United States v. Cruz

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 17, 2025
• Docket: 23-1768
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 17 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-1768 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:22-cr-00389-RS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* LUIS CRUZ, AKA Luis Arias,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Richard Seeborg, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 15, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: H.A. THOMAS, MENDOZA, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Luis Cruz appeals the district court’s decision not to apply a safety valve

adjustment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a) at his

sentencing. Cruz also appeals the district court’s decision not to hold an

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). evidentiary hearing when it determined his ineligibility for a safety valve

adjustment. Cruz’s appeal is timely. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the district court.

1. Cruz argues the district court clearly erred when it found him ineligible

for safety valve relief. The safety valve provision permits district courts to impose

a sentence below the otherwise-applicable mandatory-minimum if a defendant

satisfies five criteria, which include that “the defendant did not . . . possess a

firearm or other dangerous weapon . . . in connection with the offense.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f)(2). It is a defendant’s burden to “prov[e] safety valve eligibility by a

preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100,

1104 (9th Cir. 2007).

The district court found that Cruz had possessed a knife in connection with

the drug offenses for which he was being sentenced. Cruz admitted to possessing a

10- or 12-inch knife that officers found in his backpack, which also contained more

than a kilogram of narcotics, a digital scale, and drug packaging materials. In light

of other evidence before it, the district court did not clearly err in declining to

credit Cruz’s assertion that he had forgotten to remove the large knife from the

backpack before he loaded it with drugs. Additionally, Cruz had been arrested for

a drug offense two years before his arrest for the instant offenses and, during that

2 23-1768 previous arrest, officers found an approximately 10- or 12-inch knife in the vehicle

Cruz was using to transport narcotics.

We find the district court did not clearly err when it determined Cruz had not

carried his burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he met the

requirements of the safety valve’s second criterion.

2. Cruz argues the district court abused its discretion when it declined to

hold an evidentiary hearing about the applicability of the safety valve. “[T]here is

no general right to an evidentiary hearing at sentencing” and a “district court has

discretion to determine whether to hold such a hearing.” United States v. Real-

Hernandez, 90 F.3d 356, 362 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing, respectively, United States v.

Kimball, 975 F.2d 563, 568 (9th Cir.1992) and United States v. Montoya, 45 F.3d

1286, 1291 (9th Cir. 1995)). A “district court abuses its discretion if it does not

apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of

material fact.” Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal

citations omitted).

The district court provided the parties with reasonable opportunities to

present information to the court. Cruz filed a written sentencing memorandum one

week before sentencing, which included factual details relevant to the district

court’s safety valve determination. Cruz failed to avail himself of the opportunity

to propose additional evidence per the local rules. See N.D. Cal. Crim. R. 32-5(d)

3 23-1768 (stating that, in a request for an evidentiary hearing, a movant should set forth

“[t]he names of the witnesses to be called and a description of their proposed

testimony”). Cruz’s counsel had no specific proposal when asked by the district

court what would be covered at an evidentiary hearing, nor did he suggest that

Cruz wanted an opportunity to testify.

We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold

an evidentiary hearing.

AFFIRMED.

4 23-1768