United States v. David Piaquadio

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: November 21, 2025
• Docket: 25-1149
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________

No. 25-1149 _____________

United States of America,

v.

David Piaquadio Appellant _____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (District Court No. 4:15-CR-00249) District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner _____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) November 6, 2025

(Filed November 21, 2025)

Before: PHIPPS, ROTH, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. _________ O P I N I O N* _________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant David Piaquadio appeals the District Court’s denial of his

motion for compassionate release. The District Court based its denial on the mistaken

belief that Piaquadio had only served five years of his sentence, rather than the actual ten

years he had served, and neglected to consider Piaquadio’s post-sentencing mitigation

evidence. We will vacate the District Court’s order and remand to allow the District Court

to fully consider Piaquadio’s ten years served and post-sentencing mitigation evidence in

its 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis.

I.

Piaquadio struggled with opioid addiction after he was overprescribed oxycodone

pills and fentanyl patches for pain management. Piaquadio regularly sold his

prescriptions of oxycodone pills and fentanyl patches to buy himself heroin. Piaquadio

gave a fentanyl patch to a Joshua Moroschok who later overdosed. Moroschok recovered

after a medical intervention. In relation to these events, state authorities arrested

Piaquadio in April 2015 and transferred him to federal custody in October 2015.

On July 25, 2019, after a nonjury trial, Judge Conner of the Middle District of

Pennsylvania found Piaquadio guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute Oxycodone,

fentanyl, and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and three counts of possession with

intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

18 U.S.C. § 2. The District Court also found Piaquadio’s distribution of fentanyl resulted

in serious bodily injury to Moroschok. Judge Conner sentenced Piaquadio to 240 months

of imprisonment on August 31, 2020.

2 Piaquadio filed a compassionate release motion for sentence reduction under

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Piaquadio’s motion alleges he faces stage IV kidney disease,

a terminal illness. Piaquadio, now sixty-nine years old, also alleges that the aging process

has substantially diminished his ability to provide self-care and that he suffers from

insulin-dependent diabetes, chronic hepatitis C, hypothyroidism, spinal stenosis, and

degenerative joint disease. Piaquadio submitted evidence to the District Court that the

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) assessed him as a minimum security risk and as having a

minimal likelihood of recidivism; he maintains a work assignment; he took vocational,

educational, wellness and drug courses; he created a release plan to live with family; and

release would allow him to seek medical treatment.

The District Court denied Piaquadio’s motion for compassionate release. The

District Court assumed Piaquadio’s medical conditions were sufficient to qualify for

compassionate release but held the § 3553(a) factors did not support reducing his

sentence. The District Court’s § 3553(a) analysis considered only three factors—the

seriousness of the offense, the need to protect the public from Piaquadio’s abuses, and,

crucially, time served. In considering Piaquadio’s time served, Judge Conner provided

that: “the court conclud[es] that the immediate reduction of the twenty-year prison

sentence Piaquadio began serving less than five years ago to a sentence of time-served . .

. is unwarranted at this time under the circumstances.” App. 5. Piaquadio appeals because

he served nearly ten years of his sentence, not five, and the District Court failed to

consider his post-sentencing mitigation evidence.

3 II.1

We review the District Court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors do not

weigh in favor of granting compassionate release for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020). “[W]e will not disturb the District Court’s

decision ‘unless there is a definite and firm conviction that [it] committed a clear error of

judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.’ ” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir.

2000)). A district court abuses its discretion when it bases a fact-driven sentencing

decision on clearly erroneous factual conclusions. United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d

215, 220 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008).

Even if a district court’s sentencing decision contained a clear error, “we may still uphold

its sentence if the error was harmless,” meaning “there is a high probability” the judge

would impose the same sentence without the error. United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d

381, 386–87 (3d Cir. 2013). “ ‘High probability’ requires that the court possess a ‘sure

conviction’ that the sentence would be the same, not merely an assumption that ‘places us

in the zone of speculation and conjecture.’ ” United States v. Raia, 993 F.3d 185, 195 (3d

Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008)). The

party seeking to maintain the sentence bears the burden of showing the error was

harmless. Id.

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

4 A district court may grant compassionate release if there are extraordinary and

compelling reasons warranting a reduction and release would be consistent with the

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). District courts may also consider

the amount of time left in a sentence when deciding whether to grant compassionate

release. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 330–31. District courts carry a “standard obligation” to

demonstrate they considered the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments. Concepcion v. United

States, 597 U.S. 481, 484 (2022). Further, “evidence of post[-]sentencing rehabilitation

may be highly relevant to several of the § 3553(a) factors.”2 Pepper v. United States, 562

U.S. 476, 491 (2011). If we consider “an explanation inadequate in a particular case, [we]

can send the case back to the district court for a more complete explanation.” Chavez-

Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 116 (2018).

