NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0403n.06
Case No. 23-3924
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED ) Aug 18, 2025 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CLAUDE COLEMAN, ) OHIO Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; STRANCH and RITZ, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Chief Judge. Late on a May evening in Cleveland, officers approached a man
drinking alcohol on a sidewalk in violation of the city’s open container law. He and one other man
were directly next to a running car with two occupants. Several officers approached the four
individuals and engaged with them. At the same time, Officer Friedrich Kaufmann peered into
the window of the car and saw marijuana in an open backpack on the backseat. Officers arrested
the driver, Claude Coleman, and discovered a firearm along with several types of drugs. Coleman
argues that the district court should have suppressed the evidence found in the car because the
police wrongfully seized him under the Fourth Amendment. He also challenges various
evidentiary decisions made at trial along with his career offender designation at sentencing. We
affirm. No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
I.
Just after midnight on May 22, 2021, officers from the Cleveland Police Department
patrolled Gooding Avenue, a one-way street in the Fifth District of Cleveland. Officers drove the
wrong way down the one-way street, hoping to catch potential wrongdoers off-guard. They
spotted a man standing near a running parked car with an open container of alcohol, a violation of
Cleveland’s municipal code. He and another individual were “milling around [the] parked
vehicle.” R.168 at 28–29. The vehicle’s driver’s side window was open.
The officers parked in front of the running car, approached the two pedestrians on foot, and
began to frisk them. Twenty seconds after parking, Officer Friedrich Kaufmann walked by the
car, peered into the rear driver’s side window, and noticed an open backpack in the backseat with
a jar of marijuana in it. While the other officers frisked the pedestrians on the sidewalk, Officer
Kaufmann asked Coleman through his open driver’s side window: “What’s up bro? Hey, do me
a favor. Step out for me. Put your hand right up on the—” Kaufmann Video at 0:01:04–:11.
Coleman interrupted Kaufmann by opening his car door and sprinting away; the officers tackled
and handcuffed him.
Officers walked back to Coleman’s car. Kaufmann told another officer that “there’s some
s**t in this backpack right here. That’s what I was pulling him out for.” Kaufmann Video
0:02:45–:50. Police opened the back driver’s side door and found methamphetamine and two jars
of marijuana in the open backpack. They also discovered a gun, crack cocaine, and fentanyl.
A grand jury indicted Coleman for two counts of drug trafficking, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(C), possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and use of a firearm during
drug trafficking, id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court denied Coleman’s motion to suppress the
evidence taken from the car. Coleman went to trial, and a jury convicted him on all counts.
2 No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
At sentencing, the district court treated Coleman as a career offender based on his prior
Ohio aggravated robbery and drug trafficking convictions. See Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2911.01(A)(1),
2925.03(A)(2). The court calculated a Guidelines range of 360 months to life and sentenced him
to 360 months.
On appeal, Coleman challenges the admission of the evidence seized from his car, several
evidentiary decisions at trial, and his designation as a career offender at sentencing.
II.
Suppression motion. Did the police unlawfully seize Coleman under the Fourth
Amendment when they pulled in front of his parked car? No.
In assessing the denial of a suppression motion, we give clear-error review to the district
court’s factual findings and fresh review to its legal conclusions. United States v. Stevenson, 43
F.4th 641, 644 (6th Cir. 2022). We draw all evidentiary inferences in favor of the prevailing party
below, in this instance the government. United States v. Pyles, 904 F.3d 422, 425 (6th Cir. 2018).
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
All of the circumstances of a search—the “totality” of them, it’s often said—inform whether it is
reasonable. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). To arrest a suspect, officers must have
probable cause to believe that the individual committed a crime. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964). To stop and frisk a suspect, officers must have reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968).
