United States v. Clifton

35 M.J. 79, 1992 CMA LEXIS 161, 1992 WL 207920
CourtUnited States Court of Military Appeals
DecidedAugust 28, 1992
DocketNo. 67,010; CM 9001061
StatusPublished
Cited by131 cases

This text of 35 M.J. 79 (United States v. Clifton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Military Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Clifton, 35 M.J. 79, 1992 CMA LEXIS 161, 1992 WL 207920 (cma 1992).

Opinion

Opinion of the Court

CRAWFORD, Judge:

In February and March 1990, appellant was tried by a general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted members at Fort Carson, Colorado. Contrary to his pleas, appellant was convicted of rape and burglary, in violation of Articles 120 and 129, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 920 and 929,. respectively. Appellant was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 3 years, total forfeitures, and reduction to Private El. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence. On May 2, 1991, the Court of Military Review affirmed the findings and sentence in an unpublished opinion.

This Court granted review on December 2, 1991, on the following issues:

I
WHETHER THE U.S. ARMY COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW FAILED TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IN A CASE WHICH WAS LITTLE MORE THAN A SWEARING CONTEST.
II
WHETHER THE U.S. ARMY COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW’S CONCLUSORY OPINION DENIED APPELLANT MILITARY DUE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, BY FAILING TO SPECIFY WHY THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD WAS LEGALLY AND FACTUALLY SUFFICIENT [80]*80TO UPHOLD APPELLANT’S CONVICTION SO AS TO AFFORD HIM A BASIS FOR FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW.

FACTS

As is frequently the situation in a case of alleged rape where there are neither eyewitnesses nor overt or obvious, readily discernible physical injuries to the victim, the evidence consists of the testimony of the victim and the accused. Not surprisingly, their accounts are often contradictory on various salient points including the issue of consent. Such was the case here.

The facts asserted by the government witnesses are as follows. On the evening of November 18, 1989, appellant and his victim, Private El (PV1) D, socialized with several other soldiers at a dance club. PV1 D danced with appellant, but did not kiss or flirt with him and rebuffed the advances he made towards her. Around 0200 hours the next morning, appellant and several others returned to his barracks room for a nightcap. Because PV1 D’s roommate fell asleep in appellant’s room, appellant went across the hall to PV1 D’s room looking for a place to sleep. He remained while PV1 D slept until he and PV1 D’s roommate were both told by the Charge of Quarters to return to their own rooms.

On the afternoon of November 19, 1989, PV1 D went to a barracks room and began drinking heavily with several friends. They drank until 1400 hours, consuming at least one and one-half bottles of Jack Daniels. Around 1500 hours, PV1 D returned to her own room, vomited, changed into a T-shirt and underwear, and went to bed.

Sometime later, around 1800 hours, while PV1 D slept, appellant entered her room without her authority or knowledge. PV1 D awoke to find appellant raping her. Upon awakening, she told appellant she didn’t want to have sex with him. Yet appellant persisted, saying, “You don’t want me to stop.” Appellant continued to persist until PV1 D was finally able to push him away; appellant did not ejaculate. As appellant retreated PV1 D threw something at him and told him to get out. Appellant then hastily dressed and departed the room, leaving behind his brown underwear. PV1 D showered and immediately thereafter reported the incident to her friends and military authorities.

Appellant first claimed but later denied he had entered PV1 D’s room with her roommate’s permission. Both PV1 D and her roommate denied giving appellant permission to enter their room on the occasion in question. Appellant explained his actions to a staff sergeant stating first that he and the victim had “made love,” but then changed his claim to, “Nah, we had sex.”

The facts asserted by appellant are as follows. On the evening of November 18, 1989, at the dance club, PV1 D and appellant danced most of the dances together. PV1 D had her arms around appellant’s waist while they watched a game of pool, and PV1 D was draped over appellant most of the evening. Upon returning to their quarters, PV1 D’s roommate fell asleep in appellant’s room and appellant went to PV1 D’s room to sleep. Appellant testified that they slept in the same bed.

Appellant concurs that the next day PV1 D was drinking with friends, went to her room, vomited, and went to bed. Appellant asserts, however, that PV1 D may have been naked from the waist up rather than clad in a T-shirt. Appellant also asserts PV1 D’s roommate asked people to go up to her room to check on her. When appellant went up to check on PV1 D, he entered the room and tapped her on the shoulder, and she responded “yes” and went back to sleep. Appellant tapped her on the shoulder a second time and appellant asserts that PV1 D responded by putting her arms around his neck and kissing him. PV1 D appeared to be nude. After a period of kissing each other on the shoulders, neck, face, and chest areas, appellant removed his clothes and got into bed with PV1 D who resumed kissing and fondling his thighs, penis, shoulders, and waist. Appellant also fondled PV1 D, including her crotch. Upon finding her crotch area to be wet, appellant and PV1 D engaged in consensual sexual intercourse; appellant did not ejaculate because he wasn’t sure [81]*81whether PV1 D was using any form of contraception. Following the intercourse, appellant claims PV1 D ordered him to leave her room. He says that because her room was dark, he was unable to find his underwear.

PV1 D was taken to the emergency room after she reported being raped. No evidence of pelvic trauma was found; the only marks on her body were a “hickey” on her right breast and a minor abrasion on her wrist approximately where a wristwatch is worn. No semen was found on PY1 D’s vaginal swabs, clothes, or bed sheets. The only evidence of sexual intercourse was the presence of both PV1 D’s and appellant’s pubic hairs.

DISCUSSION

The court below affirmed appellant’s conviction in a “Memorandum Opinion.” The court decided three issues. First, applying the appropriate standards of review, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support findings of guilty of the charged offenses. Second, applying the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and United States v. Scott, 24 MJ 186 (CMA 1987), the court rejected appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 MJ 431 (CMA 1982). Third, the court held that the assertions of error made by appellant’s mother during a post-trial Article 39(a)1 session and the remaining assertions of error raised by appellant pursuant to Grostefon lacked merit.

Turning to the granted issues, appellant complains that the opinion below inadequately dealt with the evidence which consisted of little more than a swearing contest and that disposition of his claim of insufficiency of the evidence by a “Memorandum Opinion” denied him military due process and effective assistance of counsel.

At the heart of appellant’s complaint is an attack on the discretion of appellate courts to issue abbreviated opinions. This Court2

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Bluebook (online)
35 M.J. 79, 1992 CMA LEXIS 161, 1992 WL 207920, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-clifton-cma-1992.