United States v. Clinton Lyon Mayes

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: October 7, 2024
• Docket: 24-5079
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0402n.06

Case No. 24-5079

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Oct 07, 2024 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiff-Appellee, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN v. ) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY ) CLINTON LYON MAYES, ) ) OPINION Defendant-Appellant. )

Before: McKEAGUE, KETHLEDGE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Clinton Mayes pleaded guilty to possession of child

pornography after law enforcement officers found explicit images of minor children on his

electronic devices. The default maximum sentence for possession of child pornography is ten

years, but a ten-year mandatory minimum applies if the defendant has a prior state conviction “relating to . . . sexual abuse.” Mayes was previously convicted in Kentucky state court of engaging

in “deviate sexual intercourse” with a child under the age of fourteen. Based on this prior

conviction, the district court applied the ten-year mandatory minimum. Mayes appeals his

sentence, arguing that his prior conviction is not a “categorical match” to sexual abuse.

This argument fails, and the district court properly applied the ten-year mandatory

minimum. We AFFIRM. No. 24-5079, United States v. Mayes

I.

In February 2023, Mayes was indicted on one count of possession of child pornography,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Mayes entered into a plea agreement and pleaded

guilty to possession of child pornography while reserving his right to appeal his sentence. The

default statutory maximum for possession of child pornography is ten years. 18 U.S.C. §

2252(b)(2). However, § 2252(b)(2) applies a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence if the defendant “has a prior conviction . . . under the laws of any State relating to . . . sexual abuse.” Id.

In 2003, Mayes was convicted of second-degree sodomy in Kentucky. At the time of

Mayes’s conviction, the statute prohibited a person who is eighteen years old or older from

“engag[ing] in deviate sexual intercourse with another person less than fourteen (14) years old.”

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.080(1)(a) (2002) (amended 2018). Kentucky law defines “deviate sexual

intercourse” as “any act of sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one person and the

mouth or anus of another; or penetration of the anus of one person by a foreign object manipulated

by another person.” Id. § 510.010(1) (2002) (amended 2012).

Prior to sentencing, the Presentence Report (“PSR”) found that this prior conviction

triggered the ten-year mandatory minimum. Over Mayes’s objection, the district court adopted the PSR’s recommendation and applied the mandatory minimum, sentencing Mayes to ten years in

prison. Mayes timely appealed.

II.

This court “reviews de novo a district court’s legal conclusion that a prior conviction

triggers a mandatory minimum sentence.” United States v. Gardner, 649 F.3d 437, 442 (6th Cir.

2011). On appeal, Mayes argues that his prior second-degree sodomy conviction does not trigger

the ten-year mandatory minimum because under Kentucky law, second-degree sodomy does not

contain an element “involving ‘abuse.’” Appellant Br. 6.

2 No. 24-5079, United States v. Mayes

“When deciding whether a prior state-law conviction triggers an enhanced sentence, we

begin with a categorical approach.” United States v. Mateen, 806 F.3d 857, 859 (6th Cir. 2015)

(citing Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 260–61 (2013)). Under this approach, we “‘look

only to the statutory definitions’—i.e., the elements—of a defendant’s prior offenses, and not ‘to

the particular facts underlying those convictions.’” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261 (quoting Taylor v.

United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)).

In this case, § 2252(b)(2)’s mandatory minimum applies when the prior state conviction

“relat[es] to” sexual abuse. See Mateen, 806 F.3d at 860. The state conviction only needs to be

“associated” with sexual abuse. Id. at 861; see also United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 638

(9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Hardin, 998 F.3d 582, 588–89 (4th Cir. 2021). Combine the

categorical approach with the broad language of § 2252(b)(2), and the question becomes whether

second-degree sodomy “necessarily relates to ‘sexual abuse.’” United States v. Armes, 953 F.3d

875, 879 (6th Cir. 2020).

We define “sexual abuse” by its ordinary meaning: “the use or treatment of so as to injure,

hurt, or damage for the purpose of sexual or libidinal gratification.” Mateen, 806 F.3d at 861. Other

circuits use a comparable definition. See, e.g., United States v. Sinerius, 504 F.3d 737, 740–41 (9th

Cir. 2007); United States v. Barker, 723 F.3d 315, 324 (2d Cir. 2013) (defining “abusive sexual conduct involving a minor” as “misuse or maltreatment of a minor for a purpose associated with

sexual gratification” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Sonnenberg, 556 F.3d

667, 671 (8th Cir. 2009) (defining “sexual” as “the intent to seek libidinal gratification”). We adopt

the same definition here.

Mayes argues that second-degree sodomy is not related to sexual abuse because the statute

prohibits only “sexual conduct with someone incapable of legally consenting.” Appellant Br. 6.

The government responds that “non-consensual sexual contact by virtue of age categorically

qualifies as sexual abuse.” Appellee Br. 4 (internal marks omitted).

3 No. 24-5079, United States v. Mayes

At the time of Mayes’s prior conviction, Kentucky’s sodomy statute prohibited “deviate

sexual intercourse” between a person eighteen or over and a minor under fourteen. See Ky. Rev.

Stat. § 510.080(1)(a) (2002) (amended 2018). We previously held that “‘sexual intercourse’ is

‘sexual.’ And when an adult takes sexual advantage of a child or early teen, that’s ‘abuse.’” Armes,

953 F.3d at 880; see also Mateen, 806 F.3d at 862 (acknowledging that sexual contact that is non-

consensual by virtue of age is abusive). The Supreme Court and our sister circuits have reached

similar conclusions. See, e.g., Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385, 397 (2017) (noting a

consensus that “sexual intercourse is abusive solely because of the ages of the participants” when the victim is under sixteen); United States v. Grimes, 888 F.3d 1012, 1016 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding

that New York’s second-degree sodomy statute “relates to” abusive sexual conduct involving a

minor); United States v. Ragonese, 47 F.4th 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2022) (same for New York’s first-

degree sodomy statute).

We hold that “deviate sexual intercourse” by a person eighteen or over with a minor under

fourteen categorically “relates to” sexual abuse. Therefore, the district court properly concluded

that Mayes’s prior state conviction triggers the ten-year mandatory minimum under § 2252(b)(2).

III.

We AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.