United States v. Demario Covington

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: September 22, 2025
• Docket: 24-6277
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-6277

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEMARIO COVINGTON, a/k/a Booger,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. Joseph Dawson, III, District Judge. (4:11-cr-00417-JD-1)

Submitted: September 16, 2025 Decided: September 22, 2025

Before AGEE, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Demario Covington, Appellant Pro Se. Everett E. McMillian, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Demario Covington appeals the district court’s order denying his second motion for

compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In support of his motion,

Covington contended that a purported “gross disparity between his sentence and the

sentence he would receive if sentenced today”; “family circumstances”; the “increase[d]

. . . severity of his sentence” in light of the COVID-19 pandemic; and “his outstanding

accomplishments while incarcerated and his robust reentry plan” constituted extraordinary

and compelling circumstances warranting his release. The district court addressed several

of Covington’s arguments related to his allegedly disparate sentence and denied the motion.

For the reasons that follow, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for further

proceedings.

Under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a district court may reduce a defendant’s term of

imprisonment if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” “In

analyzing a motion for compassionate release, district courts must determine: (1) whether

extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant . . . a reduction; and (2) that such a reduction

is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”

United States v. Malone, 57 F.4th 167, 173 (4th Cir. 2023). “Only after this analysis may

the district court grant the motion if (3) the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, to the

extent they are applicable, favor release.” Id.

We review a district court’s ruling on a compassionate release motion for abuse of

discretion. Id. at 172. “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or

irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of

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discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.”

United States v. Hargrove, 30 F.4th 189, 195 (4th Cir. 2022) (citation modified).

Additionally, while there is no “categorical . . . requirement” that a district court explicitly

address a movant’s arguments or elucidate its reasoning, the court errs if, in light of the

particular circumstances of the case, its explanation is “[in]adequate to allow for

meaningful appellate review.” United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 187-89 (4th Cir 2021);

see Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 116 (2018) (“Just how much of an

explanation [is] require[d] . . . depends . . . upon the circumstances of the particular case.”).

At bottom, the court “must set forth enough to satisfy [this] court that it has considered the

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking

authority.” High, 997 F.3d at 190 (citation modified).

Here, the district court’s text order relied heavily on a prior August 2021 order

denying Covington’s first compassionate release motion. But Covington’s second motion

relied on different extraordinary and compelling circumstances, several of which the

district court failed to address.* The court’s order also did not mention the amended version

of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13, p.s., which became effective on

* We have previously found it “significant” when the same district judge sentences a defendant and then subsequently denies compassionate release. See Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 200. This is so because where the sentencing judge also decides a defendant’s § 3582(c)(1) motion, “[he] is presumed to have known of [the defendant’s] circumstances—both favorable and unfavorable—and to have considered the totality of the record when ruling on [the] motion for compassionate release.” United States v. Centeno- Morales, 90 F.4th 274, 281 (4th Cir. 2024). Here, the district judge who denied the instant motion was not the judge who sentenced Covington and denied his first compassionate release motion.

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November 1, 2023, and thus was applicable when the court ruled on Covington’s second

motion in March 2024. See United States v. Crawley, 140 F.4th 165, 170 (4th Cir. 2025).

“Even if a district court abuses its discretion in assessing whether the defendant

presents extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, this Court may still affirm if the

district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors was sound.” United States v. Davis,

99 F.4th 647, 659 (4th Cir. 2024). Here, however, the court’s order did not address its

weighing of the § 3553(a) factors beyond observing that the sentencing judge found that

the factors did not warrant a sentence reduction in August 2021. Accordingly, we can only

speculate as to whether the court adequately and reasonably considered Covington’s

arguments and properly applied the governing law when denying Covington’s second

motion for compassionate release. Thus, although we express no views as to the merits of

Covington’s motion, we conclude that we are unable to meaningfully review the court’s

order. See High, 997 F.3d at 189.

We therefore vacate the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

VACATED AND REMANDED