In addition, an officer may protect himself by temporarily detaining “innocent bystanders”
where “necessary to secure the scene of a valid search or arrest.” Bletz v. Gribble, 641 F.3d 743,
755 (6th Cir. 2011). That necessity-driven authority, however, does not amount to a free-ranging
3 No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
license to seize the unsuspected and unsuspecting. The officer must act “out of a justifiable fear
of personal safety,” and any detention must be “limited or routine.” Id. (quoting Ingram v. City of
Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 591–92 (6th Cir. 1999)). These parameters ensure that only the
“exigencies of the situation”—a health emergency, the risk of evidence destruction, officer
safety—make a limited seizure imperative. United States v. Johnson, No. 23-3099, 2024 WL
1956209, at *2 (6th Cir. May 3, 2024) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456
(1948)).
The “risk of harm to both the police and [others] is minimized” when officers take steps to
secure the scene or otherwise take “command of the situation” while investigating criminal
activity. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702–03 (1981). Hence, an officer who pulls a driver
over for a traffic violation may ask the passengers to exit too. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,
413–15 (1997). Even though the passengers aren’t behind the wheel and even though a traffic
violation rarely amounts to a violent crime, a brief detention prevents “sudden violence or frantic
efforts to conceal” evidence. Id. at 414 (quotation omitted). An officer searching a home for an
armed suspect likewise may detain its occupants to prevent flight and minimize other risks to
officer safety. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98–99 (2005).
Even when officers justifiably fear for their safety, the detention of a bystander must be
reasonable in scope and duration. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 & n.21. An officer thus may not
continue to detain innocent bystanders well after officers have secured the crime scene, Bletz, 641
F.3d at 755, and an officer may not handcuff the occupants of a home while arresting a suspect
absent a sign of danger. Ingram, 185 F.3d at 592. But an officer searching a home may, by
contrast, conduct a “routine detention” of its occupants. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.21.
4 No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
By these lights and under these circumstances, the officers justifiably detained Coleman.
The City of Cleveland bans people from possessing “opened container[s] of” “intoxicating liquor”
in a public place. Cleveland Mun. Code. § 617.07(b)(3). When the officers pulled down Gooding
Avenue, they “almost immediately” saw a man with an open container of alcohol standing next to
Coleman’s car. That violation of a local law gave the police probable cause to seize him. Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 819 (1996).
In securing the scene, the officers also reasonably seized Coleman for a brief period of
time. First, the officers acted out of a justifiable concern for personal safety. Cleveland’s Violent
Crime Reduction Program had designated this District as one of the City’s most dangerous
neighborhoods. Officer Kopchak recalled that the area “le[d] the city in shootings.” R.37 at 8.
There were “so many homicides” by Gooding Avenue—at least 12 in the last four to five years—
that he didn’t remember how many people had been killed there. R.37 at 8–10. But he did
remember the constant press of detectives who entered the area to seize firearms and narcotics,
often from individuals connected to violent gangs.
Making the general more specific, officers had received “shots fired” reports two years
before the search at the same “address where this very incident took place.” R.27 at 15, 36–37.
Two weeks earlier, they recovered a firearm and marijuana “three or four houses down” from
where Coleman sat. R.37 at 14–15. And Coleman’s car sat next to a memorial for a man who
others had robbed and killed years earlier. The officers’ knowledge of these criminal acts at that
specific location made Coleman’s presence—at midnight, in a car, in a part of town all agree was
dangerous—“especially fraught.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983). The officers
legitimately acted with commensurate caution when conducting activities in the area.
5 No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
Other features of the encounter further justified the officers’ safety concerns. When
officers seized Coleman, he was sitting in a car within arm’s reach of a suspect the officers were
actively frisking. It was dark, and the police could not initially see into Coleman’s vehicle. That
reality compounded the already “inordinate risk confronting” the officers as they “approache[d] a
person seated in an automobile.” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977). Given the
circumstances, officers justifiably seized Coleman to secure the scene and protect their safety.
