United States v. Darrell Devonish

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 7, 2026
• Docket: 25-1997
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-1997

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DARRELL DEVONISH, Appellant _____________________________ Appeal from U.S. District Court, M.D. Pa. Judge Jennifer P. Wilson, No. 1:23-cr-00113-001

Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges Argued Mar. 18, 2026; Decided Jul. 7, 2026 _____________________________

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

MATEY, Circuit Judge. Darrell Devonish used a charitable organization to extract

large sums of government dollars for himself, not to feed impoverished children as prom-

ised. But after pleading guilty to his fraud, Devonish pivoted and insisted his misrepresen-

tations skirted the enhancement for charitable fraud in the Sentencing Guidelines. We dis-

agree and will affirm the District Court’s sentence.

I.

The Food and Nutrition Service (“FNS”), an agency of the United States Depart-

ment of Agriculture, administers the Summer Food Service Program providing children in

low-income areas nutritious meals outside the school year. Another initiative, the Child

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. and Adult Care Food Program, supports meals for after-school activities. FNS disburses

these federal funds to state-approved providers, who pass along the money to sponsoring

organizations, who deliver the meals.

Darrell Devonish decided to take from the common good for his own good and so

formed a “non-profit corporation” called Rebuilding Better Communities (“RBC”), which

applied to the Pennsylvania Department of Education (“PADOE”) to be a sponsoring or-

ganization.1 Devonish’s application was approved, and over the next three years, RBC re-

ceived reimbursements from PADOE totaling $1,074,328.45 for meals it claimed to pro-

vide.

But nearly all of the purported altruism—some 80%—was based on Devonish’s

fraudulent billing for meals that were never delivered, or food that lacked the required

nutritional basis. To cover up the scheme, Devonish instructed RBC personnel to fabricate

records, inflate distribution numbers, and destroy receipts. All told, Devonish’s fraud

amassed $883,518.33 for lavish personal gain.2 PADOE eventually uncovered the charade,

and Devonish pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and one

count of illegal monetary transactions under 18 U.S.C. § 1957.

At Devonish’s sentencing, the United States argued for the enhancement in U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(9)(A), which is applicable when “[t]he offense involved . . . a misrepresentation

1 In his allocution, Devonish said he started RBC to feed kids but also to help himself and his family, and he acknowledged fault for things going “awry.” See App. 80. 2 For instance, he spent over $175,000 on jewelry, more than $45,000 in payments on a Mercedes and a Jeep Wrangler, some $75,000 in clothing and cosmetics, $12,000 on liquor, and over $100,000 on entertainment, travel, and dining. He also withdrew another $220,000 in cash at ATMs.

2 that the defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable . . . organization.” The District Court

agreed the enhancement covered Devonish’s conduct, justifying the two-level increase, and

sentenced him to 41 months’ total imprisonment for both counts.3

II.

To interpret the best meaning of a Sentencing Guideline, courts “carefully con-

sider[] the [Guideline’s] text, structure, history, and purpose,” United States v. Mercado,

81 F.4th 352, 356 (3d Cir. 2023), including consulting applicable background commentary,

United States v. Adair, 38 F.4th 341, 349 n.3 (3d Cir. 2022). Only where that inquiry proves

entirely unable to produce an ordinary understanding of intent can courts turn to relevant

interpretative commentary that “implicate[s] [the Commission’s] substantive expertise”

and “reflect[s] fair and considered judgment.” Mercado, 81 F.4th at 356.

Devonish argues § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) does not apply because he did not misrepresent

RBC’s charitable status,4 nor his authority to act on behalf of RBC. This largely picks up

on pieces of the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Frazier, which acknowledged

3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdic- tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a) and (e). “We review the District Court’s factual findings relevant to the Guidelines for clear error and exercise plenary re- view over the District Court’s interpretation of the Guidelines.” United States v. West, 643 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 4 The District Court found that “RBC is, in fact, was, in fact, a genuine charitable organization.” App. 76. That is debatable, as merely filing for non-profit status does not necessarily create a charity. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (emphases added) (defining a tax- exempt entity to include, amongst other things, one “organized and operated exclusively for . . . charitable . . . purposes” where “no part of the net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of any . . . individual”); IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2003) (“In defining ‘charitable,’ our analysis must focus on whether [an organization’s] activities conferred a public benefit.”). But as there is no challenge to this factual finding, we accept the characterization.

3 that the enhancement’s plain text applies if “a defendant . . . either falsely claims . . . that

he has the capacity to act as an agent or employee of [a charitable] organization,” or if he

“claims he works on behalf of a non-existent charitable organization.” 53 F.3d 1105, 1112–

13 (10th Cir. 1995). But Frazier also acknowledged that the enhancement’s plain text

would appear to apply to a defendant who “falsely claims to act ‘in the interest or aid of’

the organization,” which is exactly what Devonish did. Id. at 1112. Devonish submitted at

least one form requesting reimbursement for non-existent meals, and later pocketed the

money for himself. So he misrepresented to the government that he was working in the

interest or aid of RBC, when in fact he was working to aid his own financial interest. Even

if some small number of his reimbursements satisfied the program guidelines, much more

of his conduct did not, and his offense “involved . . . a misrepresentation that the defendant

was acting on behalf of a charitable . . . organization.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) (empha-

sis added).5

***

For these reasons we will AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment.

Alexandria J. Lappas Office of the Federal Public Defender Middle District of Pennsylvania Interim Federal Public Defender

5 Devonish insists that § 2B1.1’s commentary limits the enhancement to offenses that “exploit victims’ charitable impulses.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. background. But we need not reach for background principles given the text and context of § 2B1.1 is suffi- ciently firm.

4 Frederick W. Ulrich Office of the Federal Public Defender Middle District of Pennsylvania Asst. Federal Public Defender

Tammy L. Taylor Office of the Federal Public Defender Middle District of Pennsylvania Staff Attorney

Cristin D. Lantz [ARGUED] Office of the Federal Public Defender Middle District of Pennsylvania Staff Attorney Counsel for Appellant

John C. Gurganus United States Attorney’s Office Middle District of Pennsylvania Acting United States Attorney

Patrick J. Bannon [ARGUED] Carlo D. Marchioli United States Attorney’s Office Middle District of Pennsylvania Assistant United States Attorney Counsel for Appellee