United States v. Dawdy

17 M.J. 523
CourtU S Air Force Court of Military Review
DecidedOctober 27, 1983
DocketACM S26060
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 17 M.J. 523 (United States v. Dawdy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U S Air Force Court of Military Review primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Dawdy, 17 M.J. 523 (usafctmilrev 1983).

Opinion

DECISION

KASTL, Senior Judge:

Important signals for military judges and trial and defense counsel arise in this case. Here, the accused claims that the military judge erred in denying a defense challenge for cause against Lieutenant Colonel Delaney, the court president.1 On the particular facts, we disagree; however, we pause to sound a note of caution in this general area.

At trial, the precise defense challenge against Colonel Delaney centered on three areas: (a) his neutrality as a juror; (b) his disposition on sentencing; and (c) his views as to the weight to be accorded testimony of Office of Special Investigations (OSI) personnel. The relevant questioning at trial pertaining to each category follows.

Neutrality as a juror. During preliminary voir dire, this colloquy occurred between the military judge and Colonel Delaney:

MJ: Is any member of the court aware of any other matter which he or she believes might be grounds for challenge by either side against you?
[524]*524MEM: (Colonel Delaney was shaking his head affirmatively)
MJ: Colonel Delaney?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): Yes, Your Honor.
MJ: Very well. I think I’ll allow counsel to go into their voir dire of the court then we’ll have an individual voir dire of you, sir.
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[After the members had departed, during individual voir dire]:

MJ: The members have withdrawn from the courtroom. I believe you said that you had some knowledge of the case?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): No, sir. Your Honor, I did not say knowledge of the case.
MJ: Very well. What do you think might disqualify you?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): I’ve been a narcotics investigator for a long time now in the OSI.
MJ: You think that could so slant your viewpoint of this case and this accused that you could not sit impartially and evaluate what would be an appropriate sentence?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): I don’t know if my viewpoint would be the same as the other members of the court, Your Hon- or.
* * * * * *
MJ: How long has it been since you served as a narcotics investigator, Colonel?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): Three years.
* * * * *
MJ: For how long did you serve as a narcotics investigator?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): On and off,' ten or twelve years.
MJ: So it would have been a fairly substantial portion of your career that you spent in the OSI?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): That’s correct.
MJ: I assume you did a number of drug investigations?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): A large number.

Disposition on sentencing. Four general matters can be found under this umbrella. First, Colonel Delaney was asked if he would agree that the government could save time, money, and effort when an accused pleaded guilty. He responded, “I’d say it’s possible.” (R. 31). Second, after some initial hesitation, Colonel Delaney readily accepted the judge’s guidance that a guilty plea was properly a matter to be considered in mitigation. Third, Colonel Delaney stated that he could not consider imposing “no punishment” in the case. Fourth, concerning whether the president had a presumption as to the appropriate type of punishment, the following occurred:

MJ: Well, at this point, do you feel that any particular form of punishment would be mandatory, and are you unalterable in that position?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): Negative. I do not feel that any type punishment is unauthorized.
MJ: So, do you think you could consider at this point not confining this accused? I’m not saying that that would be the end result, but you could consider it?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): I could consider it.
MJ: Could you consider not imposing a punitive discharge?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): I could consider it.
* * * * * *
DC: Now, you said you had some preconceived ideas about the type of punishment that was appropriate in this case. Would you please tell me what your preconceived idea is?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): Not in terms of the type of punishment. In looking at the specifications, I would have a preconceived idea of what in fact happened.
DC: But my question was, do you have any preconceived ideas about the type of punishment that might be appropriate?
[525]*525MEM: (Colonel Delaney): No, no, not really.
******
DC: Based on offenses of this general nature, do you feel that a bad conduct discharge would be appropriate, without knowing anything further?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): No.

Weight to be accorded OSI investigator testimony. As to this matter, the following data is relevant:

DC: There is probably going to be at least one, maybe two witnesses who are closely involved with the OSI. Would you tend to give their testimony more credibility than you would other witnesses?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): I would.
******
MJ: Colonel Delaney, you said you would probably be inclined to believe OSI agents as opposed to possible other witnesses. Would that be because they are trained as observers and trained as investigators?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): Yes.
MJ: Would there be other reasons why you would tend to believe them?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): Certainly, Your Honor.
MJ: What are they?
MEM: (Colonel Delaney): Personal experience and belief in them.

The Harris Issue

At the outset, we note that this accused ultimately exercised his peremptory challenge against Colonel Delaney. That precludes any possibility of prejudice — accordingly, we find that the accused was sentenced by a fair, impartial court-martial. United States v. Harris, 13 M.J. 288 (C.M.A.1982).

The Harris decision, with separate opinions by the three judges of the Court of Military Appeals, reveals the numerous legal landmines in the area. Moreover, the dissent of Chief Judge Everett cogently states the dilemma in forcing the defense to use its one peremptory challenge when a challenge for cause ought to have been granted.2

Whatever the philosophical reservations about the “forced use” of the peremptory challenge, Harris is governing.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
17 M.J. 523, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-dawdy-usafctmilrev-1983.