Second, the officers conducted a very limited detention. When they turned onto Gooding
Avenue, they “almost immediately” saw a man with an open container and got out of their cars to
investigate. R.37 at 29. Officer Kaufmann detained Coleman and his car no more than 20 seconds
before he saw the marijuana in the backseat and asked him to exit. That brief seizure, used by the
officer to “check[ his] surroundings” and “look[] into the vehicle,” R.37 at 25, constitutes the kind
of “limited” detention officers may conduct out “of a justifiable fear of personal safety,” Bletz, 641
F.3d at 755 (quotation mark omitted).
Coleman’s detention fits within the principle that police officers may, as a precaution, ask
a passenger to exit a car when investigating its driver. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413–15. Yes, the
officers in this instance stopped a driver (Coleman) while investigating a crime by an adjacent
bystander. But the officer-safety risks remain similar because an “occupant of [a] vehicle” next to
an officer “increases the possible sources of harm to” him. Id. at 413. Those officers “can’t see
what anyone” inside a car is doing “from the shoulders down.” R.37 at 32–33. The same officer-
safety principles that give an officer authority to secure passengers in a car suspected of violating
the traffic laws apply when a suspect stands right next to a car and engages with passengers inside.
During that brief spell, the officers obtained probable cause to arrest Coleman. Officer
Kaufmann walked by Coleman’s vehicle and saw marijuana in plain view, supplying probable
6 No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
cause to arrest him for possessing controlled substances. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 449
(2013); United States v. Marxen, 410 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2005). That allowed the officers to
order Coleman out of the car and search the vehicle for other evidence of crime. Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009).
Coleman’s responses fall short. Coleman claims that the investigation of an open-container
violation did not require the officers to detain the three adjacent individuals. His case thus differs,
he claims, from the officer-safety risks at issue in cases like Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005),
where the officers handcuffed occupants of a home while searching for a shooter. The risks to
officer safety differ in the two situations, to be sure. But so, too, does the nature of the initial
detention here—quite brief and without handcuffs. At the same time, the officers here had an on-
the-ground basis for exercising care. Just recently, they had uncovered a gun from an address near
where they found Coleman. The officers in the past had received “several calls” about “shots
fired” on that same street. R. at 15. And a dozen homicides had occurred in the same area in
recent memory.
Bey v. Falk does not undermine this conclusion. 946 F.3d 304 (6th Cir. 2019). There, we
held that police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain a car’s passengers. But in that case,
the officers did not observe “any criminal, or even suspicious behavior” beyond three young men
driving a minivan in a high-crime area at night. Id. at 313–15. Here, the officers permissibly
stopped the pedestrians, one of whom was violating Cleveland’s open container law. See United
States v. Smith, 140 F.4th 316, 320 (6th Cir. 2025).
Coleman maintains that the officer-safety justification does not apply because the officers
first seized him when they drove the wrong way down a one-way street, before they knew about
the open-container violation. As an initial matter, however, that is not how Coleman argued the
7 No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
case below. He claimed in the trial court that the officers seized him when they “surrounded his
vehicle and prevented him from leaving,” all of which occurred after they saw the violation. R.20
at 4; R25 at 1. His new theory, at any rate, requires evidence he never introduced. To establish a
seizure, Coleman would have to show that “a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). So, Coleman’s new
claim would require knowing the distance between his car and the intersection, information he
never presented below and could not even estimate in his appellate briefs or at oral argument. That
leaves us only with this evidence—that the officers “almost immediately” observed the open-
container violation after they turned down the street, suggesting the distance from the intersection
to Coleman’s car was short. R.37 at 29. On this record, the officers fairly stopped Coleman.
