NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0332n.06
No. 26-3075 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Jul 23, 2026 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF DAVID S. TROUTMAN, ) OHIO Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION )
Before: CLAY, MURPHY, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
BLOOMEKATZ, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which CLAY, J., concurred. MURPHY, J. (pp. 12–25), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. David Troutman appeals the district court’s imposition of
three conditions of his upcoming supervised release. Because he is about to be released from
incarceration and will be subject to these terms, we expedited this matter. After reviewing the
record, we agree with Troutman that the district court abused its discretion by ordering these
special conditions without explaining its reasons on the record. Indeed, the government makes
scant attempt to defend the procedural reasonableness of the district court’s decision as to these
conditions. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order of the challenged special conditions
and remand to the district court.
BACKGROUND
Troutman challenges the conditions of supervised release attached to his most recent
sentence. But recounting some of his prior convictions and sentences is necessary to understand No. 26-3075, United States v. Troutman
the parties’ arguments here. So we describe just some of his extensive criminal history before
explaining his sentence in the instant matter. None of the relevant facts are disputed.
2018 Sentence. In 2018, Troutman pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. See 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). As part of his plea agreement, Troutman waived the right to appeal his
conviction or sentence, except in circumstances not relevant here.
For this crime, the district court sentenced Troutman to 55 months’ incarceration followed
by a three-year term of supervised release. Troutman’s lengthy criminal history contributed to his
Guidelines range, which the district court relied on in fashioning Troutman’s sentence. Troutman
had multiple prior convictions related to drugs and theft. Indeed, Troutman recognizes that he has
a history of drug and alcohol abuse. As the presentence report described, Troutman was also
convicted for sexual battery thirteen years ago, stemming from a horrific crime where Troutman
choked his then-girlfriend with his penis. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03(A)(1).
Following probation’s sentencing recommendations, the district court imposed several
special conditions of supervised release when sentencing Troutman for the felon-in-possession
conviction. Three are critical in this case. First, the district court ordered Troutman to participate
in a sex offender assessment. Second, it required Troutman to submit to periodic polygraph
examinations. And third, it said that Troutman must participate in sex-offense specific treatment
as directed by the probation office. The full text of these three conditions the district court imposed
in 2018 read:
Sex Offender – The defendant must participate in a sex offense specific assessment. Polygraph Examination – The defendant must submit to periodic polygraph testing at the discretion of the probation officer as a means to ensure that defendant is in compliance with the requirements of supervision or treatment program.
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Sex Offender Assessment – The defendant must participate in a sex offense-specific treatment and follow the rules and regulations of that program. The probation officer will supervise participation in the program (provider, location, modality, duration, intensity, etc.)1
2018 Judgment, R. 25, PageID 117. For ease of reference, we refer to these three special conditions
as the “sex-offender conditions.” Troutman did not object to the sex-offender conditions as part of
his 2018 sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon.
After Troutman served his 55-month term of incarceration, he was released in April 2023
and began his three-year term of supervised release subject to these conditions and others.
Troutman violated his supervised release, which brings us to this case.
2026 Sentence. Troutman violated the terms of his supervised release in fall 2025. Prior to
that, he had complied with the terms of his release, including the sex-offender conditions. As
Troutman’s probation officer noted, Troutman completed his sex offender assessment in June
2023, shortly after his release from prison. Based on his assessment, he was not recommended for
sex offender treatment. Troutman did attend mental health and substance abuse counseling.
Although he was initially compliant with the terms of his release, in October 2025
Troutman assaulted his girlfriend. As detailed in a police report, Troutman became angry while
intoxicated and shoved his fingers down her throat, causing her to cough up blood. The domestic
violence charges against him from this incident were dismissed because Troutman’s girlfriend
would not cooperate with the prosecution. While probation’s violation report relied on this
1 Confusing to us, the third condition here is titled “Sex Offender Assessment” when the first condition requires the assessment and this third condition requires treatment. Additionally, we note that although this third condition requires treatment, the treatment seems predicated on the assessment, so treatment is not necessarily mandated by this condition. Indeed, given his assessment, it appears as though probation has not required Troutman to participate in any sex- offense treatment.
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incident, Troutman also admitted to a separate “altercation[]” with the same girlfriend. Revocation
Hr’g Tr., R. 50, PageID 226. There, the police report states that he pushed her to the ground,
grabbed her mouth, and lightly bruised her neck.
At the revocation hearing, beyond arguing that Troutman should not be reincarcerated,
Troutman’s counsel directly addressed the sex-offender conditions. Initially, she expressed her
view that the district court should not have imposed the sex-offender conditions in the 2018
sentencing because they were not related to the felon-in-possession charge. At the end of the
hearing, she objected to the reimposition of the sex-offender conditions as part of the revocation
sentence too.
The government did not address the sex-offender conditions explicitly, but did “point out”
that Troutman had “a prior sexual battery conviction” for “gagg[ing] a woman with his penis,” and
then violated supervised release by “sticking his hands down a woman’s throat.” Id. at PageID
223–24. Because of this “consistent type of conduct,” the government argued that Troutman
needed to “serve some time in prison, and then continue on his anger management because there’s
clearly some issues there he needs to work out.” Id. at PageID 224.
