Case: 19-13887 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-13887 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:99-cr-00674-ELR-ECS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLIFFORD TIMMONS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(July 21, 2020)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, GRANT and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-13887 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 2 of 6
Clifford Timmons appeals the denial of his motion for a reduction in
sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act. He argues that the district court
erred when it considered the quantity of drugs found at sentencing in determining
that he was ineligible for relief because his crime was not a “covered offense”
under the Act. Although we agree with Timmons that his conviction involved a
covered offense under the Act, we conclude that the district committed no
reversible error in denying his motion because Timmons received the lowest
statutory penalty available for his offense. We affirm.
We review de novo whether a district court had the authority to modify a
term of imprisonment under the Act. United States v. Jones, No. 19-11505,
manuscript op. at 10 (11th Cir. June 16, 2020). We review the denial of an eligible
movant’s request for a reduced sentence under the Act for an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 11. A district court abuses its discretion when it “applies an incorrect legal
standard.” Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015)
(quotation marks omitted). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record.
United States v. Gibbs, 917 F.3d 1289, 1294 n.1 (11th Cir. 2019). District courts
lack the inherent authority to modify a term of imprisonment but may do so to the
extent that a statute expressly permits. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). The First Step
Act expressly permits district courts to reduce a previously imposed term of
imprisonment. Jones, No. 19-11505, manuscript op. at 14.
2 Case: 19-13887 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 3 of 6
The Fair Sentencing Act, enacted on August 3, 2010, reduced the sentencing
disparity between crack-cocaine and powder-cocaine offenses. Fair Sentencing
Act; see Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268–69 (2012). Section 2 of the
Fair Sentencing Act changed the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger a
mandatory-minimum sentence of ten years from 50 grams to 280 grams and the
quantity necessary to trigger a mandatory-minimum sentence of five years from 5
grams to 28 grams. Fair Sentencing Act § 2(a)(1)-(2); see also 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii). These amendments were not made retroactive to
defendants sentenced before August 3, 2010. United States v. Berry, 701 F.3d 374,
377 (11th Cir. 2012). The Fair Sentencing Act did not make any changes to
section 841(b)(1)(C), which provides for a term of imprisonment of not more than
twenty years for offenses involving quantities of crack that do not fall within
sections 841(b)(1)(A) or (B)—that is, quantities below 28 grams. See Fair
Sentencing Act § 2(a); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which made retroactive the
statutory penalties for covered offenses under the Fair Sentencing Act. See First
Step Act § 404. Under section 404(b) of the First Step Act, a district court “that
imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if
sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the
covered offense was committed.” Id. § 404(b). The Act defines “covered offense”
3 Case: 19-13887 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 4 of 6
as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were
modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . , that was committed
before August 3, 2010.” Id. § 404(a). The First Step Act provides that “[n]othing
in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant
to this section.” Id. § 404(c).
In Jones, we considered the appeals of four prisoners whose motions for a
reduction of sentence under section 404(b) were denied. See Jones, No. 19-11505,
manuscript op. at 4. We held that a movant was convicted of a “covered offense” if
he was convicted of a crack offense that triggered the penalties in
sections 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) or (B)(iii). Id. at 21. We interpreted the phrase “the
statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act” to modify the term “violation of a Federal criminal statute.” Id. at
15; see First Step Act § 404(a). So “a movant’s offense is a covered offense if
section two or three of the Fair Sentencing Act modified its statutory penalties.”
Jones, No. 19-11505, manuscript op. at 16. Because section two of the Fair
Sentencing Act “modified the statutory penalties for crack offenses that have as an
element the quantity of crack provided in subsections 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and
(B)(iii),” a movant has a covered offense if he was sentenced for an offense that
triggered one of those statutory penalties. Id.
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We explained that the “as if” qualifier in section 404(b) of the First Step Act,
which states that any reduction must be “as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed,”
imposes two limitations on the authority of a district court to reduce an eligible
movant’s sentence. Id. at 28 (quotation marks omitted); see First Step Act
§ 404(b). First, the district court cannot reduce a sentence where the movant
received the lowest statutory penalty that would also be available to him under the
Fair Sentencing Act. Jones, No. 19-11505, manuscript op. at 28. Second, in
determining what a movant’s statutory penalty would have been under the Fair
Sentencing Act, the district court is bound by a previous drug-quantity finding that
was used to determine the movant’s statutory penalty at the time of sentencing. Id.
The district court erred in ruling that Timmons was not convicted of a
covered offense under the First Step Act. Timmons was charged with possession
with intent to distribute crack, and the district court made a finding that the offense
involved 35.67 grams of crack, which triggered the statutory penalties in section
841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Because the Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties
for offenses that involved 5 grams or more of crack by raising the amount
triggering the mandatory-minimum sentence in section 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) to 28
grams, Timmons has a covered offense. See Jones, No. 19-11505, manuscript op.
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Case: 19-13887 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-13887 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:99-cr-00674-ELR-ECS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLIFFORD TIMMONS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(July 21, 2020)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, GRANT and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-13887 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 2 of 6
Clifford Timmons appeals the denial of his motion for a reduction in
sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act. He argues that the district court
erred when it considered the quantity of drugs found at sentencing in determining
that he was ineligible for relief because his crime was not a “covered offense”
under the Act. Although we agree with Timmons that his conviction involved a
covered offense under the Act, we conclude that the district committed no
reversible error in denying his motion because Timmons received the lowest
statutory penalty available for his offense. We affirm.
