine whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists, we look to
“concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society.” Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1527 (2018) (quoting Rakas,
3 At first, the district court denied Daniels’ suppression motion without a suppression hearing, under then-prevailing precedent that unauthorized drivers of a rental car “had no legitimate privacy interest in the car.” J.A. 61–62 (citing United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119–20 (4th Cir. 1994)). But before he was sentenced, the Supreme Court rejected Wellons’ “per se rule” that “drivers who are not listed on rental agreements always lack an expectation of privacy in the automobile based on the rental company’s lack of authorization alone.” See Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526–27, 1531 (2018). So Daniels moved the district court to reconsider its prior ruling. Following a suppression hearing, the district court again denied Daniels’ suppression motion. It is from that second denial that Daniels now appeals. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 19-4812 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/25/2022 Pg: 5 of 6
439 U.S.
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USCA4 Appeal: 19-4812 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/25/2022 Pg: 1 of 6
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4812
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DERRICK ALAN DANIELS, JR.,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:17-cr-00124-RJC-DSC-1)
Argued: December 9, 2021 Decided: July 25, 2022
Before RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion in which Judge Rushing and Senior Judge Traxler joined.
ARGUED: Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anthony Joseph Enright, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anthony Martinez, Federal Public Defender, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. William T. Stetzer, Acting United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 19-4812 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/25/2022 Pg: 2 of 6
RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:
Derrick Daniels challenges the admissibility of a handgun found in a rental car he
had been driving that was parked outside of his hotel. But Daniels lacked a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the car because he introduced no evidence that he was in lawful
possession of the car. So he could not challenge the search. We thus affirm the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress the handgun.
I. Background
Derrick Daniels had multiple outstanding arrest warrants, and police were actively
searching for him. So they obtained search warrants to track him using his cell-phone
location data. After using that data to find him, officers saw Daniels driving a gray Dodge
Charger with a Florida license tag. Running the license plate on the vehicle revealed that
the Charger was an Enterprise rental car.
The next morning, officers tracked Daniels to a Baymont Inn & Suites and found
the Charger parked out front. The desk clerk directed the officers to Daniels’ hotel room,
where they arrested Daniels based on the outstanding arrest warrants.
As Daniels was walked out of the hotel, he passed the Charger. An officer asked
Daniels if he knew anything about the vehicle without having provided a Miranda warning.
Daniels responded that “he didn’t know anything about a Dodge Charger.” J.A. 142.
Knowing the Charger was a rental vehicle, an officer called Enterprise about the
car. The officer spoke with an Enterprise risk manager. The risk manager testified that the
officer told her “they were making an arrest of the person who had [Enterprise’s] vehicle
and asked what [she] would like to do with the vehicle.” J.A. 217. Upon checking the
2 USCA4 Appeal: 19-4812 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/25/2022 Pg: 3 of 6
rental agreement, the risk manager discovered that Daniels did not rent the car and was not
listed as an authorized driver. 1 Instead, the authorized renter was Erica Baldwin. Under
the rental agreement, Enterprise had the right to seize the car without notice to the renter
whenever it discovered that an unauthorized person drove the vehicle. So the risk manager
sent a tow truck to return the vehicle to Enterprise’s service center.
Officers followed the tow truck to Enterprise to be present if an Enterprise employee
discovered contraband. At the service center, Enterprise’s employees consented to a search
of the vehicle. 2 After a handgun was discovered under the driver’s side floor mat, a team
of crime-scene specialists arrived to collect the firearm, and DNA analysis on the gun
revealed Daniels’ DNA.