Coleman next contends that, even if the officers were justified in initially detaining him,
the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. Not so. Even assuming an arrest occurred when
the officers asked Coleman to exit the car, as opposed to when they handcuffed him after his
attempted flight, officers had probable cause based on the plain-view sighting of marijuana. King,
569 U.S. at 449; Marxen, 410 F.3d at 332.
Coleman counters that the district court clearly erred when it found that the officers saw
the marijuana in his backseat. Not so again. The court supported its conclusion by crediting
Officer Kaufmann’s testimony. We have held that, for clear error purposes, such testimony
standing alone suffices “to establish that the [incriminating evidence] was visible from outside the
car.” United States v. Galaviz, 645 F.3d 347, 356–57 (6th Cir. 2011). Contemporaneous evidence,
moreover, corroborates Kaufmann’s account. Before the officers searched the car, the body
camera footage captured Kaufmann saying, “There’s some s**t in this backpack right here. That’s
what I was pulling him out for.” R.40 at 5. No clear error occurred.
8 No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
United States v. Loines does not change matters either. 56 F.4th 1099 (6th Cir. 2023). We
found clear error only because the government’s photographs of the car’s interior contradicted the
officer’s testimony, making it impossible that the officer saw contraband. Id. at 1107–08.
III.
Evidentiary rulings. Do any evidentiary errors require a new trial? No.
Coleman argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the government to
cross-examine him beyond the scope of his direct examination about the body camera footage, and
by allowing the government to use his prior convictions as proof that he knew how to make crack
cocaine. Rule 611(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence limits cross-examination to “the subject
matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness’s credibility.” We assess
whether the “elicited testimony” was “reasonably related to the inferences drawn from” testimony
elicited on direct examination. United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 1990).
The government’s cross-examination reasonably related to Coleman’s testimony. At trial,
Coleman answered the firearm charge by proposing that officers planted the firearm in his car. On
direct examination, Coleman testified that he “was dumbfounded” when officers told him about
finding the gun, “because there wasn’t a gun in that car.” R.169 at 218. He then introduced body
camera footage of his surprised reaction when the officers found a weapon in the car. Coleman
used this line of questioning to suggest that the officers planted the gun. Under these
circumstances, the government had every right to use this same body camera footage to cross-
examine Coleman about his theory.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the government to use
Coleman’s prior drug trafficking convictions as evidence that Coleman knew how to cook crack
cocaine. Coleman himself introduced these convictions on direct examination, which means he
9 No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
cannot complain that their admission was error now. Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 760
(2000).
Coleman separately argues that the government improperly used two officers, Officers
Donald Kopchak and Friedrich Kaufmann, as opinion witnesses. He did not raise these challenges
below and thus forfeited them. United States v. Hall, 20 F.4th 1085, 1103 (6th Cir. 2021). A party
who forfeits an argument at trial “may obtain relief on appeal only if the error is ‘plain’ and ‘affects
substantial rights.’” United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)). Neither of the district court’s decisions rises to this level.
The Federal Evidence Rules permit reliable and helpful opinion testimony from an expert,
so long as the expert does not opine on whether a criminal defendant’s mental state satisfies “an
element of the crime charged or of a defense.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, 704. An expert opinion satisfies
these requirements if it turns on the witness’s training and experience, aids the juror in determining
a relevant fact, and is based on the reliable application of reliable facts, data, and methodology.
United States v. Rios, 830 F.3d 403, 413 (6th Cir. 2016). The Criminal Rules require the
government to disclose such opinions to the defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G).
The district court did not err, let alone plainly err, in admitting Officer Kopchak’s
testimony that the drug quantities were “more consistent with drug trafficking” than “personal
use.” R.169 at 74. As for the Evidence Rules, Kopchak’s testimony was based on his training and
experience as a police officer. His testimony also helped the jury, as it tended to undermine
Coleman’s “personal use” defense. We have regularly permitted officers to give their opinion on
whether drug quantities suggest trafficking rather than personal use. See, e.g., United States v.
Ham, 628 F.3d 801, 805 (6th Cir. 2011); Hall, 20 F.4th at 1103–04. As for the Criminal Rules,
10 No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
the government provided Coleman notice that Kopchak would testify about drug use and drug
trafficking.
