United States v. David Perez

Fifth Circuit

United States v. David Perez

639 F. App'x 270

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedMay 5, 2016

Docket15-50525

StatusUnpublished

This text of 639 F. App'x 270 (United States v. David Perez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. David Perez, 639 F. App'x 270 (5th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

David Ramayo Perez, federal prisoner # 61202-180, seeks leave to proceed in for-ma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s grant of his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). By moving to proceed IFP, Perez challenges the district court’s certification decision that his appeal was not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor; 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir.1997). Our inquiry is limited to whether Perez has demonstrated good faith by raising any *271 nonfrivolous issue. Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir.1983).

In 2010, Perez pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the distribution of five kilograms or more of a mixture or* substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine. The district court sentenced Perez to 121 months of imprisonment. Pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), and in light of Amendment 782 of the Sentencing Guidelines, Perez moved for a reduction of sentence. The district court granted Perez’s § 3582(c)(2) motion and reduced his sentence to the statutory minimum sentence of 120 months.

Perez argues that he is entitled to the full benefit of Amendment 782 and that his sentence should have been reduced to 97 months, the bottom of the amended guidelines range.

Section 3582(c)(2) permits a district court to reduce a sentence that was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Doublin, 572 F.3d 235, 237 (5th Cir.2009). Perez’s argument has no merit because the district court lacked authority to reduce his sentence below the 10-year statutory minimum. See United States v. Carter, 595 F.3d 575, 578-81 (5th Cir.2010); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2010).

Perez fails to demonstrate a nonfrivo-lous issue for appeal. Accordingly, his motion for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n. 24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R, 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R, 47.5.4.

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PER CURIAM: *

David Ramayo Perez, federal prisoner # 61202-180, seeks leave to proceed in for-ma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s grant of his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). By moving to proceed IFP, Perez challenges the district court’s certification decision that his appeal was not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor; 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir.1997). Our inquiry is limited to whether Perez has demonstrated good faith by raising any *271 nonfrivolous issue. Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir.1983).

In 2010, Perez pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the distribution of five kilograms or more of a mixture or* substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine. The district court sentenced Perez to 121 months of imprisonment. Pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), and in light of Amendment 782 of the Sentencing Guidelines, Perez moved for a reduction of sentence. The district court granted Perez’s § 3582(c)(2) motion and reduced his sentence to the statutory minimum sentence of 120 months.

Perez argues that he is entitled to the full benefit of Amendment 782 and that his sentence should have been reduced to 97 months, the bottom of the amended guidelines range.

Section 3582(c)(2) permits a district court to reduce a sentence that was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Doublin, 572 F.3d 235, 237 (5th Cir.2009). Perez’s argument has no merit because the district court lacked authority to reduce his sentence below the 10-year statutory minimum. See United States v. Carter, 595 F.3d 575, 578-81 (5th Cir.2010); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2010).

Perez fails to demonstrate a nonfrivo-lous issue for appeal. Accordingly, his motion for leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n. 24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R, 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R, 47.5.4.

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639 F. App'x 270, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-david-perez-ca5-2016.

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