Based on the gun recovered from the Charger, a grand jury indicted Daniels for
possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Daniels moved to suppress
the evidence from the Charger on the theory that it was obtained from an unlawful search
1 In briefing below, Daniels’ counsel alleged that Daniels paid the deposit for the rental car, but no evidence was introduced to support that claim. 2 The officers and Enterprise employees offered somewhat different, and at times contradictory, accounts of the sequence of events at Enterprise’s service center and exactly when consent was given. But acknowledging the “discrepancy between the witnesses as to how that search transpired, [and] the mechanics of the search” the district court still made a factual finding that “Enterprise had the authority to give consent and gave valid consent.” J.A. 264–65. So we defer to the district court’s factual finding. And although Daniels argues that Enterprise’s consent was not valid, he does not argue that Enterprise did not give consent.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 19-4812 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/25/2022 Pg: 4 of 6
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A suppression hearing followed. 3 Finding that
Daniels had abandoned any legitimate expectation of privacy in the Charger, that
Enterprise had given valid third-party consent to the search, and that the Government
would have inevitably discovered the gun in the Charger, the district court denied Daniels’
motion to suppress. Daniels then entered a conditional plea, preserving his right to appeal
the adverse ruling on his suppression motion.
II. Discussion
The Fourth Amendment guards “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. To challenge the legality of a search under the Fourth Amendment, a
criminal defendant must prove that he has a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in the item
or area searched. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). “A person who is
aggrieved by an illegal search . . . of a third person’s premises or property has not had any
of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978).
To determine whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists, we look to
“concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society.” Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1527 (2018) (quoting Rakas,
3 At first, the district court denied Daniels’ suppression motion without a suppression hearing, under then-prevailing precedent that unauthorized drivers of a rental car “had no legitimate privacy interest in the car.” J.A. 61–62 (citing United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119–20 (4th Cir. 1994)). But before he was sentenced, the Supreme Court rejected Wellons’ “per se rule” that “drivers who are not listed on rental agreements always lack an expectation of privacy in the automobile based on the rental company’s lack of authorization alone.” See Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526–27, 1531 (2018). So Daniels moved the district court to reconsider its prior ruling. Following a suppression hearing, the district court again denied Daniels’ suppression motion. It is from that second denial that Daniels now appeals. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 19-4812 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/25/2022 Pg: 5 of 6
439 U.S. at 144 n.12) (noting that the inquiry is not amenable to “a single metric or
exhaustive list of considerations”). Applying those principles, the Supreme Court has
recognized that a driver in “lawful possession” of a rental car may have such a legitimate
expectation of privacy, even if the rental agreement does not authorize that driver to drive
the car. Id. at 1531.
To prevail in a Fourth Amendment challenge, the criminal defendant bears the
burden of establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched property, at the
time of the search, by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Castellanos, 716
F.3d 828, 833–35 (4th Cir. 2013). In Castellanos, the defendant sought to suppress
evidence of cocaine that was found in the gas tank of a car, but this Court held that he
lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car because he “did not introduce any
evidence to show that he owned the [car] at the time [of] the warrantless search or had
permission to use the vehicle.” Id. at 831. We noted the defendant’s failure to prove
ownership through a title, bill of sale, vehicle registration, or “anything else,” and the
failure to prove lawful possession through evidence that anyone “had granted him
permission to use the vehicle . . . or any other right of any kind to the vehicle.” Id. at 834.
Because the defendant “bore the burden of proof” but “offered no evidence that he had any
such interest,” we affirmed the denial of the suppression motion. Id.
So too here. Under Byrd, an unauthorized driver of a rental car only has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in a car when (1) they possess the rental car and (2) that possession
is “lawful.” 138 S. Ct. at 1531. And here, as in Castellanos, Daniels had the burden of
producing evidence that he had possession and that his possession was lawful. Although
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Daniels’ counsel claimed at the suppression hearing and in his briefs that Baldwin allowed
him to drive the car, Daniels did not introduce any evidence at the suppression hearing to
support that claim—not even a statement of his own to suggest that he had permission.
Counsel’s unsupported claim is not evidence. Because Daniels did not put forward any
evidence that would support his claim that Baldwin let him use the car—or that he
“lawfully” possessed the rental car by other means—he fails to carry his burden that he had
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental car. Thus, his challenge of the search that
led to the discovery of the gun must fail. 4
* * *
In suppression hearings, criminal defendants have the burden of putting forward
evidence to support all elements of their reasonable expectation of privacy. But here,
Daniels did not introduce any evidence to support his lawful possession of the Charger. So
the district court’s judgment is therefore
AFFIRMED.
4 The government presents several alternative arguments that would independently support denying the motion to suppress. But we need not address those arguments here. 6