We review de novo whether a district court had the authority to modify a
term of imprisonment under the Act. United States v. Jones, No. 19-11505,
manuscript op. at 10 (11th Cir. June 16, 2020). We review the denial of an eligible
movant’s request for a reduced sentence under the Act for an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 11. A district court abuses its discretion when it “applies an incorrect legal
standard.” Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015)
(quotation marks omitted). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record.
United States v. Gibbs, 917 F.3d 1289, 1294 n.1 (11th Cir. 2019). District courts
lack the inherent authority to modify a term of imprisonment but may do so to the
extent that a statute expressly permits. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). The First Step
Act expressly permits district courts to reduce a previously imposed term of
imprisonment. Jones, No. 19-11505, manuscript op. at 14.
2 Case: 19-13887 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 3 of 6
The Fair Sentencing Act, enacted on August 3, 2010, reduced the sentencing
disparity between crack-cocaine and powder-cocaine offenses. Fair Sentencing
Act; see Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268–69 (2012). Section 2 of the
Fair Sentencing Act changed the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger a
mandatory-minimum sentence of ten years from 50 grams to 280 grams and the
quantity necessary to trigger a mandatory-minimum sentence of five years from 5
grams to 28 grams. Fair Sentencing Act § 2(a)(1)-(2); see also 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii). These amendments were not made retroactive to
defendants sentenced before August 3, 2010. United States v. Berry, 701 F.3d 374,
377 (11th Cir. 2012). The Fair Sentencing Act did not make any changes to
section 841(b)(1)(C), which provides for a term of imprisonment of not more than
twenty years for offenses involving quantities of crack that do not fall within
sections 841(b)(1)(A) or (B)—that is, quantities below 28 grams. See Fair
Sentencing Act § 2(a); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which made retroactive the
statutory penalties for covered offenses under the Fair Sentencing Act. See First
Step Act § 404. Under section 404(b) of the First Step Act, a district court “that
imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if
sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the
covered offense was committed.” Id. § 404(b). The Act defines “covered offense”
3 Case: 19-13887 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 4 of 6
as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were
modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . , that was committed
before August 3, 2010.” Id. § 404(a). The First Step Act provides that “[n]othing
in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant
to this section.” Id. § 404(c).
In Jones, we considered the appeals of four prisoners whose motions for a
reduction of sentence under section 404(b) were denied. See Jones, No. 19-11505,
manuscript op. at 4. We held that a movant was convicted of a “covered offense” if
he was convicted of a crack offense that triggered the penalties in
sections 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) or (B)(iii). Id. at 21. We interpreted the phrase “the
statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act” to modify the term “violation of a Federal criminal statute.” Id. at
15; see First Step Act § 404(a). So “a movant’s offense is a covered offense if
section two or three of the Fair Sentencing Act modified its statutory penalties.”
Jones, No. 19-11505, manuscript op. at 16. Because section two of the Fair
Sentencing Act “modified the statutory penalties for crack offenses that have as an
element the quantity of crack provided in subsections 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and
(B)(iii),” a movant has a covered offense if he was sentenced for an offense that
triggered one of those statutory penalties. Id.
4 Case: 19-13887 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 5 of 6
We explained that the “as if” qualifier in section 404(b) of the First Step Act,
which states that any reduction must be “as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed,”
imposes two limitations on the authority of a district court to reduce an eligible
movant’s sentence. Id. at 28 (quotation marks omitted); see First Step Act
§ 404(b). First, the district court cannot reduce a sentence where the movant
received the lowest statutory penalty that would also be available to him under the
Fair Sentencing Act. Jones, No. 19-11505, manuscript op. at 28. Second, in
determining what a movant’s statutory penalty would have been under the Fair
Sentencing Act, the district court is bound by a previous drug-quantity finding that
was used to determine the movant’s statutory penalty at the time of sentencing. Id.
The district court erred in ruling that Timmons was not convicted of a
covered offense under the First Step Act. Timmons was charged with possession
with intent to distribute crack, and the district court made a finding that the offense
involved 35.67 grams of crack, which triggered the statutory penalties in section
841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Because the Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties
for offenses that involved 5 grams or more of crack by raising the amount
triggering the mandatory-minimum sentence in section 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) to 28
grams, Timmons has a covered offense. See Jones, No. 19-11505, manuscript op.
at 23-24; Fair Sentencing Act § 2.
5 Case: 19-13887 Date Filed: 07/21/2020 Page: 6 of 6
Nevertheless, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record, which
establishes that the district court lacked the authority to reduce Timmons’s
sentence. Timmons received the lowest statutory penalty that would also be
available to him under the Fair Sentencing Act. The district court was bound by its
earlier finding that Timmons was responsible for 35.67 grams of crack. See Jones,
No. 19-11505, manuscript op. at 28. Based on that drug-quantity finding,
Timmons’s statutory sentencing range remained 5 to 40 years of imprisonment
both before and after the Fair Sentencing Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii)
(2012); id. (2002). Because Timmons’s sentence for his drug offenses was equal to
the lowest statutory penalty that would be available to him under the Fair
Sentencing Act—a sentence of five years of imprisonment—the First Step Act did
not permit the district court to reduce his sentence.
AFFIRMED.