Neither did the district court exceed its discretion when it admitted Officer Kaufmann’s
undisclosed opinion testimony. Even conceding that the government should have disclosed this
testimony under Criminal Rule 16, Coleman has not “show[n] how the outcome of the case would
have been different had he received notice.” Ham, 628 F.3d at 806 (quotation omitted).
Kaufmann’s testimony covered the same topics as Kopchak’s: whether the volume of drugs
suggested personal use or trafficking. The testimony placed Coleman on notice of the potential
questions that an officer could answer. Confirming the point, Coleman’s counsel was prepared for
this line of testimony. He cross-examined Kaufmann about typical drug quantities, about how the
wrapping differs when drugs are for personal use or distribution, and about the settings in which
various drugs are used. Kaufmann’s testimony, moreover, “merely corroborated” other evidence,
including Kopchak’s extensive testimony on the distinction between the volume of drugs
consistent with personal use and that consistent with distribution, making any error harmless.
United States v. Agrawal, 97 F.4th 421, 429 (6th Cir. 2024).
The district court also did not plainly err when it failed to give a cautionary instruction
about Kaufmann’s testimony. We have previously held that such an error is not plain so long as
“the jurors had the tools for properly evaluating the opinions,” such as another witness’s
“testimony.” United States v. Pritchett, 749 F.3d 417, 430 (6th Cir. 2014). Kopchak’s testimony
amply supported Kaufmann’s opinions about the distribution quantity of the drugs.
Coleman separately contends that the district court improperly instructed the jury that the
government established his intent to distribute drugs when it rejected his request for a third cross
11 No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
examination of Officer Kopchak based on his testimony. After Coleman asked to cross-examine
Kopchak to bolster his personal-use defense, the district court stated:
No, we’ve had enough. I’ve given you leeway. No. Have a seat. That issue is clear. There has been testimony to that effect, in a number of witnesses, that there was no evidence in the car of personal use of the drugs as described. It’s not a matter in dispute. Thank you. You can step down.
R.169 at 155–56. Coleman did not raise this challenge before the district court. The parties dispute
whether we should review Coleman’s challenge for plain error as a forfeited due-process claim or
with fresh eyes as an Evidence Rule 605 claim. His argument fails under either standard.
United States v. Johnson sets the rule. 803 F.3d 279, 284 (6th Cir. 2015). There, a district
court, on cross-examination, stated that “based upon the testimony of this witness, both of these
weapons crossed state lines and were in interstate commerce.” Id. (quotation and emphasis
omitted). We said that this offhand comment did not constitute plain error because the district
court did not “instruct[] the jury that an element of the crime had been established.” Id. (emphasis
in original). And we noted that the comment did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights
because the district court clarified to the jury that “[d]eciding what the facts are is your job, not
mine.” Id. (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
Here, too, the district court did not err because its comment was not an instruction to the
jury but an explanation to counsel for why it cut cross-examination short. And this explanation
did not infringe on the defendant’s substantial rights because the court later instructed the jury that
it must decide whether Coleman’s possession was for distribution or personal use based on the
evidence. The court also instructed the jury that its “comments and questions are not evidence.”
R.170 at 66. “[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S.
534, 540 (1993) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). No reversible error
occurred.
12 No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
IV.
Sentencing. Did the district court err in treating Coleman as a career offender under the
Guidelines? No.
The Sentencing Guidelines set a higher base offense level for a defendant who, having
committed at least two prior violent or drug felonies, commits another violent crime. U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1(b)(4). A “crime of violence” includes several enumerated offenses. Id. § 4B1.2(a). We
assess whether the targeted crime’s elements are “the same as, or narrower than,” the enumerated
offense’s elements. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). Sometimes a state
defines its crime in a “divisible” way, allowing a defendant to commit a crime by satisfying one
of several combinations of elements. Id. For these crimes, we look to state charging documents
to compare the actual elements of the conviction with the enumerated offense’s elements. Id.
