United States v. Daly

69 M.J. 549, 2010 WL 2346664
U S Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals·Decided June 14, 2010·No. CGCMS 24437·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

McClelland, Chief Judge:

This is a Government appeal under Article 62, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). On 5 March 2010, the military judge dismissed the single charge under Article 134, UCMJ, and its four specifications. The Government requested reconsideration on 17 March 2010, which the military judge summarily denied on 26 March 2010. The Government gave notice of appeal on 29 March 2010. On 17 May 2010, the Government filed with this Court the record of trial, which had been authenticated on 2 May 2010. The Government filed its brief on 7 June 2010.

Under Article 62, we act only with respect to matters of law, which we review de novo. Having considered the Government’s brief and the record, we affirm.

[550]*550Proceedings Below

Appellee was charged under Article 134, UCMJ, the “general article,” which makes punishable “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital”. As originally charged, each of the four specifications alleged an offense occurring between March 2008 and July 2009 in the following form:

... did on between or about (date) and on or about (date), violate a lawful general order, to wit: Commandant Instruction M1000.6A, Personnel Manual, paragraph 8.H.2.Í., by wrongfully engaging in romantic relationships with subordinate members of his command, to wit: (one or more sexual acts) with (named female E-2 or E-3), then knowing that said (same named female) was subordinate to the said Boatswain’s Mate First Class Daly, and that such conduct was prejudicial to the good order and discipline in the armed forces.

On 4 February 2010, subsequent to two R.C.M. 802 conferences at which the discussion included the form of the charges and the doctrine of preemption, the specifications were amended by deleting from each the clause alleging violation of a lawful general order. (Appellate Ex. XIII at 4.) The specifications as amended were in the following form:

... did on between or about (date) and on or about (date), wrongfully engaging [sic] in romantic relationships with subordinate members of his command, to wit: (one or more sexual acts) with (named female E-2 or E-3), then knowing that said (same named female) was subordinate to the said Boatswain’s Mate First Class Daly, and that such conduct was prejudicial to the good order and discipline in the armed forces.

Appellee moved to dismiss Charge I and its four specifications for failure to state an offense and for violating his Fifth Amendment right to due process and his First Amendment right to freedom of association.1 The motion was argued at an Article 39(a), UCMJ, session on 1 March 2010.2 Appellee’s arguments were based on 8.H. of the Coast Guard Personnel Manual, COMDTINST M1000.6A (PERSMAN).3 This portion of the Personnel Manual, entitled “Interpersonal Relationships within the Coast Guard,” offers wide-ranging guidance on various kinds of relationships among personnel and their various effects, good and bad, on work environment, professional development, good order and discipline, and other matters. Relevant to this case, it creates three categories: acceptable relationships, unacceptable relationships and conduct, and prohibited relationships and conduct.4

PERSMAN paragraph 8.H.2.g sets forth three types of relationships or conduct and explicitly prohibits them, and goes on, “This provision is a punitive general regulation, applicable to all personnel subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice without further implementation. A violation of this provision is punishable in accordance with the UCMJ.”

PERSMAN paragraph 8.H.2.Í describes several circumstances of “romantic” relationships5 and calls them unacceptable, including where the parties “have a supervisor and subordinate relationship (including periodic supervision of duty section or watchstanding [551]*551personnel)” and where they “are assigned to the same small shore unit (less than 60 members)”. Paragraph 8.H.2.d.3.c says that resolution of an unacceptable relationship is “normally administrative.” PERSMAN section 8.H.6, “Resolving Unacceptable Relationships,” discusses many administrative approaches to addressing unacceptable relationships, including “a direct order to terminate a relationship,” paragraph 8.H.6.C, and “direet[ion] to end a relationship,” paragraph 8.H.6.d. It concludes with paragraph 8.H.6.g, “Disciplinary Action”: “Non-judicial punishment or courts-martial may address fraternization or other unlawful or prohibited relationships or conduct.”

Before the military judge, the Government alleged (Appellate Ex. IX at 8), and Appellee acknowledged the possibility (Appellate Ex. VII at 4, 6), that Appellee’s conduct was “unacceptable” in that he and each of his sexual partners were assigned to the same small shore unit having less than sixty members. However, Appellee argued that PERSMAN 8.H. made it clear that this conduct was not prohibited, only unacceptable, and that he could not be prosecuted for the conduct, but could only suffer administrative consequences for it. The Government responded that the qualified statement in PERSMAN paragraph 8.H.2.d.3.c, that resolution of an unacceptable relationship is normally administrative, leaves open the possibility of prosecution in a non-normal case, and, the Government asserted, the facts of this case were not normal.

The military judge ruled that the terms of the Personnel Manual clearly provide that conduct such as Appellee’s alleged conduct subject a member to administrative but not criminal resolution, and declared that qualifying this policy with the word “normally” was “insufficient to show that an accused is on notice that his conduct is subject to criminal sanction.” (Appellate Ex. XIII at 10.) Therefore, “there was no due process ‘fair notice’ that the accused’s conduct was made subject to criminal sanction.” (Appellate Ex. XIII at 11.) Accordingly, he granted the motion to dismiss.

In its request for reconsideration, the Government pointed out that an order to terminate a relationship, noted by the military judge as a possible administrative avenue to address an unacceptable relationship under PERSMAN section 8.H.6, would open up the possibility of prosecution if the order were not obeyed, i.e. if the relationship were not terminated. From this, the Government urged the military judge to acknowledge that criminal sanctions are available under certain circumstances for unacceptable relationships. The Government further contended that the facts and circumstances as revealed in an investigation indicated that Appellee “could — and did — understand that his unacceptable relationship with subordinate members of his command might violate the U.C.M.J.” (Appellate Ex. XIV at 13.) Therefore, the Government argued, he “had notice satisfying the requirements of due process of law.” (Id.)

The Government also urged, in favor of reconsideration, that notice that conduct is wrongful can be found in military custom, citing United States v. Vaughan, 58 M.J.

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United States v. Daly, 69 M.J. 549, 2010 WL 2346664 (uscgcoca 2010).

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