United States v. Daniel J. Bowles

488 F.2d 1307, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 407
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedMarch 25, 1974
Docket72-1427
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 488 F.2d 1307 (United States v. Daniel J. Bowles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Daniel J. Bowles, 488 F.2d 1307, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

Opinion

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge:

This post-conviction proceeding seeking a new trial or, alternatively, the dismissal of the indictment, follows our en banc decision in Bowles v. United States, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 26, 439 F.2d 536 (1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995, 91 S.Ct. 1240, 28 L.Ed.2d 533 (1971) , affirming appellant’s conviction of murder in the first degree (while attempting to perpetrate a robbery) 1 and of assault with intent to rob. 2

The majority opinion in the en banc hearing sets forth the facts relevant to the conviction, which arose out of a fatal stabbing and attempted robbery of Donald Ingham, a soldier, on March 14, 1967 in an alley in the rear of the 1400 block of R Street Northwest, in Washington. The jury verdict followed a trial which ran from March 13 to 22, 1968, and the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. On April 26, 1968 appellant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of life imprisonment on the murder count and three to ten years for assault with intent to rob.

Then followed the appeal which resulted in the en banc decision, supra. That appeal was argued, en banc, on November 24, 1969, and the decision thereon was issued on November 20, 1970. In early October 1969, prior to the argument on November 24, 1969, counsel for appellant went to the office of the United States Attorney and informally discussed the issues with the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the then pending appeal. During this discussion appellant’s counsel was shown two typed, signed statements contained in the Government’s file on the case. 3 *1309 These statements, taken from two persons among the many who were interviewed in the broad investigation immediately undertaken in the area following the discovery of the murder, recited facts given to the Metropolitan Police on March 15, 1967, the day following the murder, by Rose Marie Bannister and Edith Mickins. The defense was not aware of the existence of these individuals or their statements at the time of trial. When appellant’s counsel received these statements in early October, 1969, he took no action with respect to them, though he had ample time to inject any issue raised by them into the forthcoming appeal, since oral argument was not scheduled until November 24, 1969, substantially more than a month away. However, approximately two years later on October 14, 1971, appellant filed the instant motions alleging that the circumstances surrounding the statements amounted to a violation of the principles enunciated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The instant motions for a new trial, or dismissal of the indictment followed and were grounded on the failure of the Government, notwithstanding requests prior to trial by defense counsel for such information, to provide defense counsel with alleged “exculpatory evidence” 4 which was in its possession, and its “obligation by virtue of the decision in Brady v. Maryland to disclose to defense counsel anything that comes to their attention which would be helpful to the defense.” 5 Appellant contends that the events recited in the Bannister and Mickins statements constituted “exculpatory evidence.”

Full hearings were held on the instant motions on January 31 and February 29, 1972, at which testimony was taken of Bannister, Mickins and one Samuel Floyd, the “Floyd” referred to in the Bannister statement. Thereafter on March 28, 1972 the trial court filed a Memorandum Opinion denying the motion for a new trial and the alternative motion for dismissal of the indictment. We affirm.

I

Appellant’s principal contention is that the failure of the Government prior to trial to inform him of the contents of the Bannister and Mickins statements, and the circumstances to which they refer, constitutes reversible error.

The principal fact that appellant relies on in the. Bannister statement (given at 11:32 A.M. on March 15, 1967) is a reference to a conversation at 1 o'clock in the afternoon of March 14, 1967 (following the murder in the early morning hours of that day) with one “Floyd,” an acquaintance of Bannister and Mickins, who was later identified as Floyd Harris :

On Tuesday, March 14th, 1967 about 1:00 p. m., while at 14th and S Street, N.W. I met a man that I know as Floyd who lives at 1703 or 1705 13th Street, N.W. I called him over to where me and Edith Mickens were and asxed him to go with us to the Charles Hotel. While at 14th and R street N.W. and on the way to the hotel I brought up the subject that wasn’t it a shame about that boy being killed at 14th and R Street N. W. At this time Floyd told me that he had been at 14th and R Street N. W. and that he saw a white boy being chased by some boys and the damn fool ran up the alley. He then caught a cab and left because he knew that there was going to be trouble. That was about all that was said and we were about at the hotel at this time. Statement of- Rose Marie Bannister, female, negro, 28 years of age.

Govt.Br. 13-14.

*1310 In the Mickins statement (given at 12 noon on March 15, 1967), 6 appellánt seeks reliance upon the assertions that:

On . . . March 14th, 1967 . about 1:00 a. m. by the clock at Peoples Drug Store [at Thomas Circle she] left and walked on 14th Street N.W. heading towards R Street. .
While on 14th Street N.W. near the High’s store (R.I. and N Street N.W.) I was walking behind a white male, *1311 and I guess that I was walking loud or something and any way he jumped back. He looked back and said Hi to me and I said Hi. His exact words were “Hi how are you” and I said all right. He asked me where I was going, and I said no where special, just walking. He did not say anything so I asked him if he was sporting tonight and he said no.
Nothing else was said and I walked up 14th Street N.W. to R Street and he was behind me all the way. I knew that he was behind me as I would look back once in a while.

Govt. Br. 16. The statement goes on to say that Mickins went to the D.C. morgue on March 15, 1967 and viewed the body of Donald W. Ingham (the victim of the murder) and identified it as being the body of the same white male that she “met on 14th Street N.W. something after 1:00 a. m. Tuesday, March 14th, 1967 near the High’s store.” 7

Appellant also contends that had he been given the Bannister and Mickins statements he would have been led to “Floyd,” later identified as “Floyd— Hugh Harris, Jr.,” who would have given evidence that could have caused the jury to acquit appellant.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
488 F.2d 1307, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 407, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-daniel-j-bowles-cadc-1974.