United States v. Daniel Gatson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: September 17, 2025
• Docket: 25-2042
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

ALD-209 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-2042 ___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DANIEL GATSON, a/k/a Tokyo Gatson, a/k/a Craig, a/k/a Big Country, Appellant ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Criminal Action No. 2:13-cr-00705-001) District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini ____________________________________

Submitted By the Clerk for Possible Dismissal as Untimely and on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Affirmance Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 September 4, 2025

Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 17, 2025) _________

OPINION * _________ PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Daniel Gatson is serving a 300-month federal sentence for transporting the

proceeds of his many burglaries. He appeals the denial of his fourth motion for a

sentence reduction (sometimes called compassionate release) under 18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(1)(A)(i). On the Government’s motions, we summarily affirmed the denial of

Gatson’s first three motions. See, e.g., United States v. Gatson, No. 23-1660, 2023

6139559 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 2023) (affirming the denial of Gatson’s third motion and

noting our previous rulings, which set forth the governing legal framework and our

abuse-of-discretion standard of review). The Government has filed a motion for

summary affirmance in this appeal too. We will grant that motion and affirm. 1

In Gatson’s third motion, he argued in relevant part that our decision in United

States v. Banks, 55 F.4th 246, 255-58 (3d Cir. 2022), constituted an “extraordinary and

compelling reason[]” for a sentence reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We held

there that the victim-loss enhancement of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 applies only to actual loss,

not intended loss. Gatson argued that our holding invalidated the § 2B1.1 loss

enhancement applied in his case. We rejected that argument as “frivolous” because

Gatson’s sentence clearly was based on actual loss and not intended loss. Gatson, 2023

WL 6139559, at *1.

1 Our Clerk advised the parties that this appeal appears to be untimely. We need not address that issue because the governing time limitation is not jurisdictional and thus “may be waived,” United States v. Muhammud, 701 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2012), and the Government has expressly waived it in this case.

2 While our ruling was still on rehearing (which we ultimately denied), Gatson filed

his fourth motion. This time, he argued primarily that his sentence is illegal, not because

the District Court based its § 2B1.1 calculation on intended loss (which it clearly did not),

but because the court failed to expressly state whether it based its § 2B.1 calculation on

actual or intended loss. Gatson relied for that argument on law existing at the time of his

sentence. 2 The District Court rejected his argument in light of our previous analysis. The

court also rejected his other arguments and denied his motion.

We will summarily affirm because the court did not abuse its discretion for the

reasons it explained, see United States v. Stewart, 86 F.4th 532, 534 (3d Cir. 2023), and

because that issue presents no substantial question, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 (2011). In

doing so, we reject all of Gatson’s arguments on appeal, including his erroneous

argument that the District Court misapprehended the nature of his claims.

2 Gatson’s argument thus does not implicate Rutherford v. United States, No. 24-820, 2025 WL 1603603 (U.S. June 6, 2025), or Carter v. United States, No. 24-860, 2025 WL 1603599 (U.S. June 6, 2025), in which the Court granted certiorari to consider, inter alia, whether certain changes in the law can constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons. Gatson’s argument also does not warrant waiting for a ruling in Fernandez v. United States, No. 24-556, 2025 WL 1496486 (U.S. May 27, 2025), in which the Court granted certiorari to consider whether extraordinary and compelling reasons can include those that may be alleged as grounds for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Gatson’s Guidelines- related argument is not cognizable under § 2255, see United States v. Folk, 954 F.3d 597, 604 (3d Cir. 2020), and, even if such an argument could constitute grounds for compassionate release in an appropriate case, Gatson’s argument here lacks merit.