The probation officer did not address the sex-offender conditions at the hearing. Instead,
the officer recommended an “alcohol condition” prohibiting possession and use of alcohol, given
that “increased drinking” was an underlying cause of the domestic violence. Id. The officer did not
otherwise weigh in on Troutman’s sentence.
The district court calculated the Guidelines sentencing range as eight to fourteen months,
and varied downward, sentencing Troutman to six months’ imprisonment, to be followed by one
year of supervision “with the same conditions” as the 2018 sentence, plus the alcohol condition.
Id. at PageID 228. The district court never directly explained why it believed the sex-offender
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conditions were justified. In its colloquy with Troutman, the district court told him, “You’ve got
sex offenses in the past.” Id. at PageID 226. It further emphasized that Troutman took “advantage
of a weak and vulnerable person,” and that the court had “a responsibility to her, . . . that’s she’s
protected.” Id. at PageID 226–27. When Troutman’s counsel objected to the reimposition of the
sex-offender conditions at the end of the hearing, the court responded that it would “take a look at
that,” and then adjourned the hearing. Id. at PageID 228. The written order that followed ordered
a year of supervised release on the revocation, including the sex-offender conditions.
Troutman filed a timely appeal of the district court’s imposition of the sex-offender
conditions as part of his revocation sentence.
ANALYSIS
Troutman challenges the district court’s reimposition of the sex-offender conditions.
Specifically, he argues that the district court’s imposition of these conditions as part of his
revocation sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not adequately
explain its reasoning on the record. See United States v. Widmer, 785 F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 2015).
We review this challenge for abuse of discretion.2 United States v. Barcus, 892 F.3d 228, 235 (6th
Cir. 2018). But even under this deferential standard of review, we agree with Troutman. Our
review of the record reveals that the district court abused its discretion by failing to explain how
the sex-offender conditions reasonably furthered the purposes of sentencing.
The district court has broad discretion to impose special conditions of supervised release,
as long as the conditions further the purposes of sentencing and are not more restrictive than
2 The government contends we should review for plain error, since Troutman did not object to these conditions in his original 2018 sentencing hearing. For reasons we discuss below, however, this misses the mark. Troutman does not now object to the imposition of those charges in 2018. Rather, he objects to their reimposition in 2026. Because he did object in 2026, abuse of discretion review is proper.
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necessary to do so. As the supervised release statute establishes, these conditions must satisfy three
inquiries. United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1997). First, they must be “reasonably
related” to specified sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, including the “nature and
circumstances of the offense” and the “history and characteristics of the defendant.” Id.
§§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a)(1). Second, the conditions cannot mandate a “greater deprivation of liberty
than is reasonably necessary” to deter future criminal conduct, protect the public, and rehabilitate
the defendant. Id. § 3583(d)(2). Third, they must be “consistent” with the Sentencing
Commission’s relevant policy statements. Id. § 3583(d)(3).
As with all sentences, in addition to satisfying the statutory criteria, the district court must
also explain its reasoning. It must “state in open court . . . its rationale for mandating special
conditions of supervised release.” United States v. Childress, 874 F.3d 523, 526 (6th Cir. 2017);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, the district court’s
explanation must “be sufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Solano-
Rosales, 781 F.3d 345, 351 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation modified); see also United States v. Zobel,
696 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2012). While the district court enjoys discretion in how fulsome its
explanation ought to be, that explanation still must assure us that the court “considered the parties’
arguments.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). To determine whether the district
court has satisfied this standard, we look at the court’s analysis in the transcript of the sentencing
hearing. See United States v. Doyle, 711 F.3d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 2013).
Our review of the sentencing transcript from the revocation hearing reveals that the district
court did not directly provide reasons for reimposing the sex-offender conditions, let alone
sufficiently explain why it viewed these conditions as reasonably related to the purposes of
sentencing and not unduly restrictive. The district never explicitly addressed its decision to impose
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the sex-offender conditions, except to state that it would “look at that” later. Revocation Hr’g Tr.,
R. 50, PageID 228. This non-response is not only confusing, but it also violates the requirement
that the district court’s rationale for imposing special conditions be given “in open court.”
Childress, 874 F.3d at 526.
True, the court need not respond to each defense objection and argument if we can discern
its rationale from its reasons for imposing a term of incarceration. United States v. Matthews, 155
F.4th 845, 854–55 (6th Cir. 2025). But we have combed the transcript, and the district court did
not give us enough explanation at any point during the hearing.
The district court addressed harm that is sexual in nature at only one point. It confronted
Troutman by saying, “You’ve got sex offenses in the past.” Revocation Hr’g Tr., R. 50, PageID
226. It is unclear why the district court referred to “sex offenses” in the plural—there is only one
sex offense in the record.3 But even assuming the district court did not misperceive the record—
and just inadvertently misspoke—it is still unclear that the court thought this singular sex offense
from thirteen years before necessitated the sex-offense conditions it imposed. Especially given that
Troutman had already completed the “sex offense specific assessment,” and probation had
determined that he did not need treatment, we are not persuaded that the court’s one reference to
the thirteen-year-old offense reflects its justification for reimposing the sex-offense conditions. Cf.
