United States v. Cooley

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 28, 2026
• Docket: 25-309
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 28 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-309 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:24-cr-00910-SHR-MAA-1 v. MEMORANDUM*

SHARNESIA LATRICE COOLEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Scott H. Rash, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 19, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: GOULD, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellant Sharnesia Cooley (“Cooley”) challenges the district

court’s application of three sentencing enhancements: (1) four levels for transporting

an unaccompanied minor under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(4); (2) two levels for recklessly

creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person during

the offense under § 2L1.1(b)(6); and (3) six levels for transporting an unlawful alien

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. who suffered a permanent or life-threatening injury during the offense under

§ 2L1.1(b)(7). Cooley also challenges her 60-month below-guidelines sentence as

substantively unreasonable. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm.

We review interpretations of Sentencing Guidelines de novo and “application

of the guidelines to the facts for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Herrera,

974 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2020). The substantive reasonableness of a sentence

is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110,

1116 (9th Cir. 2010).

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by applying the four-point

enhancement under § 2L1.1(b)(4) for transporting an unaccompanied minor. This

enhancement, contrary to Cooley’s contention, does not require that it be reasonably

foreseeable that she would transport an unaccompanied minor. Reasonable

foreseeability is relevant when assessing jointly undertaken criminal activity and the

foreseeable acts and omissions of others in the criminal scheme. See United States

v. Reyes, 772 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2014); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Here,

under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), we assess Cooley’s own actions and omissions, not those of

others. There was also sufficient record evidence that Cooley transported an

unaccompanied minor. The minor’s medical intake form indicates that the hospital

was “[u]nable to locate family” and that Border Patrol was “unable to provide any

2 25-309 information for relatives.” Further, the agency ultimately identified the minor

through the Mexican Consulate, which identified the minor’s father, who was not in

the car with him. Cooley contends that the agency’s lack of questioning of the other

unlawful aliens about the minor was inadequate, but no evidence indicates that any

of the others were the parents, adult relatives, or legal guardians of the minor. See

United States v. Lucas, 101 F.4th 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (due process

is satisfied when the district court’s guidelines factfinding is supported by a

preponderance of the evidence).

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by applying the two-point

enhancement for reckless creation of a substantial risk of death or serious bodily

injury under § 2L1.1(b)(6). Cooley was legally reckless because she acted in an

unreasonable manner and had a subjective awareness of that objective

unreasonableness. United States v. Gardenhire, 784 F.3d 1277, 1282–83 (9th Cir.

2015). A reasonable person under the circumstances would not have continued

driving approximately 50 miles per hour with the vehicle door open and several

people in the back seat. Cooley was subjectively aware of the risk she created by

continuing to drive without slowing down or stopping even after she heard the back

door open, and passengers began jumping out through that door. Despite having 20

to 30 seconds to slow down or stop before the final unlawful alien jumped, Cooley

did not do so. Moreover, Cooley “created” the risk here. Even assuming this test

3 25-309 requires a showing of proximate cause, Cooley’s decision to continue driving 50

miles per hour after the individuals started jumping from her back seat, rather than

slowing down or stopping, bears a sufficient nexus to those individuals’ risk of

injury, under any proximate cause standard. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride,

564 U.S. 685, 701 (2011) (surveying various proximate cause formulations).

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by applying the six-point

enhancement for permanent or life-threatening injury resulting during transport

under § 2L1.1(b)(7). Assuming without deciding that the application of

§ 2L1.1(b)(7) requires a showing of proximate cause, Cooley’s actions were the

proximate cause of the unlawful aliens’ injuries. While Cooley contends that the

aliens’ independent decisions to jump from her moving vehicle supersede her

liability for their injuries, a third party’s conduct, if foreseeable to the wrongdoer,

does not comprise a superseding cause. See, e.g., Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d

1081, 1101 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 563 U.S. 915 (2011), reinstated in relevant

part, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011). As noted above, Cooley was aware that the

unlawful aliens were jumping from her car and had 20 to 30 seconds to slow down

or stop her car. It was foreseeable to Cooley, at least once the first unlawful alien

had jumped from the car, that others would do so, and it was foreseeable that they

would be seriously injured by doing so. The district court did not abuse its discretion

by applying this enhancement.

4 25-309 4. The district court’s imposition of a 60-month below-guidelines range sentence

was not substantively unreasonable. “[I]t is probable that the sentence is reasonable”

when that sentence falls within a properly calculated guidelines range. United States

v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 994 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351

(2007)). It is improper, however, to equalize defendants’ sentences when they are

convicted of different crimes. United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969,

978 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). But, as Cooley concedes, “the district court did not

depart to equalize” her sentence with that of her codefendant. The district court had

broad discretion to weigh different sentencing factors, United States v. Gutierrez-

Sanchez, 587 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2009), and departed downward from a 77-to-

96-month guideline range based on the § 3553(a) factors, including consideration of

Cooley’s “family ties and responsibilities.” The district court did not abuse its

discretion by departing downward in considering Cooley’s circumstances.

AFFIRMED.

5 25-309