United States v. David M. Belanger

970 F.2d 416, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18542, 1992 WL 191086
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedAugust 12, 1992
Docket91-3070
StatusPublished
Cited by78 cases

This text of 970 F.2d 416 (United States v. David M. Belanger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. David M. Belanger, 970 F.2d 416, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18542, 1992 WL 191086 (7th Cir. 1992).

Opinion

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

On January 24, 1990, David Belanger was charged by indictment with possessing with the intent to distribute 9.15 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Prior to trial, the government filed and served on Belanger its “Notice of Intention to Seek Enhanced Penalty,” pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. Section 851 provides in relevant part:

No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part [21 U.S.C. § 841, et seq.~\ shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States Attorney files an information with the court (and serves a copy of such information on the person or counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon.

21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). 1 Following the “Notice of Intention to Seek Enhanced Penalty” (and prior to trial), the government filed and served on Belanger a “Notice of Intent to Offer Evidence,” which stated that it intended to offer evidence of Belan-ger’s two prior state court felony drug convictions in order to establish his intent *418 to distribute marijuana and for impeachment purposes. The latter notice stated in detail that Belanger was convicted of possessing a controlled substance with the intent to deliver on December 12, 1986 and of attempting to distribute cocaine on March 8, 1988. Also prior to trial, Belanger stipulated that he was a convicted felon as of the date of the indictment.

After Belanger was found guilty of both charges, the government introduced evidence of his two prior convictions. Belan-ger challenged the use of the convictions with regard to the career offender calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court found that the prior convictions qualified Belanger as a career offender under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of imprisonment of 25 years and 5 years for the crimes.

Belanger appealed the district court’s determination that the convictions qualified him as a career offender. We affirmed the court’s finding that Belanger was a career offender, but remanded the case for resen-tencing because the district court should have applied 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), involving offenses of less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, rather than § 841(b)(1)(C), in enhancing Belanger’s sentence. See United States v. Belanger, 936 F.2d 916, 920 (7th Cir.1991).

Prior to his resentencing, Belanger argued that the government’s § 851 filing was insufficient and therefore the district court did not have jurisdiction to impose an enhanced penalty pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(D). The district court found that although the government's “Notice of Intention to Seek Enhanced Penalty” may have been insufficient by itself, when taken together with the government’s “Notice of Intent to Offer Evidence,” the government had filed a “record” of Belanger’s prior felony convictions, see Gaertner v. United States, 763 F.2d 787, 790 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1009, 106 S.Ct. 535, 88 L.Ed.2d 466 (1985), and notified him of its intent to seek an enhanced penalty. The court concluded that the filings were sufficient to satisfy § 851, and sentenced Belan-ger to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 10 years and 5 years for the crimes. He appeals and we affirm.

Due process requires that a defendant receive reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the possibility of an enhanced sentence for recidivism. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452, 82 S.Ct. 501, 504, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962). Section 851 was enacted to fulfill this due process requirement. See United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 407 (8th Cir.1991) (§ 851 allows the defendant an opportunity to determine whether to enter a plea or go to trial, and to plan his trial strategy with full knowledge of the consequences of a potential guilty verdict); United States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 882 (10th Cir.) (§ 851 provides the defendant an opportunity to challenge the prior convictions), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 428, 116 L.Ed.2d 448 (1991).

The sentencing court may enhance a defendant's sentence on the basis of a prior conviction only when the government files an information, before trial, indicating its intent to rely on that conviction for sentencing purposes. Johnson, 944 F.2d at 406. Failure to file the notice prior to trial deprives the district court of jurisdiction to impose an enhanced sentence. Wright, 932 F.2d at 882; see Gaertner, 763 F.2d at 790; United States v. Olson, 716 F.2d 850, 852-53 (11th Cir.1983). Strict compliance with the mandatory language of the procedural requirements of § 851 is required, especially with respect to the timing of the government’s filing with the court and serving on the defendant a notice signifying its intent to rely on a prior drug conviction. United States v. Weaver, 905 F.2d 1466, 1481 (11th Cir.1990); see United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 1526, 1529 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Noland, 495 F.2d 529, 533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966, 95 S.Ct. 228, 42 L.Ed.2d 181 (1974); United States v. Wirsing, 662 F.Supp. 199, 200 (D.Nev.1987). But see United States v. Brown, 921 F.2d 1304, 1308-09 (D.C.Cir.1990) (district judge’s acceptance of § 851 filing in court on day of trial following two-day postponement of tri *419

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Bluebook (online)
970 F.2d 416, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18542, 1992 WL 191086, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-david-m-belanger-ca7-1992.