United States v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that a seventeen-year-old sex
offense conviction did not justify imposing special sex-offender conditions); United States v.
Thomas, 212 F. App’x 483, 488 (6th Cir. 2007) (similar).
3 While Troutman also has a conviction for failing to register as a sex offender, this crime does not itself qualify as a sex offense. Barcus, 892 F.3d at 236.
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The district court, in explaining its revocation sentence generally, also stated that it was
concerned with protecting Troutman’s girlfriend. After it criticized Troutman for taking
“advantage of a weak and vulnerable person,” the court explained that it had “a responsibility to
her, too, that she’s protected.” Revocation Hr’g Tr., R. 50, PageID 226–27. It also expressed
concern that, if drunk, he could get angry and hurt her again. But, as the government admits, this
abuse “was not sexual.” Appellee Br. at 16. The court’s analysis demonstrates that Troutman has
an extensive criminal history and that, based on his history, the court was appropriately concerned
about protecting Troutman’s girlfriend and the public. But such a generalized concern does not
mean that any and all special conditions of supervised release are justified. It explains the alcohol
condition, anger management treatment, and others, but not the conditions Troutman asks us to
review.
Even together, the district court’s single reference to the thirteen-year-old sexual battery
and its general concern for protecting Troutman’s girlfriend is not sufficient reasoning to allow for
“meaningful appellate review” of its decision to reimpose the sex-offender conditions. Zobel, 696
F.3d at 566 (citation omitted). Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by failing to put
its reasons for reimposing the sex-offender conditions on the record “in open court.” Childress,
874 F.3d at 526.4
We are not persuaded by the government’s counterarguments. It advances three arguments
in support of affirming, but they are all nonresponsive. None addresses the procedural
reasonableness of the district court’s reimposition of the sex-offender conditions.
4 Troutman also disputes the substantive reasonableness of the sex-offender conditions that the district court imposed on his 2026 sentence. Because we remand this case based on his procedural reasonableness challenge, we need not reach the question of substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Gates, 48 F.4th 463, 472 (6th Cir. 2022).
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First, the government argues that Troutman’s challenge is procedurally improper. It
contends that Troutman cannot challenge the special conditions of supervised release that the
district court imposed at his “original sentencing hearing” during his revocation hearing. Appellee
Br. at 10. As the government correctly explains, we have “consistently held” that a defendant may
not attack the terms of their supervised release during the hearing, or appeal, about violating those
conditions. United States v. Hall, 735 F. App’x 188, 191 (6th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases). That
rule means Troutman cannot attack the terms of supervised release that the district court imposed
on his 2018 felon-in-possession conviction now that he has admittedly violated those terms.
The fatal flaw in the government’s argument is that Troutman is not appealing the terms of
supervised release imposed at his original sentencing hearing in 2018. Instead, Troutman appeals
the new sentence that the district court imposed in 2026. Irrespective of whether the conditions
were proper in 2018, Troutman argues that the district court’s reimposition of the sex-offender
conditions as part of his new sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release is
procedurally unreasonable. Yes, it’s a bit confusing. But, as the government is well aware,
Troutman is allowed to appeal his revocation sentence, including the attendant conditions of
supervised release. See United States v. Lowenstein, 108 F.3d 80, 81–86 (6th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Kelly, 630 F. App’x 416, 418–22 (6th Cir. 2015). The government makes no argument
that, just because conditions of supervised release attached to the original sentence, a defendant is
forever barred from challenging them in the future if the district court reincorporates the same
conditions into a separate revocation sentence. That argument would raise a host of statutory and
due process concerns, so it is unsurprising that the government does not contend that Troutman
cannot challenge his new revocation sentence now. It instead misconstrues his appeal as being to
his original sentence, which is likewise unavailing.
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Second, the government argues that Troutman waived his right to challenge the sex-
offender conditions in his plea agreement. But this argument suffers from the same flaw as the
first: The government mischaracterizes the scope of Troutman’s appeal. Again, there are two
sentences at issue: (1) the 2018 felon-in-possession sentence and (2) the 2026 revocation sentence.
Troutman appeals only the later sentence here. Just because Troutman waived his right to challenge
the former, does not mean he waived his right to challenge the latter. The government does not
argue as much, and nothing in the plea agreement suggests as much. Thus, like the government’s
procedural argument, this waiver argument is inapt.
Third, the government argues that the district court’s imposition of the sex-offender
conditions in 2018 was procedurally and substantively reasonable. Because Troutman’s counsel
did not object to these conditions “when he was originally sentenced,” the government requests
plain error review. Appellee Br. at 14. And it argues repeatedly that there was no plain error in
imposing the sex-offender conditions because Troutman’s sexual battery convict was only “four
years” old. Id. at 2, 10, 13, 16, 18, 19. This argument too misses the mark for the same reason as
the government’s other two counterarguments. As explained, Troutman does not argue that the
original sentence was unreasonable. He argues that his 2026 sentence was unreasonable, and (over
his objection) the court imposed that sentence thirteen years after his sexual battery, not four.
