United States v. Colp

249 F. Supp. 2d 740, 91 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1339, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4293, 2003 WL 1192859
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedMarch 10, 2003
DocketCR. A. 02-511-A
StatusPublished

This text of 249 F. Supp. 2d 740 (United States v. Colp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Colp, 249 F. Supp. 2d 740, 91 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1339, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4293, 2003 WL 1192859 (E.D. Va. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ORDER

LEE, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court for sentencing of Defendant Nancy L. Colp and Defendant’s Motion for Downward Departure from the applicable sentencing guidelines. Defendant was convicted of *741 one count of income tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. The issue before the Court is whether a downward departure based on exceptional family circumstances is warranted when Defendant is the sole caretaker of her disabled husband, who suffers from traumatic brain injury and seizure disorder as a result of a 1995 automobile accident.

Pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the Presentence Report properly computed Defendant’s base offense level at 14, and subtracted 2 offense levels for acceptance of responsibility. As such, the Court finds that the offense level is 12, which provides for a sentencing range of 10 to 16 months of incarceration.

Defendant’s motion for downward departure is based on family ties and responsibilities under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6. Ms. Colp contends that her family circumstances are exceptional and distinguish this case from the heartland of cases covered by the Guidelines. For the reasons stated below, the Court holds that a downward departure from the applicable sentencing guidelines based on Defendant’s family ties and responsibilities is warranted because Defendant has unique family circumstances; her husband’s medical condition and the constant care she provides are atypical and outside of the heartland of cases covered by the guidelines.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Nancy L. Colp was convicted of one count of income tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. Between 1996 and 2000, she was employed as the business manager/controller of Platinum Care, a company that did business as Brooke Nursing Center (“BNC”) in Stafford, Virginia. As the business manager of BNC, Ms. Colp managed the day to day activities of BNC.

During the years 1996 though 2000, Ms. Colp made “loans” to BNC and to an associate at BNC, and she received repayments for these loans from BNC in excess of the amount loaned. She failed to report this excess interest reimbursement on her individual income tax returns. In addition, at the direction of the BNC associate, Ms. Colp paid the personal expenses of that associate out of the checking accounts of Brookwood and BNC.

On October 8, 2002, a one-count Criminal Indictment was filed in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, charging the Defendant with income tax evasion. Ms. Colp pled guilty to the Criminal Indictment. Based on the guilty plea and pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, the Presentence Report placed Defendant’s base offense level at 14. The offense level was reduced 2 points for acceptance of responsibility. As such, Defendant’s offense level is 12 with an applicable Guideline range of 10 to 16 months of incarceration.

Ms. Colp requests that the Court depart from the Guidelines and moves for a downward departure on the basis of family ties and responsibilities. The thrust of Ms. Colp’s argument is that she is the sole caretaker of her disabled husband, which distinguishes this case from the heartland of cases covered by the guidelines.

II. DISCUSSION

Ms. Colp was convicted of one count of income tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201; the offense level is 12 with an applicable Guideline range of 10 to 16 months incarceration. Ms. Colp requests a downward departure so that she will be able to provide care for her husband, who suffers from traumatic brain injury and seizure disorder due to injuries he sustained in an automobile accident in 1995. Ms. Colp is the sole caretaker for her *742 disabled husband, as he has no family in the area.

A. Standard of Review

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a district court must ordinarily impose sentences within the range specified by the applicable guidelines. See United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 757 (4th Cir.1996). Each guideline is intended to carve out a “heartland” of cases that are representative of the circumstances and consequences of the ordinary crimes of the type to which the guidelines apply. Id. (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996)) (holding that a district court’s decision to depart in an “atypical” case is to be reviewed for abuse of discretion). A district court may only depart from the applicable guideline range if there exists “an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). In deciding whether to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines, this Court adheres to the standard set forth in Koon and expounded upon in Rybicki.

In Rybicki, the court prescribed a five-part analysis for district courts to follow when deciding whether to depart. Rybicki, 96 F.3d at 757. First, the court must determine the circumstances and consequences surrounding the offense of conviction. See id. Second, the court must decide whether any of these circumstances or consequences appear “atypical” such that they potentially take the case out of the guideline’s heartland. See id. Third, the court must determine, according to the Guideline’s classifications, whether the identified circumstances are a “forbidden,” “encouraged,” or “unmentioned” basis for departure. See id. Fourth, a finding that a factor is “forbidden” ends the inquiry, while a finding that a factor is “encouraged,” “discouraged,” or “unmentioned” requires further analysis. Id. “Discouraged” factors are “not ordinarily relevant,” but may be relied upon as bases for departure in “exceptional cases.” See id. (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 94-95, 116 S.Ct. 2035). The final step in the analysis is for the court to consider whether the circumstances considered take the case out of the applicable guideline’s heartland and whether a departure from the guideline’s specified range is warranted. Id. In making this determination, the court compares the case to other Guidelines’ cases, weighs the facts bearing on the outcome, informed by its unique vantage point and day to day experience in criminal sentencing, and then exercises its traditional sentencing discretion. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98, 116 S.Ct. 2035.

The Fourth Circuit has narrowly construed downward departures based on family ties. See United States v. Spedden,

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Bluebook (online)
249 F. Supp. 2d 740, 91 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1339, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4293, 2003 WL 1192859, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-colp-vaed-2003.