United States v. C.W.E.H., a Juvenile

Eighth Circuit

United States v. C.W.E.H., a Juvenile

838 F.2d 993, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 1599, 1988 WL 8319

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedFebruary 10, 1988

Docket87-5226

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 838 F.2d 993 (United States v. C.W.E.H., a Juvenile) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. C.W.E.H., a Juvenile, 838 F.2d 993, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 1599, 1988 WL 8319 (8th Cir. 1988).

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PER CURIAM.

C.W.E.H. appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her motion for postcon-viction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. She claims the district court committed error in denying her an opportunity to withdraw her guilty plea to a charge of assault with a dangerous weapon. We affirm.

C.W.E.H. argues she is entitled to section 2255 relief because the district court did not comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 at the change of plea hearing. More specifically, C.W.E.H. claims the district court committed error because it: failed to inform her of the nature of the charge; failed to inform her that her plea could not be withdrawn if the court did not accept the government’s sentencing recommendation; and failed to inform her of her rights to present evidence, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to appeal. C.W.E.H. argues the district court’s “failure to comply with the dictates of [r]ule 11 * * * constitutes a manifest miscarriage of justice, a denial of due processf,] and a failure to observe the rudiments of fair procedure.”

[994]*994We must agree with C.W.E.H.’s assertion that the district court’s rule 11 dialogue leaves a great deal to be desired. We conclude it is unnecessary to consider C.W.E.H.’s arguments, however, because the content of her postconviction motion is causally deficient. The motion does not allege that had the district court correctly informed C.W.E.H. under rule 11 she would have pleaded not guilty. United States v. Runck, 817 F.2d 470, 471 (8th Cir.1987). C.W.E.H.’s allegation that “[h]ad I [known] that I was going to receive incarceration, I would have never pleaded guilty to the charge[ ]” misses the mark because the district court was not required to disclose the eventual sentence with this precision before accepting her guilty plea. Thus, “even if [r]ule 11 was violated, postconviction relief would not be appropriate, because the violation is not causally connected to [C.W.E.H.'s] plea and conviction.” Runck, 817 F.2d at 471.

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.

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PER CURIAM.

C.W.E.H. appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her motion for postcon-viction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. She claims the district court committed error in denying her an opportunity to withdraw her guilty plea to a charge of assault with a dangerous weapon. We affirm.

C.W.E.H. argues she is entitled to section 2255 relief because the district court did not comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 at the change of plea hearing. More specifically, C.W.E.H. claims the district court committed error because it: failed to inform her of the nature of the charge; failed to inform her that her plea could not be withdrawn if the court did not accept the government’s sentencing recommendation; and failed to inform her of her rights to present evidence, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to appeal. C.W.E.H. argues the district court’s “failure to comply with the dictates of [r]ule 11 * * * constitutes a manifest miscarriage of justice, a denial of due processf,] and a failure to observe the rudiments of fair procedure.”

[994]*994We must agree with C.W.E.H.’s assertion that the district court’s rule 11 dialogue leaves a great deal to be desired. We conclude it is unnecessary to consider C.W.E.H.’s arguments, however, because the content of her postconviction motion is causally deficient. The motion does not allege that had the district court correctly informed C.W.E.H. under rule 11 she would have pleaded not guilty. United States v. Runck, 817 F.2d 470, 471 (8th Cir.1987). C.W.E.H.’s allegation that “[h]ad I [known] that I was going to receive incarceration, I would have never pleaded guilty to the charge[ ]” misses the mark because the district court was not required to disclose the eventual sentence with this precision before accepting her guilty plea. Thus, “even if [r]ule 11 was violated, postconviction relief would not be appropriate, because the violation is not causally connected to [C.W.E.H.'s] plea and conviction.” Runck, 817 F.2d at 471.

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.

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838 F.2d 993, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 1599, 1988 WL 8319, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-cweh-a-juvenile-ca8-1988.

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