The government defends the reasonableness of Troutman’s 2026 sentence with a single
passing sentence. It argues that Troutman’s “history and characteristics” not only justified the sex-
offender conditions in 2018, but also “justified the continuation of sex-offender special conditions
for his continued supervised release period.” Appellee Br. at 17. This defense of the district court’s
2026 sentence is so meager that it is difficult to ascertain whether the government even disagrees
with Troutman that the district court’s explanation was insufficient.
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The government never addresses Troutman’s argument that the district court procedurally
erred by failing to explain its basis for the sexual-offense conditions in the revocation sentence. It
does not direct our attention to anything in the revocation hearing transcript where, in its view, the
district court explained the basis for these conditions. Instead, it argues that these conditions were
“reasonably related” to Troutman’s history and conditions. Appellee Br. at 16. But this argument
seeks to justify the substantive reasonableness of Troutman’s sentence, not its procedural
reasonableness. See Carter, 463 F.3d at 528–29.
To the extent the government implies that the district court’s procedural error was harmless
because the reasons for the sex-offender conditions are “evident on the overall record” and related
to rehabilitation and public safety, United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828, 836 (6th Cir. 2001),
we reject that contention, too. While we have occasionally affirmed special conditions “on a silent
record,” we have only done so where the reasons for those conditions were “clear.” United States v.
Widmer, 511 F. App’x 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2013). For the reasons described above, the record is not
so “obvious” as to excuse the district court’s error. United States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 554, 599 (6th
Cir. 2015).
CONCLUSION
We vacate the sex-offender conditions that the district court added to Troutman’s
supervised release and remand to the district court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
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MURPHY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. David Troutman has followed a dangerous pattern
of getting drunk and abusing his girlfriends. In July 2013, an “intoxicated and upset” Troutman
believed that his girlfriend “was cheating on him” and violently forced her to perform oral sex
until he was “satisfied that he choked her with his penis.” Rep., R.22, PageID 89. Then, while on
supervised release for a federal gun crime in October 2025, Troutman (who had been “drinking”)
“accused” his current girlfriend “of cheating” and “shove[d] his fingers down” her “throat” so
aggressively that she began “coughing up blood[.]” Rep., R.42, PageID 189. This fresh round of
violence led the district court to revoke Troutman’s supervised release. When previously
sentencing Troutman for the gun crime, the court had imposed special supervised-release
conditions related to his prior sexual battery. It chose to reimpose these conditions for Troutman’s
revocation sentence. He now calls that choice both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
Given the new acts of domestic violence, though, the record leaves no doubt in my mind why the
court imposed these conditions again. Unlike my colleagues, then, I do not view its sentence as
procedurally unreasonable. Nor do I find the conditions substantively unreasonable because they
reasonably relate to his proclivity to commit domestic violence. And because my colleagues do
not reach Troutman’s substantive challenge, the district court is free to reach the same conclusion
on remand. Because I think it has already said enough, however, I respectfully dissent.
I
On November 2, 2017, police officers in Akron, Ohio, stopped a pickup truck for a cracked
windshield. Troutman, a passenger in the truck, held a backpack on his lap when the officers
approached. After he exited the vehicle, the officers spotted a syringe and a baggie with a small
amount of white powder on the floor of his seat. The powder turned out to be methamphetamine.
Officers searched the truck and discovered a sawed-off shotgun concealed in a coat behind a seat.
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They also found three shotgun shells and more methamphetamine in Troutman’s backpack. He
admitted that he had put the shotgun and shells where the officers had found them.
At this time, Troutman also had warrants out for his arrest because he had violated the
requirements of his sex-offender designation. He incurred this designation four years earlier in
July 2013 when he violently assaulted a prior girlfriend. According to his presentence report,
Troutman (while “intoxicated and upset”) kicked on the door of this girlfriend’s home until she let
him in around 4:00 or 5:00 a.m. Rep., R.22, PageID 89. He hit and choked this woman and
“slammed her head against the wall” because she refused to disclose her phone’s password so he
could investigate whether she had cheated on him. Id. He next forced her to the ground and
demanded that she perform oral sex. She refused, pointing out that he had awakened their two-
year-old son who “was right there.” Id. But Troutman repeated his demand anyway. Ultimately,
he forcibly required her to perform oral sex until he was “satisfied that he choked her with his
penis.” Id. After she still refused to disclose her phone’s password, he threatened to “snap the
necks” of their young children and tore up the home. Id. Although charged with rape, Troutman
pleaded guilty to sexual battery in an Ohio court. He received a one-year prison sentence and was
designated a Tier III sex offender. Following his prison time, Troutman repeatedly violated the
terms of his release. Among other things, he committed many new drug and theft offenses.
During the stop in November 2017, then, the police arrested Troutman not just for his
illegal drug and firearm possession but also for his failure to verify his address as required by his
sex-offender designation. A fresh slate of state and federal convictions followed. A state court
convicted Troutman of the failure-to-verify offense. It sentenced him to 18 months in prison.
While those state proceedings progressed, the federal government charged Troutman with
various crimes. Troutman entered a plea agreement. He agreed to plead guilty to one count of
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illegally possessing a firearm as a felon. The government agreed to dismiss the other two counts.
And both parties agreed to recommend a within-guidelines sentence.
At sentencing, the district court calculated Troutman’s guidelines range as 51 to 63 months’
imprisonment. The court imposed a sentence of 55 months’ imprisonment followed by three years
of supervised release. Without objection from Troutman, it also imposed several special
supervised-release conditions. Given Troutman’s previous sex offense, the court required him to
undergo a “sex offender assessment protocol,” submit to a “polygraph examination” on a periodic
basis, and participate in a “cognitive behavioral treatment program[.]” Sentencing Tr., R.53,
PageID 242. The judgment listed a “sex offense specific assessment” and “sex offense-specific
treatment” as part of these supervised-release conditions. Am. Judgment, R.27, PageID 128.
Troutman left prison to start his three-year term of supervised release in April 2023. The
first two and a half years went by without incident. He never tested positive for drug use. He
worked as a tattoo artist and hoped to save enough money to start his own shop. And he completed
a sex-offender assessment. The evaluators did not recommend him for any sex-offender treatment.
Troutman also sat for various polygraph examinations. Although one examiner found that he had
acted with deception, his probation officer noted that the deception concerned conduct (contact
with minors) that was unrelated to his “risk factors.” Rep., R.42, PageID 190.
In October 2025, though, Troutman again found himself in trouble for domestic violence.
According to a police report, his girlfriend said that the couple had both been drinking when “out
of nowhere Troutman accused her of cheating.” Id., PageID 189. Troutman violently “shove[d]
his fingers down” his girlfriend’s “throat,” and she began “coughing up blood[.]” Id. His girlfriend
screamed in the hope that neighbors would call the police. Id. A responding officer saw “blood
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on her chin, neck and upper shirt area,” open cuts in her throat, and “dried blood” on Troutman.
Id. The police arrested Troutman and charged him with domestic violence.
On learning of this new crime, Troutman’s probation officer investigated. She discovered
that the same girlfriend had gone to the police the prior month based on a similar incident. During
that earlier incident, she accused Troutman of “grabb[ing] her around the mouth and side of her
neck” and breaking her phone. Id. But prosecutors did not pursue charges for these assaults
because Troutman’s girlfriend refused to cooperate. Still, the probation officer notified the district
court of this potential supervised-release violation and recommended that the court hold a hearing.
The district court accepted this recommendation. At the hearing, Troutman admitted that
he had “altercations” with his girlfriend but claimed that he did not “comprehend” what he was
doing because of his drinking. Tr., R.50, PageID 226. His counsel also explained that he was still
together with his girlfriend, had stopped drinking, and had entered anger-management counseling.
Troutman’s counsel thus asked the court to let him complete his supervised-release term.
Separately, Troutman’s counsel (who had not represented him in the original felon-in-
possession proceedings) suggested that his earlier attorney should have objected to the special sex-
offense and polygraph conditions because they had nothing to do with his felon-in-possession
conviction. When the court asked what this complaint had to do with the current hearing, counsel
“apologize[d] for delaying the Court” but noted that these conditions had been “listed in the”
probation officer’s “report” and that she wanted to say her “gripe” about them. Id., PageID 222.
The court revoked Troutman’s supervised release. When speaking with him, it noted that
he had “sex offenses” in his past and that he had again taken “advantage of a weak and vulnerable
person.” Id., PageID 226. The court found Troutman’s violence against his girlfriend “completely
unacceptable,” adding that “nobody deserves to be treated like this.” Id., PageID 227. As the
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court also opined, it had a “responsibility” to ensure that his girlfriend was “protected” and could
not “take a chance” that he might harm her again during an alcohol relapse. Id., PageID 227–28.
Although Troutman’s guidelines range was 8 to 14 months’ imprisonment, the court varied below
that range by imposing a six-month term with one year of additional supervision. It reimposed the
same supervised-release conditions as before plus a prohibition on drinking alcohol.
At the hearing’s end, counsel formally objected to the sex-offender and polygraph
conditions for the reasons she had given earlier in the hearing. The court responded by saying “I’ll
take a look at that after I get this.” Id., PageID 228. The hearing then ended (with a lack of clarity
by what the court meant by “this”). But the court later issued an order imposing “the same
conditions as previously ordered” along with (among other things) a ban on Troutman’s alcohol
use and a requirement that he get anger-management treatment. Order, R.47, PageID 213.
II
Troutman challenges the district court’s decision to reimpose the special supervised-release
conditions that he undergo a sex-offender assessment, participate in any recommended sex-
offender treatment, and take polygraph examinations. At the outset, the government raises several
procedural objections to this challenge. It claims that Troutman may not use revocation
proceedings to attack supervised-release conditions imposed at his original sentencing. It claims
that the appellate waiver in Troutman’s plea agreement covers not just challenges to his original
sentence but also challenges to his sentence on a supervised-release revocation. And it claims that
we at least must review Troutman’s claims under the deferential plain-error test. My colleagues
reject all these arguments. But because I would affirm on the merits, I would not enter this debate.