Ohio law permits prosecutors to charge “aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon” if they
believe the defendant committed any one of 31 predicate “theft offenses.” United States v. Ivy, 93
F.4th 937, 943 (6th Cir. 2024). The indictment in this instance specifies that prosecutors charged
Coleman with a “theft offense, as defined in Section 2913.01 and 2913.02” of the Ohio Revised
Code. R.146-1 at 1. The first section (§ 2913.01) lists a wide range of “theft offense[s],” and the
second section (§ 2913.02) describes the features of one specific offense of “Theft.” Ohio Rev.
Code §§ 2913.01, 2913.02. Taking the two statutory references together, Coleman’s charging
documents thus clarify his theft offense: “aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon” by means of
“theft.” See also United States v. Mandela, No. 24-3718, 2025 WL 2181485, at *3–4 (6th Cir.
Aug. 1, 2025); United States v. Rice, No. 23-3771, 2024 WL 3898564, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 22,
2024).
13 No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
“Aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon” by means of theft is a categorical match to
the Guidelines offense of actual or attempted “extortion.” The Guidelines offense of extortion
criminalizes “obtaining something of value from another by the wrongful use of (A) force, (B) fear
of physical injury, or (C) threat of physical injury.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), (d), (e)(2). The
relevant state crime proscribes displaying, brandishing, or using “a deadly weapon,” while
committing or attempting to commit “theft.” Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2911.01(A)(1), 2913.02(A).
Consider each feature of extortion and its match with each feature of the Ohio theft offense.
Start with the first element of extortion under the Guidelines: “obtaining something of value from
another.” Ohio’s “Theft” statute provides that “[n]o person, with purpose to deprive the owner of
property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services”
of another in any one of five specified ways. Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.02(A). Depriving someone
of their property or services parallels “obtaining something of value” from that person. See United
States v. Carter, 69 F.4th 361, 364 (6th Cir. 2023), abrogated on other grounds by United States
v. Cervenak, 135 F.4th 311 (6th Cir. 2025) (en banc).
Turn to the second element of extortion under the Guidelines: “the wrongful use of (A)
force, (B) fear of physical injury, or (C) threat of physical injury.” Coleman’s aggravated robbery
under Ohio law requires displaying, brandishing, or using a dangerous weapon. Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2911.01. Using a dangerous weapon satisfies the wrongful use of force element in extortion.
Coleman’s aggravated robbery conviction in the end required Ohio prosecutors to prove
the elements of federal extortion. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. That qualifies Coleman as a
career offender.
United States v. Ivy does not change matters. 93 F.4th 937. There, the defendant’s charging
documents did not specify the “theft offense” with which he was charged. Id. at 947–48. They
14 No. 23-3924, United States v. Coleman
mentioned only Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.01 and did not, as here, include the illuminating addition
of Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.02. Id. at 943. Under the categorical approach, we had to presume the
least culpable conduct, which did not satisfy the “obtaining something of value” prong. Id. at 946.
Here, we know that the predicate offense is “theft,” a crime that requires “obtaining something of
value.”
Coleman points out that an aggravated robbery could be committed by deception, which
falls outside the Guidelines requirement of “the wrongful use of” actual, feared, or threatened force
for extortion. But Coleman ignores another element—that Ohio’s prosecutors had to prove that
he used, brandished, or displayed a deadly weapon. It stretches credulity to imagine an aggravated
robber using a weapon to steal from someone in a way that does not involve actual, feared, or
threatened force. We need not entertain such “legal imagination” when the statute’s text makes it
exceedingly unlikely that a crime could be committed in this way. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez,
549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007); accord Cervenak, 135 F.4th at 326–27; id. at 333–34 (Nalbandian, J.,
concurring in part); id. at 341 (Ritz, J., concurring in part); id. at 364–67 (Thapar, J., dissenting).
We affirm.