United States v. David Walsh
This text of United States v. David Walsh (United States v. David Walsh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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United States v. David Walsh, (1st Cir. 1993).
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
For the First Circuit
____________________
No. 93-1083
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
DAVID WALSH,
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________
No. 93-1328
IN RE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner.
____________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
____________________
Before
Stahl, Circuit Judge,
_____________
Aldrich and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges.
_____________________
____________________
Ira Belkin, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Margaret
__________ ________
E. Curran, Assistant United States Attorney, and Lincoln C. Almond,
__________ _________________
United States Attorney, were on brief for appellant.
Susan M. Carlin with whom Stephen R. Famiglietti and Famiglietti
_______________ _______________________ ___________
& Carlin, Ltd. were on brief for appellee.
______________
____________________
October 27, 1993
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ALDRICH, Senior Circuit Judge. This case presents,
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in the words of the district court, an issue of "very first
impression under the guidelines." We believe the court
correct as to uniqueness, but we would not limit this
description to the guidelines. Having initiated the vacation
of a negotiated plea at the time of sentencing, the court
nevertheless left defendant with the benefit of his bargain,
viz., free from all related charges, an immunity the
government had granted as consideration for the plea. We
concur in the government's unhappiness at this one way
street.
Defendant, an officer of a mortgage company,
allegedly endorsed a sizeable check so as to enable the
company to receive its proceeds instead of paying off a
customer's mortgage. The government investigated the
possibility of mail fraud and other felonies, but, before
seeking an indictment, discussed the matter with defendant's
counsel. In due course a plea agreement in customary form
was worked out and executed. Basically, defendant consented
to an information charging aiding and abetting bank fraud
being filed to which he would plead guilty, and waived any
right to withdraw his plea, once entered; the government, in
return, would recommend a low sentence, and would not
institute any additional charges for defendant's "previously
disclosed criminal conduct at Medcon Mortgage Corp." In due
-2-
course, after a comprehensive examination of defendant (16
pages of transcript that presented no problems), the court
accepted the plea. Sentencing was twice deferred. When the
time came, the court announced that it had read the pre-
sentence report, and that on defendant's interpretation of
the facts he was not guilty, and it would vacate the plea.
The government protested, saying that its interpretation
differed, but the court was adamant. It is common ground
that there was no bad faith in connection with the plea
agreement, or any defect or deficiency in the acceptance of
the plea. Defendant, however, accepted the court's
suggestion and moved to vacate his plea. The court did so.
Whether this was unique -- we will not question the
court's right to vacate a plea -- the procedure and outcome
were entirely so. Upon the government's stating that on the
vacation of the plea it would not be prepared for trial on
the information, and that it wanted to go back to square one
and consider presenting the other matters to a grand jury,
the court responded that this would not be fair to the
defendant. It concluded by ordering the information
-3-
dismissed with prejudice.1 The government appeals, and, as
a precaution, also seeks mandamus.
The court opened the hearing saying that it
understood the government did not want to stay "in the
position where you end, but advancing that position somewhat
in terms of possibly making more charges against the
defendant." The government replied that if the defendant's
undertaking was off, so should be the government's. The
court, evidently troubled,2 responded that because of what
it, the court, had done, the defendant may be facing other
charges "in spite of the government's prior agreement with
him." To the government's statement,
All we're asking is that the Court allow
the government to go back to the position
it was in before it filed the information
in reliance upon the agreement.
the court said,
The government made a bargain. The
defendant made a bargain. They're going
to carry it out.
On analysis "they" meant the government.
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1. We note in passing that the government at one point said
it would move to dismiss with prejudice, but on timely
recognizing that this would be a procedural -- and
substantive -- mistake, did not do so, but sought dismissal
without prejudice.
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