The sentencing laws give district courts discretion to impose unique supervised-release
conditions that they find “appropriate” for a defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Yet any special
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condition must satisfy three requirements. See United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 573 (6th Cir.
2012). It must be “reasonably related” to several of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Id. § 3583(d)(1). It must “involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary
for the purposes” identified in some of those factors. Id. § 3583(d)(2). And it must comport with
“any pertinent policy statements” from the Sentencing Commission. Id. § 3583(d)(3).
We review a district court’s decision to impose a special supervised-release condition for
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Brogdon, 503 F.3d 555, 563 (6th Cir. 2007). And when
undertaking this review, we must ensure that a supervised-release condition (just like a term of
imprisonment) is both procedurally and substantively sound. See United States v. Carter, 463 F.3d
526, 528–29 (6th Cir. 2006). Here, Troutman argues that the district court abused its discretion
both for a procedural reason (because it did not discuss why it reimposed the challenged special
conditions) and for substantive ones (because those conditions do not relate to his felon-in-
possession offense and are overly burdensome). In my view, he is twice mistaken.
A. Procedural Challenge
In two pages of argument, Troutman first asserts (and the majority agrees) that the district
court did not adequately explain its decision to reimpose the challenged conditions during the
revocation hearing. See United States v. Doyle, 711 F.3d 729, 732–33 (6th Cir. 2013). Troutman
is correct that a district court must give its “reasons” for imposing these conditions. Zobel, 696
F.3d at 572 (quoting Carter, 463 F.3d at 528–29). But he is wrong to suggest that a district court
must give unique reasons apart from its justifications for the overall sentence. We have instead
held that a court’s generic discussion of the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) can adequately convey
its reasons for imposing the special conditions. See United States v. Matthews, 155 F.4th 845, 854
(6th Cir. 2025); United States v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2016). In Matthews, for
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example, we upheld a special condition allowing the probation office to randomly search a
defendant’s “electronic devices” because the district court generically discussed a need to
“protect[] the public from those” like the defendant “who traffic fentanyl-laced drugs.” 155 F.4th
at 854. We saw a connection between this general concern and the special condition because that
condition likewise helped to deter the defendant’s future drug offenses. See id. at 854–55.
Here too, the district court’s generic reasons reveal the basis for the special conditions: to
deter Troutman’s violence against women. See Zobel, 696 F.3d at 572. At the revocation hearing,
the court explained that Troutman had “sex offenses in the past” and that he had again taken
“advantage of a weak and vulnerable person.” Tr., R.50, PageID 226. The court thus expressed a
concern for the safety of Troutman’s girlfriend, pointing to its “responsibility” to ensure “she’s
protected.” Id., PageID 227. It could not “take a chance” that Troutman might again get drunk
and “angry” and engage in more domestic abuse—as he had done against both his prior girlfriend
and his current one. Id., PageID 227–28. So the need “to protect the public from” Troutman’s
“further crimes” and to “afford adequate deterrence” drove the court’s decisionmaking. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C). We thus need make “only a slight inference” to find that the court imposed
the conditions to reduce the risk that Troutman would commit domestic violence “while on
supervised release.” Matthews, 155 F.4th at 854–55 (quoting Zobel, 696 F.3d at 572).
True, the court originally imposed these conditions because of Troutman’s sex-offender
status, presumably to ensure he did not commit similar sex offenses in the future. Also true,
Troutman’s recent conduct was not explicitly sexual. But his recent conduct is disturbingly similar
to his prior offense. In both incidents, Troutman got intoxicated and angry. In both incidents, he
accused his girlfriend of cheating. And in both incidents, he forced body parts down his
girlfriend’s throat. It is easy to understand why the district court thought Troutman’s conduct
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warranted the same conditions he had received years ago. At day’s end, the conditions all relate
to Troutman’s propensity for this type of domestic abuse. And “the record” makes “clear” why
the district court thought those conditions necessary. United States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 554, 599
(6th Cir. 2015); see United States v. Lantz, 443 F. App’x 135, 144–45 (6th Cir. 2011).
My colleagues respond that the court stated that it would “take a look at” Troutman’s
objection at the end of the hearing and did not give an on-the-record rebuttal. Tr., R.50, PageID
228. Yet Troutman’s two pages of argument on this procedural-reasonableness claim did not rely
on this omission. Appellant’s Br. 14–15. His decision not to argue the point makes good sense.
Although a lawyer’s objections may give the sentencing court an opportunity to respond, the
objections do not create an obligation to do so. See United States v. Mitchell, 107 F.4th 534, 542
(6th Cir. 2024). And because the court had adequately “state[d] in open court the reasons” for its
sentence (including the conditions), it had no need to elaborate with an additional post-hoc
explanation. United States v. Childress, 874 F.3d 523, 526 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
Troutman’s counterarguments fare no better. He compares the district court’s discussion
in this case to the discussion we found inadequate in Doyle. There, the defendant had committed
“attempted sexual abuse in the first degree” in New York, which required him to register as a sex
offender. Doyle, 711 F.3d at 731. (Our opinion does not describe the conduct underlying this
offense.) After the defendant moved to Tennessee, he “failed to register” as a sex offender in this
new location. Id. at 732. He pleaded guilty to a federal failure-to-register offense. Id. at 731. The
district court imposed several special supervised-release conditions, including that he avoid legal
pornography, have no contact with minors, “not use sexually-oriented telephone numbers or
computer services,” and obtain his probation officer’s permission before accessing a computer
with internet access. Id. at 732. We vacated these conditions because the court offered “no
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explanation” for them. Id. at 733. And we could not infer any explanation for the conditions that
was obvious from the defendant’s prior sex offense or his current failure-to-register offense. Id.
