United States v. Cuadrado

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 12, 2026
• Docket: 24-2937
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 12 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-2937 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:23-cr-01855-LAB-1 v. MEMORANDUM* EDWIN CUADRADO, Jr.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 3, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN and KOH, Circuit Judges, and BARKER, District Judge.**

Edwin Cuadrado, Jr. (“Cuadrado”) appeals his conviction for assault on a

United States Postal Service employee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a), (b). We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable J. Campbell Barker, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation. 1. The district court did not err in denying Cuadrado’s motion for a new

trial based on the Government’s failure to correct the testimony of its expert

witness, Dr. Nicholas Badre (“Dr. Badre”). Cuadrado contends that Dr. Badre’s

testimony that he held the title of “Director of Forensic Training” at a university

with which he was affiliated constitutes false testimony, and that the Government’s

failure to correct this falsity violated Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). To

prevail on this claim, Cuadrado “must show that (1) the testimony was actually

false, (2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was

actually false, and (3) that the false testimony was material. In assessing

materiality under Napue, we determine whether there is any reasonable likelihood

that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” United

States v. Rodriguez, 766 F.3d 970, 990 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation modified).

Even assuming that Dr. Badre’s testimony was false and that the

Government knew or should have known that it was false, Cuadrado has failed to

demonstrate that the testimony was material to the jury’s verdict. Dr. Badre had

extensive experience in the field of forensic psychiatry and clearly would have

been qualified to serve as an expert witness irrespective of whether he held the

“Director” title. Dr. Badre also accurately conveyed to the jury the nature of his

work for the university. He admitted on cross-examination that he was an unpaid,

volunteer lecturer who worked at the university less than part-time. Moreover, the

2 24-2937 Government presented significant evidence, including video evidence, testimony

from percipient witnesses, and Cuadrado’s own post-arrest statements, from which

the jury could have concluded that Cuadrado appreciated the wrongfulness of his

acts and was not insane at the time of the assault. Accordingly, there is no

reasonable likelihood that the contested testimony could have affected the

judgment of the jury.

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Dr. Badre

to testify about the “credibility problem” he observed when interviewing Cuadrado

and evaluating the veracity of Cuadrado’s claimed mental symptoms. Although

“[a]n expert witness is not permitted to testify specifically to a witness’

credibility,” United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 506 (9th Cir. 1989),1

Cuadrado acknowledges that it was permissible for Dr. Badre to testify, based on

his specialized knowledge and experience, that Cuadrado was exaggerating his

symptoms. The district court’s decision to permit Dr. Badre to use the words

“credible” and “credibility” when explaining this opinion was not “illogical,

implausible, or without support from inferences that may be drawn from the facts

in the record.” United States v. Redlightning, 624 F.3d 1090, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010);

cf. United States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 1000, 1008-15 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding

1 We assume without deciding that the general prohibition against expert witnesses testifying about a witness’s credibility applies to the facts of this case.

3 24-2937 that expert psychologist’s testimony regarding whether the defendant was “faking

or lying” was both reliable and relevant).

Moreover, any error in admitting such testimony would have been harmless.

Given that the jury properly heard testimony that Cuadrado was exaggerating his

symptoms, it is not more probable than not that Dr. Badre’s use of the words

“credible” and “credibility” materially affected the verdict. See United States v.

Laurienti, 611 F.3d 530, 547 (9th Cir. 2010).

3. The district court abused its discretion in permitting Dr. Badre to

testify that in his opinion, video surveillance footage taken shortly after the assault

depicted Cuadrado smoking methamphetamine. Such testimony was not

sufficiently reliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as the district court itself

appeared to recognize in its in limine rulings. However, the error was harmless. Dr.

Badre commented on the video only briefly and after listing several other

symptoms exhibited by Cuadrado that supported Dr. Badre’s diagnosis of

substance abuse disorder, including that Cuadrado admitted using

methamphetamine while working, admitted using methamphetamine two days

before the assault, and admitted that he burned his hands trying to make

methamphetamine. In light of the other evidence of Cuadrado’s methamphetamine

use, Dr. Badre’s testimony did not more likely than not materially affect the

4 24-2937 verdict. See Laurienti, 611 F.3d at 547.2

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to make

explicit findings regarding the reliability of Dr. Badre’s opinions. “A district court

cannot be silent about reliability when challenged.” United States v. Holguin, 51

F.4th 841, 854 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, however, the primary reliability concerns

raised in Cuadrado’s motions in limine and discussed at the motions hearing were

whether Dr. Badre could testify to hearsay statements and vouch for the

Government’s other witnesses. The district court ruled on both of those issues.

Moreover, to the extent the court’s ruling did not sufficiently address Cuadrado’s

concerns about the reliability of Dr. Badre’s opinions or methodology, the district

court permitted Cuadrado to re-raise those issues after meeting and conferring with

the Government. At the following day’s hearing, Cuadrado did not raise any

additional challenges to the reliability of Dr. Badre’s opinions beyond what had

previously been discussed. Cuadrado also failed to object at trial when the district

court designated Dr. Badre as an expert witness. Under these circumstances, the

district court properly fulfilled its gatekeeping obligation and did not abuse its

discretion.

5. Cuadrado also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 111 is a specific intent crime,

2 Because we find no other error in the district court’s rulings, we need not engage in a cumulative error analysis.

5 24-2937 but he acknowledges that this argument is foreclosed by Ninth Circuit precedent.

See United States v. Jim, 865 F.2d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1989). Cuadrado has

provided no reason to revisit that precedent, and we decline to do so.

AFFIRMED.

6 24-2937