United States v. David Walsh

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedOctober 27, 1993
Docket93-1083
StatusPublished

This text of United States v. David Walsh (United States v. David Walsh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. David Walsh, (1st Cir. 1993).

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


United States Court of Appeals
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
For the First Circuit
____________________

No. 93-1083

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellant,

v.

DAVID WALSH,

Defendant, Appellee.
____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________

No. 93-1328

IN RE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner.
____________________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
____________________

Before

Stahl, Circuit Judge,
_____________
Aldrich and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges.
_____________________
____________________

Ira Belkin, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Margaret
__________ ________
E. Curran, Assistant United States Attorney, and Lincoln C. Almond,
__________ _________________
United States Attorney, were on brief for appellant.
Susan M. Carlin with whom Stephen R. Famiglietti and Famiglietti
_______________ _______________________ ___________
& Carlin, Ltd. were on brief for appellee.
______________
____________________

October 27, 1993
____________________

ALDRICH, Senior Circuit Judge. This case presents,
____________________

in the words of the district court, an issue of "very first

impression under the guidelines." We believe the court

correct as to uniqueness, but we would not limit this

description to the guidelines. Having initiated the vacation

of a negotiated plea at the time of sentencing, the court

nevertheless left defendant with the benefit of his bargain,

viz., free from all related charges, an immunity the

government had granted as consideration for the plea. We

concur in the government's unhappiness at this one way

street.

Defendant, an officer of a mortgage company,

allegedly endorsed a sizeable check so as to enable the

company to receive its proceeds instead of paying off a

customer's mortgage. The government investigated the

possibility of mail fraud and other felonies, but, before

seeking an indictment, discussed the matter with defendant's

counsel. In due course a plea agreement in customary form

was worked out and executed. Basically, defendant consented

to an information charging aiding and abetting bank fraud

being filed to which he would plead guilty, and waived any

right to withdraw his plea, once entered; the government, in

return, would recommend a low sentence, and would not

institute any additional charges for defendant's "previously

disclosed criminal conduct at Medcon Mortgage Corp." In due

-2-

course, after a comprehensive examination of defendant (16

pages of transcript that presented no problems), the court

accepted the plea. Sentencing was twice deferred. When the

time came, the court announced that it had read the pre-

sentence report, and that on defendant's interpretation of

the facts he was not guilty, and it would vacate the plea.

The government protested, saying that its interpretation

differed, but the court was adamant. It is common ground

that there was no bad faith in connection with the plea

agreement, or any defect or deficiency in the acceptance of

the plea. Defendant, however, accepted the court's

suggestion and moved to vacate his plea. The court did so.

Whether this was unique -- we will not question the

court's right to vacate a plea -- the procedure and outcome

were entirely so. Upon the government's stating that on the

vacation of the plea it would not be prepared for trial on

the information, and that it wanted to go back to square one

and consider presenting the other matters to a grand jury,

the court responded that this would not be fair to the

defendant. It concluded by ordering the information

-3-

dismissed with prejudice.1 The government appeals, and, as

a precaution, also seeks mandamus.

The court opened the hearing saying that it

understood the government did not want to stay "in the

position where you end, but advancing that position somewhat

in terms of possibly making more charges against the

defendant." The government replied that if the defendant's

undertaking was off, so should be the government's. The

court, evidently troubled,2 responded that because of what

it, the court, had done, the defendant may be facing other

charges "in spite of the government's prior agreement with

him." To the government's statement,

All we're asking is that the Court allow
the government to go back to the position
it was in before it filed the information
in reliance upon the agreement.

the court said,

The government made a bargain. The
defendant made a bargain. They're going
to carry it out.

On analysis "they" meant the government.

____________________

1. We note in passing that the government at one point said
it would move to dismiss with prejudice, but on timely
recognizing that this would be a procedural -- and
substantive -- mistake, did not do so, but sought dismissal
without prejudice.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
United States v. David Walsh, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-david-walsh-ca1-1993.