This case is different. Unlike in Doyle, the district court generally explained its sentence
based on the need to protect the public from Troutman’s violence. Indeed, Troutman’s violation
of his supervised-release conditions involved domestic violence against his girlfriend that
resembled the conduct underlying his prior sexual-battery conviction. Because we can infer the
basis for the court’s special conditions, this case resembles Matthews, not Doyle.
Troutman also argues that the district court misstated his criminal history when imposing
the special conditions. The court noted that Troutman had committed “sex offenses” in the plural,
but Troutman asserts that he committed only one sexual battery (and no other sexually violent
crimes). Tr., R.50, PageID 226. Yet Troutman did not object to this alleged misstatement at the
revocation hearing. So I would review it for plain error. See United States v. Holt, 116 F.4th 599,
612–13 (6th Cir. 2024). And the statement was not obviously wrong. See id. at 613. The district
court did not disclose what it meant by “sex offense.” And it might have meant for the phrase to
cover Troutman’s crimes associated with his sex-offender designation, such as his failure to verify
his address. To be sure, I agree that “[f]ailure to register is not a ‘sex offense’” in the technical
sense. United States v. Barcus, 892 F.3d 228, 236 (6th Cir. 2018). But the district court may have
used the phrase in a colloquial sense to refer more broadly to conduct that has “to do with sex.”
Id. And failure-to-register crimes have “everything to do with sex” (regardless of whether they
fall into the technical definition of “sex offense”). Id. If the phrase is construed broadly, then, the
district court would have been right to state that Troutman had multiple “sex offenses.”
Besides, even if we interpret the phrase narrowly, this minor misstatement would not render
Troutman’s sentence procedurally unreasonable. He points to no evidence suggesting that the
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misstatement “prejudiced him” in any way. Holt, 116 F.4th at 613; see United States v. Hatcher,
947 F.3d 383, 394 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Parks, 2023 WL 4543486, at *5 (6th Cir. July
14, 2023); see also United States v. Faulkner, 926 F.3d 266, 275 (6th Cir. 2019). For example,
nothing in the record suggests that the court believed that Troutman had committed multiple
sexually violent crimes. When discussing Troutman’s criminal history, both his attorney and the
government referred only to the prior sexual-battery conviction. Tr., R.50, PageID 221, 223. And
the district court did not make any statements indicating that it believed Troutman had a lengthier
criminal history. I thus see no basis for concluding that the misstatement “had any effect on his
sentence.” United States v. Beattie, 2026 WL 1383339, at *2 (6th Cir. May 18, 2026). Indeed,
Troutman’s own argument confirms this point. The district court made this comment while
imposing its overall sentence, including the six-month prison term. Yet Troutman does not claim
that the statement rendered his prison sentence procedurally unreasonable. And it likewise did not
render his special supervised-release conditions procedurally unreasonable.
B. Substantive Challenge
Because I would find Troutman’s sentence procedurally reasonable, I must confront his
primary challenge: that the special supervised-release conditions are substantively unreasonable.
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Troutman contends that the conditions do not
satisfy the three requirements for imposing them in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). In particular, he argues
that the sex-offender assessment and potential treatment are not reasonably related to the § 3553(a)
factors. And he argues that the requirement to take polygraph exams is too burdensome. But the
district court reasonably imposed all these conditions. See Brogdon, 503 F.3d at 563.
Sex-Offender Conditions. Troutman first criticizes the conditions reimposing a sex-
offender assessment (and potential sex-offender treatment). His challenge turns on the subpart of
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§ 3583(d) that requires a special condition to be “reasonably related to the factors set forth in
section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D)[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). These specific
§ 3553(a) factors include “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant” along with the need for “deterrence” and “to protect the public
from” the defendant’s future crime. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(C). We have held that a special
condition need only relate to one of these § 3553(a) factors. See Barcus, 892 F.3d at 235. So a
district court may impose sex-offender conditions based on a defendant’s “history and
characteristics” even if the “circumstances” of the crime of conviction had nothing to do with
sexual misconduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); Childress, 874 F.3d at 527 n.2; United States v.
