United States v. Corey Lawson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: April 28, 2025
• Docket: 24-4228
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-4228 Doc: 30 Filed: 04/28/2025 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4228

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

COREY LAWSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Julie R. Rubin, District Judge. (1:23-cr-00010-JRR-1)

Submitted: April 24, 2025 Decided: April 28, 2025

Before RICHARDSON and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Brent E. Newton, Gaithersburg, Maryland, for Appellant. Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney, David C. Bornstein, Assistant United States Attorney, Michael C. Hanlon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4228 Doc: 30 Filed: 04/28/2025 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

Corey Lawson appeals his 70-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to

being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). On appeal,

Lawson argues that the district court plainly erred by unconstitutionally delegating core

judicial functions. Specifically, Lawson asserts that by delegating the discretion to

supervise Lawson’s participation in mental health and substance abuse treatment, including

“provider, location, modality, duration, intensity, etc,” the court unconstitutionally gave

the probation officer authority to require in-patient treatment. In response, the Government

argues that Lawson’s appeal should be dismissed as barred by the appeal waiver included

in his plea agreement and, alternatively, that Lawson’s argument is meritless. In his reply,

Lawson counters that improper delegation of a core judicial function to the probation

officer results in an illegal sentence outside the scope of the waiver.

“We review an [appeal] waiver de novo to determine whether the waiver is

enforceable” and “will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls

within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir.

2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant enters

it “knowingly and intelligently, a determination that we make by considering the totality

of the circumstances.” Id. A claim that a sentence is “illegal,” and thus falls outside the

scope of an appeal waiver, refers only to a sentence “alleged to have been beyond the

authority of the district court to impose”; an illegal sentence is not merely a sentence arising

from alleged “legal error.” United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 539 (4th Cir. 2012).

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We recently decided in United States v. Williams, 130 F.4th 177, 187 (4th Cir.

2025), that delegating authority to the probation officer to determine “provider, location,

modality, duration, intensity, etc.” of mental health and substance abuse treatment

programs was not an unconstitutional delegation of a core judicial function but merely a

proper delegation of administrative responsibilities. Therefore, Lawson’s argument that

his sentence is illegal, based on the exact same language in his conditions of supervised

release, is foreclosed by binding circuit precedent. See id. at 186-87.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED