OPINION OF THE COURT
ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal raises questions concerning the guidelines formulated by this court in United States v. Barber, 442 F. 2d 517 (3d Cir. 1971), for jury instructions on identification. Appellant, Claude Lamott Wilford, Jr., was tried to a jury and convicted of one count of unlawful distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to a term of eight years plus a special parole term of three years. On appeal, he contends that the failure of the trial judge to specifically instruct the jury on eyewitness identification constitutes reversible error. We affirm.
On the afternoon of December 18, 1972, Agents Britt and Malloy of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and James Vaughn, a paid Government informer, met and formulated plans to purchase narcotics from an individual known to Vaughn as “La-mott” living at 2606 Bowers Street, Wilmington, Delaware. About 5:15 that afternoon, after searching Vaughn to assure that he had no narcotics or money on his person, the agents provided Vaughn with $40 and drove him to a housing project located near the intersection of 24th and Bowers Streets. The two agents remained in the car and observed Vaughn as he walked to 2606 Bowers Street, knocked on the front door, and talked to a man at the doorway. The agents then observed Vaughn leave the residence and return to the car where he turned over four glassine packages containing white powder. Field testing and chemical analysis showed that the substance was heroin. Wilford was arrested on January 4, 1973, and tried on May 4.
On direct examination Vaughn testified that on two or three prior occasions he had purchased narcotics from Wilford. He- positively identified Wilford in court as the person from whom he purchased narcotics on December 18. Vaughn further testified that he purchased the narcotics as he and Wilford stood in the open doorway of the Bowers Street residence, after Wilford came downstairs in response to his knock.
During the transaction, Agents Britt and Malloy remained in the parked car, approximately 150-200 feet from the [732]*732Bowers Street residence. Although both testified that they observed two men at the doorway and could identify one as Vaughn, neither was able to positively identify the individual with whom Vaughn was talking.1 Malloy, however, testified that just prior to his observations of the two men at the doorway he saw a Negro male leaning out of a second floor window of the residence. Mal-loy definitely identified the individual as Wilford2 and he adhered to this positive identification on cross-examination.3
Wilford took the stand in defense. He admitted that he, together with his mother, two brothers and a sister, lived at 2606 Bowers Street. He denied, however, ever having met or seen James Vaughn prior to his arrest on January 4. In addition, he denied that he sold Vaughn anything on December 18 or at any time. Although he did not deny that he could have been at his residence on December 18, he testified that he could not recall where he was at that time. Concerning Malloy’s positive identification at the second story window, Wilford asserted that screens on the window prevented him from looking out and that even had he leaned out, poor lighting at the housing project would have made identification impossible.
Relying on our recent decision in United States v. Barber, Wilford’s sole assignment of error is the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury that identification testimony should be “received with caution and scrutinized with care.”4 He maintains that the evidence introduced on that issue, the testimony of Vaughn and Malloy, failed to [733]*733meet the four criteria outlined in Barber. . Under such circumstances, he contends that under Barber, the trial court was compelled, on its own motion and absent a request, to give an appropriate cautionary instruction.
In Barber we dealt with a special set of facts. Seven defendants were charged in four counts of an indictment with assaulting FBI agents, conspiring to commit such assaults, and assisting a federal prisoner to escape from custody. Fifteen men had approached the two FBI agents, Snyder and Grant, and three to four persons had assaulted each agent. Thus, the confusion surrounding the short-lived episode could easily result in misidentification. Many of the eyewitnesses were unclear as to what had occurred and were often self-contradictory. As Judge Aldisert noted:
An affray of such short duration, involving so many participants, affords but limited opportunities for witnesses to observe and to make positive identifications.
442 F.2d 525. Our concern in Barber was with the crucial problem of mistaken identification — a problem which is frequently presented when the prosecution relies on eyewitness testimony to establish the identity of the defendant.5 We noted the often “skeletal” instructions given on this question and sought to insure that where appropriate, cautionary instructions should focus the jury’s attention to the possibility of mistaken identification with sufficient particularity. To achieve this goal, we took occasion, under our supervisory power, to provide trial courts with guidelines that were “require [d]” to be satisfied when cautionary instructions were given.
We first address the contention that Barber requires a cautionary jury charge even absent a request from counsel.6 We do not read Barber to require this result. Barber involved a case where a specific charge was requested. In that context we stated that instructions with sufficient particularity were required.7 We did not direct, as Wilford here contends, that in every case, even absent a request, such instructions are required.8 Our inquiry, therefore, is limited to the question of whether the trial court’s failure to sua [734]*734sponte instruct the jury that the testimony concerning identification should be “received with caution and scrutinized with <?are” constitutes plain error. F.R. Crim. P. 52(b).
In the case sub judice, the issue of good faith mistake in identification did not play such a central role9 that the failure to give cautionary instructions requires reversal. The identification of Wilford by the Government’s central witness Vaughn clearly met the four criteria outlined in Barber, and accordingly, required no’ cautionary instruction.10 The thrust of Wilford’s [735]*735cross-examination of Vaughn, moreover, was directed not to Vaughn’s inability to observe the seller or remember the transaction but rather to Vaughn’s basic credibility. The cross-examination developed that at the time of the alleged transaction Vaughn was a paid informer compensated by Government agents for “useful information,” that he was a heroin addict, and that he was obtaining funds from his activities with the Government as a means of feeding his drug habit. The court accordingly cautioned the jury that the testimony of the informer must be examined and weighed with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness.11
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OPINION OF THE COURT
ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal raises questions concerning the guidelines formulated by this court in United States v. Barber, 442 F. 2d 517 (3d Cir. 1971), for jury instructions on identification. Appellant, Claude Lamott Wilford, Jr., was tried to a jury and convicted of one count of unlawful distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to a term of eight years plus a special parole term of three years. On appeal, he contends that the failure of the trial judge to specifically instruct the jury on eyewitness identification constitutes reversible error. We affirm.
On the afternoon of December 18, 1972, Agents Britt and Malloy of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and James Vaughn, a paid Government informer, met and formulated plans to purchase narcotics from an individual known to Vaughn as “La-mott” living at 2606 Bowers Street, Wilmington, Delaware. About 5:15 that afternoon, after searching Vaughn to assure that he had no narcotics or money on his person, the agents provided Vaughn with $40 and drove him to a housing project located near the intersection of 24th and Bowers Streets. The two agents remained in the car and observed Vaughn as he walked to 2606 Bowers Street, knocked on the front door, and talked to a man at the doorway. The agents then observed Vaughn leave the residence and return to the car where he turned over four glassine packages containing white powder. Field testing and chemical analysis showed that the substance was heroin. Wilford was arrested on January 4, 1973, and tried on May 4.
On direct examination Vaughn testified that on two or three prior occasions he had purchased narcotics from Wilford. He- positively identified Wilford in court as the person from whom he purchased narcotics on December 18. Vaughn further testified that he purchased the narcotics as he and Wilford stood in the open doorway of the Bowers Street residence, after Wilford came downstairs in response to his knock.
During the transaction, Agents Britt and Malloy remained in the parked car, approximately 150-200 feet from the [732]*732Bowers Street residence. Although both testified that they observed two men at the doorway and could identify one as Vaughn, neither was able to positively identify the individual with whom Vaughn was talking.1 Malloy, however, testified that just prior to his observations of the two men at the doorway he saw a Negro male leaning out of a second floor window of the residence. Mal-loy definitely identified the individual as Wilford2 and he adhered to this positive identification on cross-examination.3
Wilford took the stand in defense. He admitted that he, together with his mother, two brothers and a sister, lived at 2606 Bowers Street. He denied, however, ever having met or seen James Vaughn prior to his arrest on January 4. In addition, he denied that he sold Vaughn anything on December 18 or at any time. Although he did not deny that he could have been at his residence on December 18, he testified that he could not recall where he was at that time. Concerning Malloy’s positive identification at the second story window, Wilford asserted that screens on the window prevented him from looking out and that even had he leaned out, poor lighting at the housing project would have made identification impossible.
Relying on our recent decision in United States v. Barber, Wilford’s sole assignment of error is the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury that identification testimony should be “received with caution and scrutinized with care.”4 He maintains that the evidence introduced on that issue, the testimony of Vaughn and Malloy, failed to [733]*733meet the four criteria outlined in Barber. . Under such circumstances, he contends that under Barber, the trial court was compelled, on its own motion and absent a request, to give an appropriate cautionary instruction.
In Barber we dealt with a special set of facts. Seven defendants were charged in four counts of an indictment with assaulting FBI agents, conspiring to commit such assaults, and assisting a federal prisoner to escape from custody. Fifteen men had approached the two FBI agents, Snyder and Grant, and three to four persons had assaulted each agent. Thus, the confusion surrounding the short-lived episode could easily result in misidentification. Many of the eyewitnesses were unclear as to what had occurred and were often self-contradictory. As Judge Aldisert noted:
An affray of such short duration, involving so many participants, affords but limited opportunities for witnesses to observe and to make positive identifications.