Cabrera-Jimenez, 545 F. App’x 385, 388–89 (6th Cir. 2013); Brogdon, 503 F.3d at 565–66;
United States v. Perkins, 207 F. App’x 559, 561–62 (6th Cir. 2006).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the sex-offender conditions
were “reasonably related” to Troutman’s “history and characteristics” and the need to protect
women from violence. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(C). Among other reasons,
Troutman remains a registered sex offender who committed a violent sexual battery in 2013. He
also committed a failure-to-verify offense in 2017—a type of offense that can justify sex-offender
conditions. See Barcus, 892 F.3d at 236. Plus, a district court need not limit itself to a defendant’s
“prior criminal convictions” when imposing supervised-release conditions. Childress, 874 F.3d at
528. So the district court could consider Troutman’s recent violent acts against his girlfriend. See
id. at 528–29. And although those acts did not involve a “rape or sexual assault,” they continued
a trend of “aggressive behavior toward women” that the conditions might “help ameliorate.”
Perkins, 207 F. App’x at 561; cf. United States v. Hill, 150 F. App’x 416, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2005).
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All told, I have no “definite and firm conviction” that the sex-offender conditions are unrelated to
Troutman’s history and characteristics. Childress, 874 F.3d at 526 (citation omitted).
Troutman retorts that these conditions are not “reasonably related” to his underlying felon-
in-possession offense. Carter, 463 F.3d at 530 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)). But the district
court need not find that a condition relates to every sentencing factor identified in § 3583(d)(1).
See Barcus, 892 F.3d at 235. The court thus could impose the condition based on his history and
characteristics alone without regard to the nature of his underlying conviction. See Childress, 874
F.3d at 527 n.2.
Troutman next asserts that the special conditions do not even relate to his history and
characteristics because his prior sexual-battery conviction occurred too long ago. True, some of
our cases have found a defendant’s prior sex offense “too remote in time to justify” sex-offender
conditions. Carter, 463 F.3d at 531; see United States v. Hundley, 625 F. App’x 274, 277 (6th Cir.
2015); United States v. Thomas, 212 F. App’x 483, 487 (6th Cir. 2007). In these cases, the
defendants had committed their prior sex crimes at least 17 years in the past, and nothing about
their current crimes resembled those prior offenses or suggested that they might reoffend. Carter,
463 F.3d at 532; see Hundley, 625 F. App’x at 277; Thomas, 212 F. App’x at 487. But, unlike
those defendants, Troutman’s earlier conduct does not stand in isolation. Troutman had two recent
incidents involving “aggressive behavior toward” his girlfriend that resembled his prior sexual
battery. Perkins, 207 F. App’x at 561. A shorter time gap also existed between the prior sexual
battery (in 2013) and the current domestic violence (in 2025). And that time gap is effectively
even shorter because Troutman spent much of this period in prison.
Troutman counters that Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025), requires us to
disregard his recent violence toward his girlfriend. But Esteras holds no such thing. It concluded
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that district courts may not consider a different sentencing factor—the one in § 3553(a)(2)(A)—
when punishing supervised-release violations. See id. at 188. Yet Troutman’s violence toward
his girlfriend formed part of his “history and characteristics,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and Esteras
sets no bar on the use of that distinct factor, see 606 U.S. at 191–92.
Troutman lastly attributes this recent physical violence against his girlfriend to his alcohol
problem, claiming that the violence had nothing to do with his sex-offender propensities. Yet he
also committed his prior sexual violence while “intoxicated and upset” with his previous girlfriend.
Rep., R.22, PageID 89. And he admitted that he could not “comprehend”—and thus control—his
actions. Tr., R.50, PageID 226. The district court could reasonably conclude that it would best
protect the public from Troutman’s future violence if it imposed multiple preventive measures
rather than just one. So I fail to see why it had to avoid requiring a sex-offender assessment and
treatment just because it also required Troutman to avoid alcohol.
Polygraph Examination. Troutman next criticizes the supervised-release condition that he
take polygraph examinations. This separate challenge turns on a different part of § 3583(d).
Section 3583(d)(2) also requires any special condition to “involve[] no greater deprivation of
liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),
and (a)(2)(D)[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). Troutman argues that the polygraph requirement
intrudes on his liberty more than necessary. Yet when we have held that sex-offender conditions
were reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors, we have also found that polygraph examinations
did not impose undue intrusions on a defendant’s liberty. See Barcus, 892 F.3d at 237; see also
United States v. Pate, 2025 WL 1342740, at *6 (6th Cir. May 8, 2025); United States v. Teeple,
447 F. App’x 712, 713 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by reaching the same conclusion here. For
one thing, the record contains no evidence that this condition has been overly invasive in the past.
Troutman must participate in these polygraph examinations only “at the discretion of [his]
probation officer[.]” Am. Judgment, R.27, PageID 128. During his first term of supervised
release, he submitted to one polygraph in October 2024 and a maintenance polygraph over a year
later in November 2025. For another thing, other evidence shows the need for reimposing this
condition. Troutman, for example, responded with deception during his maintenance polygraph
exam when he was asked about minors. Although the probation officer did not think this deception
implicated Troutman’s “risk factors” because he had no convictions involving minors, she ordered
a follow-up polygraph as a precaution. Rep., R.42, PageID 190. Troutman, moreover, initially
lied to the police about his recent abuse of his girlfriend.
In sum, the district court acted within its discretion by requiring Troutman to participate in
a sex-offender assessment, potential sex-offender treatment, and polygraph testing.
I respectfully dissent.
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