United States v. Clarence P. Brown

661 F.2d 855, 50 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 505, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 16918
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedOctober 14, 1981
Docket81-1221
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 661 F.2d 855 (United States v. Clarence P. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Clarence P. Brown, 661 F.2d 855, 50 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 505, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 16918 (10th Cir. 1981).

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

Clarence P. Brown appeals his conviction by jury for transmitting radio energy without a license in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 301(d). The only question on appeal is whether the trial court’s instruction to the jury was erroneous when it did not state that the government must show the signals actually left the state.1

Based upon radio transmissions they intercepted in Arvada, Colorado, agents of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) obtained an affidavit for a search warrant. Pursuant thereto they confiscated from Brown’s residence a citizens’ band type radio transmitter, linear amplifiers, and other radio transmitting apparatus capable of transmitting signals over a hundred miles. The agents testified that although they intercepted the radio signals within Colorado, only a few miles from Brown’s transmitter, the wattage of the transmissions was greater than the FCC allows for citizens’ band use, and the transmissions could have crossed state borders or interfered with interstate radio signals.

Radio communications have traditionally been considered interstate commerce and subject to federal regulation. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. FCC, 94 F.2d 249, 251 (D.C. Cir.1937). See WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 153 [856]*856F.2d 623, 628 (D.C.Cir.), rev’d on other grounds, 329 U.S. 223, 67 S.Ct. 213, 91 L.Ed. 204 (1946) (plenary power). Cf. Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1966) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1464). The issue at bar is one of statutory construction, whether under the “effects” test of 47 U.S.C. § 301(d) the government must prove the signals actually extended across a state border. The government offered no proof here that Brown’s transmission actually interfered with interstate transmissions or that it crossed a state’s border. The statute declares that “No person shall use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or communications or signals by radio ... (d) within any State when the effects of such use extend beyond the borders of said State.” 47 U.S.C. § 301 (emphasis added).

The statute states expressly that the United States intends to control all channels of interstate radio transmission.2 Cf. American Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 617 F.2d 875 (D.C.Cir.1980) (upholding FCC authority to prohibit manufacture and sale of amplifiers that might be misused by citizens’ band operators). We need not consider here all possible applications of the “effects” test for violation of subsection (d); we hold, however, that it is satisfied by proof that defendant’s transmission was powerful enough to cross the state border. Requiring the prosecuting authorities to monitor defendant’s signal from a point outside the state in order to sustain his conviction seems to us to impose a greater burden than the statute contemplates. The evidence presented to the jury in the instant case was sufficient to support its judgment that Brown violated the statute. The jury instruction correctly reflected the applicable law.

AFFIRMED.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Clarence P. Brown
661 F.2d 855 (Tenth Circuit, 1981)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
661 F.2d 855, 50 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 505, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 16918, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-clarence-p-brown-ca10-1981.