United States v. Christopher Salisbury

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 26-6314

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL SALISBURY, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell, III, Chief District Judge. (1:15-cr-00621-GLR-1)

Submitted: August 27, 2026 Decided: September 1, 2026

Before KING, HEYTENS, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christopher Michael Salisbury, Appellant Pro Se. David Christian Bornstein, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2

PER CURIUM:

Chrisopher Michael Salisbury appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to vacate, modify, or defer the fine imposed in his criminal judgment. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to grant Salisbury’s motion. 1 A sentencing court generally lacks authority to modify a fine once imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3572(c). Salisbury requested alteration of his fine pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(3), 2 based on a change in his economic circumstances and various purported procedural and constitutional errors in the fine and sentencing proceeding. But, § 3572(d) permits a district court to modify a payment schedule only if the “judgment for a fine . . . permits payment in installments.” 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(3). Because Salisbury’s fine was due immediately, see 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1), (2); United States v. Diehl, 848 F.3d 629, 631 (5th Cir. 2017), he has no cognizable remedy under § 3572(d)(3), see United States v. Savage, 954 F.3d 610, 613-14 (3d Cir. 2020). Although a different provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1), permits remission or modification of a fine upon petition by the Government, no such petition has been filed in Salisbury’s case. Insofar as Salisbury sought

1

In his informal brief, Salisbury asserts that the district court violated his due process rights by adopting the reasoning of the Government’s response in opposition, which he has not received. On the particular facts before us, we conclude that any procedural deficiency is necessarily harmless, given that the district court lacks authority to entertain Salisbury’s requests. Further, we find no colorable merit in Salisbury’s bald assertions of judicial bias. See Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567, 573 (4th Cir. 2011).

2

Salisbury’s additional references to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k) are inapposite, as that provision applies only to restitution orders.

3

modification of his monthly payment obligation through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, such a claim is a challenge to the execution of his sentence that must be raised, if at all, through a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition filed in his district of confinement. See Fontanez v. O’Brien, 807 F.3d 84, 87 (4th Cir. 2015); Kanai v. McHugh, 638 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We deny as moot Salisbury’s motion for injunctive relief pending appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED