United States v. Demetrius Burt Catching

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: March 4, 2026
• Docket: 22-5698
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0103n.06

Case Nos. 22-5697/5698

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Mar 04, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiff-Appellee, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN v. ) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY ) DEMETRIUS BURT CATCHING, ) OPINION Defendant-Appellant. ) )

Before: McKEAGUE, LARSEN, and RITZ, Circuit Judges.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. While on federal supervised release, Demetrius Catching was

distributing drugs and laundering the illicit proceeds through gambling transactions. He admitted

to violating the terms of his supervision and pled guilty to two new federal offenses. Finding no

error in the district court’s resulting sentences, we AFFIRM.

I.

In 2011, Demetrius Catching pled guilty to distributing cocaine base. He was sentenced to

60 months’ imprisonment, followed by a four-year term of supervised release.

Not long after he completed his prison term, marijuana and money were found in vehicles

that Catching was either riding in or driving. As a result, the district court revoked Catching’s

supervised release and ordered him to serve an additional prison term. But we later vacated that Nos. 22-5697/5698, United States v. Catching

order, and Catching’s supervised release was reinstated. See United States v. Catching, 786 F.

App’x 535, 543 (6th Cir. 2019).

About a year and a half later, Catching again found himself in potential legal trouble. A

controlled garbage collection at Catching’s residence led to a search of his home, which turned up

about 27 pounds of suspected marijuana packed in large plastic bags, about 4 pounds of suspected

marijuana edibles, a digital scale, a money counter, large denomination money wraps, and cash.

Photos on Catching’s phone indicated that he was engaged in the importation and distribution of

marijuana. And receipts, bank records, and informant interviews revealed that Catching was

laundering the illicit proceeds of his drug trafficking by placing large wagers (sometimes

personally, and sometimes through associates) at several out-of-state casinos.

All that led to new federal charges and triggered a violation of Catching’s supervised

release in his 2011 case. He pled guilty to distributing marijuana and conspiring to commit money

laundering offenses. And he admitted to violating the terms of his supervision.

The district court held a joint sentencing and supervised release revocation hearing.1 It

imposed two within-Guidelines sentences—93 months for the new offenses and 55 months for

violating the terms of his supervised release. And it ordered those sentences to run consecutive to

each other, as well as any term of imprisonment imposed in a separate federal case from the Middle

District of Pennsylvania. Despite being given the opportunity, Catching did not object to the

sentences. And this appeal followed.

1 The transcript for the joint sentencing and revocation hearing is filed in both Case No. 21-cr-46 and Case No. 11-cr-109. For ease, when citing to the transcript, this opinion references only R. 117 in Case No. 21- cr-46. -2- Nos. 22-5697/5698, United States v. Catching

II.

Catching now challenges his sentences on three fronts. He argues that the district court

(1) considered impermissible factors in deciding to revoke his supervised release, (2) failed to

adequately explain why it ran his revocation sentence consecutive to his new sentence, and

(3) imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence for his new offenses.

A.

First, Catching argues that the district court considered impermissible factors in revoking

his supervised release. See United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018) (to fashion

a procedurally reasonable sentence, a district court must “refrain from considering impermissible

factors”). Catching did not object on this basis below, so we review only for plain error. United

States v. Patterson, 158 F.4th 700, 702 (6th Cir. 2025). To make that “difficult” showing, Catching

must point to an error that was plain, that affected his substantial rights, and that seriously affected

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Greer v. United States, 593 U.S.

503, 507–08 (2021) (citation modified).

Catching cannot do so. In determining whether to revoke a defendant’s supervised release,

district courts must consider most of the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e). But some are off limits. A district court, for example, cannot take into account

§ 3553(a)(2)(A): the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s

underlying offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.

Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 195 (2025). Put differently, “district courts cannot consider

the need to exact retribution for the defendant’s original criminal offense when imposing a prison

sentence after revoking a term of supervised release.” United States v. Welch, No. 25-5136, 2026

WL 209787, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2026) (citing Esteras, 606 U.S. at 203) (citation modified).

-3- Nos. 22-5697/5698, United States v. Catching

But even after Esteras, a district court can consider the seriousness of a defendant’s

violation conduct as a breach of trust. See, e.g., Patterson, 158 F.4th at 702-03 & n.2; United States

v. Sims, 161 F.4th 455, 459 (6th Cir. 2025) (recognizing that Esteras “does not prohibit a district

court from considering the seriousness of the supervised-release violation”). And a “court may

consider the nature and circumstances of the [underlying] offense as relevant for the considerations

set forth in §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and (D)—namely, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation”

even if it “cannot consider the nature and circumstances of the offense as relevant to

§ 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive focus.” Esteras, 606 U.S. at 200.

Against that backdrop, Catching asserts the district court erred by considering

§ 3553(a)(2)(A) in revoking his supervision, although the exact scope of his argument is unclear.

See Appellant Br. at 9, 13. No matter how his challenge is construed, however, the district court

did not plainly err.

First, the district court did not plainly err in considering Catching’s new case. To be sure,

the court noted the “serious” nature of his new offenses, but that conduct also triggered a

supervised-release violation. Sent. Tr., R. 117, PageID 475. And “district courts may consider the

seriousness of . . . violation conduct when determining the sanction for the breach of trust

associated with a supervised-release violation.” United States v. Morris, 71 F.4th 475, 482 (6th

Cir. 2023). Esteras did not change that. Patterson, 158 F.4th at 702-03 & n.2. Catching has pointed

to nothing suggesting the district court did anything more than that here.

Nor did the district court plainly err in considering Catching’s prior criminal conduct. True,

the district court alluded to the seriousness of Catching’s 2011 conviction, but it did not indicate

that it intended to punish Catching for that underlying offense. In fact, it offered almost no detail

about that case at all. Instead, throughout the hearing, the district court’s focus was squarely on

-4- Nos. 22-5697/5698, United States v. Catching

how Catching’s past conduct factored into, among other things, his likelihood of recidivism and

the need to provide deterrence—permissible considerations under § 3583(e). See Sent. Tr., R. 117,

PageID 471-77. And although the district court did mention the need to promote respect for the

law and provide just punishment, it did not tie those considerations to the revocation of Catching’s

supervised release “expressly or by unmistakable implication.” Esteras, 606 U.S. at 203. A

“passing reference to the § 3553(a) factors, without more, does not imply—unmistakably or

otherwise—that the district court ‘actually relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A).’” Welch, 2026 WL 209787,

at *3 (quoting Esteras, 606 U.S. at 202-03). In fact, the district court was careful to explain (more

than once) that the sentencing factors considered when revoking supervised release differ from

those considered at initial sentencings. United States v. Allison, No. 24-1824, 2025 U.S. App.

LEXIS 27132, at *11 (6th Cir. Oct. 17, 2025) (order).

With all that in mind, we cannot say that the district clearly or obviously considered

impermissible sentencing factors. Esteras, 606 U.S. at 202-03. But even if we were to conclude

otherwise, the district court did not emphasize impermissible considerations, so we are not

convinced that Catching was prejudiced. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, No. 24-3675, 2025 WL

2306589, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2025). Indeed, Catching offers no argument to the contrary. All

in all, Catching cannot show the district court plainly erred by relying on impermissible factors in

revoking his supervised release.

B.

Next, Catching argues that the district court failed to adequately explain why it ran his

revocation sentence consecutive to the sentence imposed for his new offenses, although he does

not pinpoint how the explanation was lacking. See Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 440 (stating that a court

must “adequately explain why it chose the sentence” for a sentence to be procedurally reasonable).

-5- Nos. 22-5697/5698, United States v. Catching

Catching lodged no objection with the district court as to the adequacy of its explanation, so we

again review only for plain error. United States v. King, 914 F.3d 1021, 1024 (6th Cir. 2019).

In most cases, district courts can choose whether to run sentences concurrently or

consecutively. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). But, in exercising that discretion, they must consider the

§ 3553(a) factors. Id. § 3584(b). That said, because “district courts already look to the § 3553(a)

factors to determine a sentence’s length,” they need not “repeat the § 3553(a) analysis when

deciding to impose a consecutive sentence.” United States v. Brown, 131 F.4th 337, 349 (6th Cir.

