United States v. Clifford E. Davis

442 F.2d 72, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10357
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedMay 6, 1971
Docket431-70_1
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 442 F.2d 72 (United States v. Clifford E. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Clifford E. Davis, 442 F.2d 72, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10357 (10th Cir. 1971).

Opinion

ADAMS, Circuit Judge.

The question raised by this appeal is whether comments by the trial judge so intimidated defendant’s attorney that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

Defendant, Clifford E. Davis, was convicted in a trial before a jury on two counts of violating 21 U.S.C. § 331 (q) (2) by unlawfully selling to a narcotics agent a quantity of pentobarbital and secobarbital, “depressant or stimulant drug[s]” within the meanin of 21 U.S.C. § 321 (v) (l). 1

Following extensive pre-trial motions and hearings, Davis’ case was called for trial on April 21, 1969. At that time, Davis’ attorney, Mr. Hansen, attempted to discuss with the court the desire of a defendant in a different matter to have Mr. Hansen serve as her counsel.

A colloquy between the court and counsel then occurred. Set forth in extenso in the appendix is the part of the colloquy particularly apposite to this appeal. We note that much of what counsel for the defendant said and did may be subject to some criticism. However, that is not the issue here. The question with which we mus't deal is whether the exchange between court and counsel functioned, in effect, to deprive the defendant of effective assistance of counsel.

As stated by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, for admonitions to counsel “to constitute ground [s] for reversal, it must appear that in some way the judge’s conduct operated to deprive the defendant of his right to * * * [the] effective assistance of counsel * * * ” Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 976, 983 (5th Cir. 1968); Johnson v. United States, 356 F.2d 680, 683 (8th Cir. 1966); cf. Paddock v. United States, 320 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1963). When counsel is so unnerved that he cannot “devote his best talents to the defense of his client, then this is ground for reversal, no matter what counsel’s experience and equipoise may be.” Bursten, supra 395 F.2d at 983.

The trial court’s comments in this case clearly appear to have intimidated defendant’s attorneys. One of the defense attorneys stated in open court during the course .of the exchange that he felt the *74 court had demeaned counsel and that such counsel was afraid to be a-vigorous advocate for fear of the judge’s reaction, After the court had told counsel three times that counsel needed a lawyer for himself, had questioned counsel’s competence, and had stated that the court would have counsel investigated by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Association, counsel moved for trial before a different judge in the district. We believe the judge had an obligation to grant counsel’s motion, and under the unusual circumstances in this case failure to grant this motion denied the defendant effective assistance of counsel. But compare Cooper v. United States, 403 F.2d 71, 73 (10th Cir. 1968).

There is an additional matter upon which we consider it appropriate to comment. The government’s chief witness against the defendant was the special agent in charge of the Salt Lake City District Office of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Chris V. Saiz. He testified that Davis sold him the drugs on the two occasions in question — allegations which Davis vigorously denied with respect to one of the times, and admitted but defended with an affirmative defense with respect to the other. On July 24, 1969, Saiz was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Central District of California for conspiring to corrupt justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, to make false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, to commit perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621, to suborn perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1622, and to deprive willfully one-Romero of his constitutional rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. The purpose of the Saiz conspiracy was to convict Romero of violating federal narcotics laws. Saiz pleaded guilty to count twelve of the indictment, thereby admitting the civil rights violation, and received a one year suspended sentence. The other counts — including those charging perjury — were dismissed. The period of the alleged conspiracy was May 10, 1966 until March 5, 1969, thereby encompassing the time in which the sales charged here — December 26, 1968 and February 10, 1969 — were made.

A recent decision of the Ninth Circuit reviewing a case in which Saiz also testified has considered what disposition should be made of a case similar to the present one. Judge Duniway said:

“We do not consider the dismissal of the other counts, obviously part of a plea bargain, as rehabilitating the veracity of Saiz or Downing for the purposes of Chisum’s case.

In our opinion, this case is not governed by the ordinary rules governing motions for a new trial. Rather, it falls within the principles announced in Mesarosh v. United States, 1956, 352 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1, 1 L.Ed.2d 1”. United States v. Chisum, 436 F.2d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1971).

In Mesarosh, the government advised the Supreme Court that one of its witnesses had lied in several other proceedings, and requested a remand to the district court to determine the question of the witness’ truthfulness at the trial of the Mesarosh case. Since the government’s statement raised a doubt about the witness’ veracity, the Supreme Court, exercising its supervisory jurisdiction over federal courts, viewed the matter as sufficiently serious to require a new trial. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit granted a new trial in Chisum. While we make no holding on this issue in this case, we do express concern regarding the handling of such possibly tainted evidence in a federal prosecution.

The judgment of the district court will be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.

Appendix

THE COURT: So you promptly jumped onto the bridge and were caught, is that it?

MR. HANSEN: That is not correct, your Honor.

So I immediately told her the first thing that would have to be done would be that she would have to talk to her law *75

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Bluebook (online)
442 F.2d 72, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10357, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-clifford-e-davis-ca10-1971.