The District Court must reach its conclusions after a “weighing of the relevant

factors.” Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 330 (emphasis added) (quoting Oddi, 234 F.3d at 146).

Here, the District Court gave weight to a factor based on an erroneous fact and gave none

to Piaquadio’s relevant post-sentencing mitigation evidence.

The Government asks us to assume the District Court meant the correct amount of

time served based on the context of the record and Judge Conner’s familiarity with the

case. The plain meaning of the District Court’s order shows that it believed Piaquadio had

only served five years: “[T]he immediate reduction of the twenty-year prison sentence

2 This Court requires district courts to consider post-sentencing mitigation evidence raised by the parties in the context of First Step Act motions. United States v. Shields, 48 F.4th 183, 191 (3d Cir. 2022). 5 Piaquadio began serving less than five years ago . . . is unwarranted at this time under the

circumstances.” App. 5. The Government claims, “[T]he more reasonable reading of that

statement is that the same considerations from Piaquadio’s sentencing just five years

earlier are still relevant to considering the instant motion.” Appellee Br. 17. That

interpretation finds no support in the text of the order. We cannot assume Judge Conner

remembered correctly because a “judge who presided over a defendant’s sentencing

hearing years or even decades ago may not have a clear memory of the original

sentencing, especially considering that district judges sentence, on average, over a

hundred defendants each year.” Shields, 48 F.4th at 193. Because we lack indication from

Judge Conner that he has relied on his familiarity with the matter and because of the five

years separating Judge Conner’s sentencing from the instant denial, we cannot use the

Government’s requested interpretation while ignoring the plain meaning of the District

Court’s order.

Even applying the harmless error rule, which the Government does not argue

applies, we lack “sure conviction” that this error did not prejudice Piaquadio. Raia, 993

F.3d at 195. This error underpinned one of the District Court’s three reasons for denial

and could have influenced the District Court’s consideration of the other two factors. The

Government did not carry its burden to show that the error was harmless.

The Government also argues the District Court’s decision, while concise, had a

reasoned basis—the seriousness of the offense and the need to protect the public. The

District Court only provided three factors underlying its decision, so those three factors

6 likely weighed heavily—including the one based on an erroneous fact. Thus, we are

uncertain the District Court had a reasoned basis for its decision. Additionally, the

Government asserts that a district court’s failure to give mitigating factors the weight a

defendant seeks does not amount to an abuse of discretion. However, we are not

reviewing the weight the District Court gave to mitigating factors, but rather its failure to

consider them at all. The District Court did not discuss relevant mitigating factors that

Piaquadio briefed and failed to even state that it considered them—specifically or by

general reference. The District Court’s only reference, by citation, to Piaquadio’s brief

and reply related to the discussion of his extraordinary and compelling medical condition.

Piaquadio’s post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence is highly relevant to his “history and

characteristics” and the District Court’s duty “to ‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not

greater than necessary.’” Pepper, 562 U.S. at 492–93 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).

Thus, we cannot say the District Court reached its conclusions after a “weighing of the

relevant factors.” Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 330 (emphasis added) (quoting Oddi, 234 F.3d

at 146).

Because the District Court’s § 3553(a) analysis relied on an erroneous fact and

neglected Piaquadio’s nonfrivolous arguments, it abused its discretion in denying

Piaquadio’s motion for compassionate release.

III.

The Government also argues that Piaquadio’s medical conditions do not constitute

extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. The District Court

7 assumed Piaquadio’s medical conditions were extraordinary and compelling, and

Piaquadio does not question that on appeal. We will reserve further consideration of this

question for the District Court.

IV.

For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.3

3 Judge Phipps agrees that in denying David Piaquadio’s motion for compassionate release, the District Court erred by misstating the amount of the sentence that Piaquadio had already served. Nonetheless, the rule of harmless error applies and need not be affirmatively raised by the Government. See, e.g., United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 387 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A] non-constitutional error is harmless when ‘it is highly probable that the error did not prejudice’ the defendant.” (quoting United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008))); see also TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2019) (recognizing that an appellate court may affirm “on any basis supported by the record, even if it departs from the District Court’s rationale”). And as he sees it, the two other rationales provided by the District Court for denying Piaquadio’s motion for compassionate relief independently justify the District Court’s ruling. The offense was unquestionably serious: in 2015, during the peak of the opioid epidemic, Piaquadio was selling hundreds of prescription opioids and fentanyl patches per month, and that conduct contributed to an overdose. Also, the need to protect the public from Piaquadio remained a strong interest even ten years later because Piaquadio was actively selling opioids and fentanyl patches so that he himself could use heroin even at age 58. Because Judge Phipps is confident that it is “highly probable the error did not prejudice” Piaquadio, Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 387, he would affirm the denial of the motion for compassionate release. 8