442 F.2d 525. Our concern in Barber was with the crucial problem of mistaken identification — a problem which is frequently presented when the prosecution relies on eyewitness testimony to establish the identity of the defendant.5 We noted the often “skeletal” instructions given on this question and sought to insure that where appropriate, cautionary instructions should focus the jury’s attention to the possibility of mistaken identification with sufficient particularity. To achieve this goal, we took occasion, under our supervisory power, to provide trial courts with guidelines that were “require [d]” to be satisfied when cautionary instructions were given.
We first address the contention that Barber requires a cautionary jury charge even absent a request from counsel.6 We do not read Barber to require this result. Barber involved a case where a specific charge was requested. In that context we stated that instructions with sufficient particularity were required.7 We did not direct, as Wilford here contends, that in every case, even absent a request, such instructions are required.8 Our inquiry, therefore, is limited to the question of whether the trial court’s failure to sua [734]*734sponte instruct the jury that the testimony concerning identification should be “received with caution and scrutinized with <?are” constitutes plain error. F.R. Crim. P. 52(b).
In the case sub judice, the issue of good faith mistake in identification did not play such a central role9 that the failure to give cautionary instructions requires reversal. The identification of Wilford by the Government’s central witness Vaughn clearly met the four criteria outlined in Barber, and accordingly, required no’ cautionary instruction.10 The thrust of Wilford’s [735]*735cross-examination of Vaughn, moreover, was directed not to Vaughn’s inability to observe the seller or remember the transaction but rather to Vaughn’s basic credibility. The cross-examination developed that at the time of the alleged transaction Vaughn was a paid informer compensated by Government agents for “useful information,” that he was a heroin addict, and that he was obtaining funds from his activities with the Government as a means of feeding his drug habit. The court accordingly cautioned the jury that the testimony of the informer must be examined and weighed with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness.11 The suggestion that Vaughn was not worthy of belief and had strong motivation to lie, reinforced by Wilford’s denial of the sale, was the central and crucial issue in the case.
The contrast to that of Vaughn, Malloy’s testimony concerning his identification of Wilford at the second story window and uncertain identification at the door12 did raise an issue of the possibility of mistaken identification. Both in his cross-examination of Malloy and in his testimony on direct examination, Wilford raised questions concerning Malloy’s opportunity to observe the figure at the second floor. Malloy’s testimony, however, was not persuasive standing alone. At best, it merely placed Wilford on the premises near the time of the sale and provided some slight support for the credibility of Vaughn on the crucial point of the identity of the man at the door. The issue of mistaken identification, therefore, was at most tangential to the central question in the case, i. e., Vaughn’s credibility. We do not believe that under such circumstances the failure of the trial judge on his own motion to give special cautionary instructions on the issue of mistaken identification was reversible error.13
We share the concern expressed by Judge Adams in his dissent on the shortcomings of eyewitness identification testimony. We do not minimize “the vagaries of eyewitness identification” or the hazards such testimony often raises. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). When convictions obviously turn on the testimony of eyewitnesses who are uncertain, unclear, or inconsistent, the difficulties raised by such evidence are manifest. In such circumstances, a cautionary instruction will help to obviate the danger of erroneous conviction.
The dissent apparently believes that an identification charge should have been given in the case sub judice because Malloy’s testimony may have strengthened the Government’s case in the minds of the jury. As we have indicated, we believe that when the Government’s case rests chiefly on the credibility of an actual party to the alleged transaction, and at best only minimally on the identification testimony of another witness, absent a request by counsel, the failure to give a cautionary identification instruction does not constitute plain error.
The facts of every case vary, and the spectrum of the identification issue may [736]*736range from the obvious to the obscure. In view of the many variations of fact and circumstance which must be considered in determining whether a special cautionary instruction should be given, we are reluctant to impose the responsibility for making this determination upon the trial judge. This is and should remain the responsibility of defense counsel. Counsel knows his case, his witnesses, and his strategy. He should have the duty to alert the court to the identification issue, especially when the issue is less than obvious. To hold that it is plain error to fail to give a special charge in the circumstances of this or similar cases would only encourage lethargy on the part of counsel, and would permit counsel to sow the seeds of error by remaining mute until after the verdict is returned.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.