United States v. Cleveland (In Re Cleveland)

64 B.R. 810, 15 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 864, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5297
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. California
DecidedSeptember 17, 1986
Docket19-00620
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 64 B.R. 810 (United States v. Cleveland (In Re Cleveland)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Cleveland (In Re Cleveland), 64 B.R. 810, 15 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 864, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5297 (Cal. 1986).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JOHN J. HARGROVE, Bankruptcy Judge.

I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter came before this Court on the motion of the United States of America (“United States”) for summary judgment on its adversary complaint to determine dischargeability of a guaranteed student loan obtained by the debtor defendant, Stephen George Cleveland (“debtor”) under the auspices of the Health Education Assistance Loan program (“HEAL”), 42 U.S.C. § 294.

At the hearing, this Court also considered the matter of the debtor’s motion to strike the amended complaint as well as the motion of the United States to vacate the order of confirmation or to modify the Chapter 13 plan.

*811 II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 30, 1983, the debtor obtained a HEAL loan in the amount of $12,000.00 through First American Bank, Washington, D.C., in order to attend the California School of Professional Psychology for his education in clinical psychology. Apparently, due to academic deficiencies, in May or June of 1984, the debtor was terminated from the doctorate program at California School of Professional Psychology. Thereafter, the debtor obtained a full time job as a mental health worker at a local hospital. He made no payments on the HEAL loan and on October 18, 1985 filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The original confirmation hearing was set for December 2, 1985, by Court notice dated October 23, 1985. However, that hearing date was subsequently vacated by the Court because of improper notice to creditors given by the Court. The confirmation hearing was rescheduled for January 9, 1986 by Court notice dated December 13, 1986. The Loan Servicing Center for the Student Loan Marketing Association (“SALLIE MAE”) which had purchased and received an assignment of the debtor’s HEAL note from First American Bank, received notice from the Bankruptcy Court of the debtor’s confirmation hearing on December 16, 1985.

At the plan confirmation hearing on January 9, 1986, the Chapter 13 trustee objected to the debtor’s plan inter alia on the ground that the plan was not proposed in “good faith”. At the confirmation hearing, the debtor amended his plan by interline-ation and thereby increased the monthly payments to the Chapter 13 trustee from $43.00 to $117.00 a month. The approximate result of the increased monthly payments over the 60 month life of the plan was to increase the percentage of repayment to unsecured creditors from approximately 3% to 18%. The United States did not appear at the hearing nor did it file written objections to the plan, which was confirmed as amended on January 9, 1986.

The United States initially filed its adversary proceeding objecting to the discharge of the HEAL loan on March 18, 1986. An amended complaint was filed on April 15, 1986. On May 13,1986, the debtor filed his motion to strike the amended complaint and on June 24, 1986 the United States filed its motion for summary judgment. Additionally, on June 24, 1986, the United States filed its Motion to Vacate Order of Confirmation or to Modify Plan. The matters were consolidated for hearing by this Court.

III.

DISCUSSION

In its motion to vacate the order of confirmation or to modify the plan, the United States argues that the debtor’s plan was not filed in “good faith”. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). This Court finds that the motion of the United States to vacate the previous order of this Court confirming the debtor’s plan is untimely.

It is undisputed that the Loan Servicing Center for the United States received notice of the January 9, 1986 confirmation hearing on December 16, 1985. No written objection to the plan was filed nor was there an appearance by a representative of the United States. Further, the Court notes that the Chapter 13 trustee did file a “bad faith” objection which resulted in the debtor amending his plan to the satisfaction of the Chapter 13 trustee and this Court. There was no assertion by the United States that it did not receive notice or that notice was not timely. Indeed, the United States is silent as to why it did not raise its “good faith” objection prior to the confirmation hearing on January 9, 1986.

The United States also argues that the confirmed plan should be set aside because the confirmation order was procured by fraud. 11 U.S.C. § 1330. In support of this contention, the United States relies on In re Chinichian, 784 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir.1986). This Court holds that In re Chinic Man is not applicable to the facts in this case and further finds that the United *812 States does not support its argument that the confirmation order was procured by fraud with any competent evidence. Accordingly, the motion of the United States to vacate the order confirming the plan or to permit the United States to modify the plan is denied.

In its complaint, the United States argues that a HEAL loan is not dischargea-ble unless the three conditions required by 42 U.S.C. § 294f(g) are met. That section provides:

(g) A debt which is a loan insured under the authority of this subpart may be released by a discharge in bankruptcy under Title 11 only if such discharge is granted—
(1) after the expiration of the 5-year period beginning on the first date, ... when repayment of such loan is required;
(2) upon a finding by the Bankruptcy Court that the nondischarge of such debt would be unconscionable; and
(3) upon the condition that the Secretary shall not have waived the Secretary’s rights to apply subsection (f) of this section to the borrower and the discharged debt.

Section 294f(g) is an absolute prohibition against discharge of the loan in question prior to expiration of the five-year period commencing with the first date repayment begins. After the five year period expires, the loan may be discharged upon a finding by the Bankruptcy Court that nondischarge would be unconscionable. In re Hampton, 47 B.R. 47, 49 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1985).

In this case, the debtor’s repayment period begin on or about May 1, 1985. Consequently, the debtor’s obligation would be precluded from consideration for discharge until April 30, 1990.

Generally, § 1328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code serves to discharge even those student loans listed in § 523(a)(8), which, in a Chapter 7 case, would not be discharged. Recent case law, however, establishes that the dischargeability of HEAL loans is not governed by § 523 or § 1328 but rather by 42 U.S.C. § 294f(g). In re Johnson,

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Bluebook (online)
64 B.R. 810, 15 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 864, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5297, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-cleveland-in-re-cleveland-casb-1986.