2025). Nor must they “state a specific reason for a consecutive sentence.” United States v. Johnson,

640 F.3d 195, 209 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). Instead, we only require a district court to

make “generally clear” its rationale. Id. (citation modified). And a district court “is free to

intertwine its discussion of the length of the defendant’s sentence with its determination that the

terms of imprisonment should run consecutively.” Brown, 131 F.4th at 349 (citation modified);

see King, 914 F.3d at 1026.

Gauged by those standards, the district court here said enough. It engaged in an extensive

analysis of the § 3553(a) factors, and explained that a lesser sentence would “unduly depreciate

the offenses.” Sent. Tr., R. 117, PageID 476. Its decision to run Catching’s sentences consecutive

was made “in conjunction with” and “immediately following” that discussion. Morris, 71 F.4th at

483 (citation modified). True, the district court did not explicitly invoke U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f),

which recommends that the court impose a consecutive sentence upon revocation of supervised

release. See King, 914 F.3d at 1025. But it thoroughly reviewed the § 3553(a) factors, and there is

no indication the district court misunderstood its discretion in running Catching’s sentences

consecutive to each other. See United States v. Miller, No. 23-5270, 2025 WL 459648, at *13-14

(6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 158 (2025). “Where, as here, the court has engaged

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in a lengthy discussion of the sentencing factors in explaining the sentence itself, it is generally

clear that the decision to impose a consecutive sentence is based on the same factors.” United

States v. Murphy, 591 F. App’x 377, 386 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). More to the point,

the district court “made its consecutive-versus-concurrent decision alongside its § 3553(a)

analysis.” Brown, 131 F.4th at 350. As a result, we see no plain error. See, e.g., United States v.

Barnett, No. 25-5355, 2025 WL 3244953, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2025).

But even if the district court’s explanation was lacking, Catching again fails to explain how

that shortcoming affected his sentencing. The “relevant guidelines generally recommend that

district courts impose consecutive sentences for supervised-release violations when,” as is the case

here, “the conduct underlying those violations produced fresh criminal convictions.” United States

v. Hinojosa, 67 F.4th 334, 347 (6th Cir. 2023). Catching recognizes as much in his brief, but he

never asked the district court to impose a concurrent sentence. So, in the end, Catching “received

the sentence advised by the guidelines, and he has not presented any evidence that the court’s

error—if indeed there was one—affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Rutherford, 563

F. App’x 368, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2014). All told, the district court did not plainly err in explaining

Catching’s consecutive sentences.2

C.

Finally, Catching contends that a 93-month prison term for his new crimes is too long—a

substantive reasonableness challenge. A criminal sentence is substantively unreasonable if “the

court placed too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others in sentencing

2 As we read his brief, Catching appears to limit his challenge to the district court’s explanation of why it ran his 93-month sentence consecutive to his 55-month revocation sentence. Indeed, throughout his brief, Catching makes no mention of his federal case from the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Nonetheless, we see no reason why the district court’s explanation on that front would amount to plain error either. -7- Nos. 22-5697/5698, United States v. Catching

the individual.” Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442. But, because sentencing is “a matter of reasoned

discretion, not math,” we review the district court’s weighing of the sentencing factors for abuse

of discretion. Id. (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). And a within-Guidelines

sentence is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389–90 (6th Cir.

2008) (en banc).

The district court sentenced Catching to a within-Guidelines 93-month term of

imprisonment. Nonetheless, Catching argues that the district court should have given more

consideration to his tumultuous upbringing, personal struggle with drug addiction, prior stints of

incarceration, and reduced risk of recidivism. To his mind, those mitigating factors point toward a

sentence at the lower end of the Guidelines range. But the district court found “no correlation

between those issues and the offenses that were committed.” Sent. Tr., R. 117, PageID 481-82.

Catching’s argument for a shorter sentence, then, “ultimately boils down to an assertion

that the district court should have balanced the § 3553(a) factors differently.” United States v.

West, 962 F.3d 183, 191 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation modified). And that is “simply beyond the scope

of our appellate review, which looks to whether the sentence is reasonable, as opposed to whether

in the first instance we would have imposed the same sentence.” Id. (citation modified). Here,

Catching’s within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable.3

III.

For those reasons, we AFFIRM the sentences imposed by the district court.

3 Again, Catching’s challenge on this score appears to be limited to his 93-month sentence. Nonetheless, to the extent he intended to challenge the length of his 55-month revocation sentence, it is substantively reasonable for the same reasons. -8-