USCA11 Case: 20-14840 Date Filed: 08/11/2021 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-14840 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:07-cr-00315-SCJ-RGV-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER OCTAVIOUS JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(August 11, 2021)
Before JILL PRYOR, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-14840 Date Filed: 08/11/2021 Page: 2 of 7
Christopher Octavious Jackson, through counsel, appeals the district court’s
denial of compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) after finding that
Jackson remained a danger to the community. He argues that the district court erred
by considering his dangerousness under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) without first
considering whether the sentencing disparity among offenders sentenced under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)’s stacking provision and his age when he committed his crimes
constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant a sentence reduction.
We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251
(11th Cir. 2021). After eligibility is established, we review a district court’s decision
as to whether to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of discretion. Id.
In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, 132
Stat. 5194 (“First Step Act”), which, in part, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to
increase the use and transparency of compassionate release of federal prisoners. See
First Step Act § 603. The statute provides that a court may not modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed except under certain circumstances and
further provides:
[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if it 2 USCA11 Case: 20-14840 Date Filed: 08/11/2021 Page: 3 of 7
finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Section 3582(c)(1)(A) also requires that the court
consider the applicable factors in § 3553(a) and that any reduction be consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id.; United
States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180, 1184 (11th Cir. 2021).
The policy statements applicable to § 3582(c)(1)(A) are found in U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13, which states that the court must determine that the defendant is not a
danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18
U.S.C. § 3142(g), before it can determine whether extraordinary and compelling
reasons exist. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; id., comment. (n.1). The district court is to
consider the following factors when determining whether an individual is a danger
to another person or the community: the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged; the weight of the evidence against the individual; the history and
characteristics of the individual, including his past conduct, criminal history, and
health; and the nature and seriousness of the danger that would be posed by the
individual’s release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
An application note to § 1B1.13 lists four categories of extraordinary and
compelling reasons: “(A) Medical Condition of the Defendant”; “(B) Age of the
Defendant”; “(C) Family Circumstances”; and “(D) Other Reasons.—As determined
by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant’s case an 3 USCA11 Case: 20-14840 Date Filed: 08/11/2021 Page: 4 of 7
extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons
described in subdivisions (A) through (C).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1). A
prisoner’s rehabilitation is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason
warranting a sentence reduction. Id., comment. (n.3).
In Bryant, we concluded that § 1B1.13 is applicable to all motions filed
under § 3582(c)(1)(A), including those filed by prisoners. 996 F.3d at 1251-59. We
thus held that § 1B1.13 continues to constrain a district court’s ability to evaluate
whether extraordinary and compelling reasons are present to warrant a sentence
reduction. Id. at 1252. Next, we held that the catch-all provision in Application
Note 1(D) “does not grant discretion to courts to develop ‘other reasons’ that might
justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence.” Id. at 1248, 1263-65. Finally, we
held that, because Bryant’s motion did not fall within any of the reasons that
§ 1B1.13 identified as extraordinary or compelling, the district court correctly
denied his motion for a reduction in sentence. Id. at 1265.
In Cook, we held that a district court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider
all applicable § 3553(a) factors before granting or denying a motion for
compassionate release. 998 F.3d at 1184-86. A district court must explain its
decision sufficiently to allow for meaningful appellate review, i.e., to allow the court
of appeals to determine whether the district court considered the applicable factors.
Id. at 1184-85. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for the district court to state on the
4 USCA11 Case: 20-14840 Date Filed: 08/11/2021 Page: 5 of 7
record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss
each of them. See United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).
A sentence may be affirmed if the record indicates that the court considered a
number of the factors. See United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir.
2007) (concluding that, while the district court did not specifically state that it had
considered the factors, it necessarily considered a number of them by entertaining
the defendant’s objections and motion for a downward departure). The weight given
to any of the § 3553(a) factors is committed to the sound discretion of the district
court. United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293
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USCA11 Case: 20-14840 Date Filed: 08/11/2021 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-14840 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:07-cr-00315-SCJ-RGV-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER OCTAVIOUS JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(August 11, 2021)
Before JILL PRYOR, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-14840 Date Filed: 08/11/2021 Page: 2 of 7
Christopher Octavious Jackson, through counsel, appeals the district court’s
denial of compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) after finding that
Jackson remained a danger to the community. He argues that the district court erred
by considering his dangerousness under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) without first
considering whether the sentencing disparity among offenders sentenced under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)’s stacking provision and his age when he committed his crimes
constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant a sentence reduction.
We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251
(11th Cir. 2021). After eligibility is established, we review a district court’s decision
as to whether to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of discretion. Id.
In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, 132
Stat. 5194 (“First Step Act”), which, in part, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to
increase the use and transparency of compassionate release of federal prisoners. See
First Step Act § 603. The statute provides that a court may not modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed except under certain circumstances and
further provides:
[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if it 2 USCA11 Case: 20-14840 Date Filed: 08/11/2021 Page: 3 of 7
finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Section 3582(c)(1)(A) also requires that the court
consider the applicable factors in § 3553(a) and that any reduction be consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id.; United
States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180, 1184 (11th Cir. 2021).
The policy statements applicable to § 3582(c)(1)(A) are found in U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13, which states that the court must determine that the defendant is not a
danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18
U.S.C. § 3142(g), before it can determine whether extraordinary and compelling
reasons exist. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; id., comment. (n.1). The district court is to
consider the following factors when determining whether an individual is a danger
to another person or the community: the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged; the weight of the evidence against the individual; the history and
characteristics of the individual, including his past conduct, criminal history, and
health; and the nature and seriousness of the danger that would be posed by the
individual’s release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
An application note to § 1B1.13 lists four categories of extraordinary and
compelling reasons: “(A) Medical Condition of the Defendant”; “(B) Age of the
Defendant”; “(C) Family Circumstances”; and “(D) Other Reasons.—As determined
by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant’s case an 3 USCA11 Case: 20-14840 Date Filed: 08/11/2021 Page: 4 of 7
extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons
described in subdivisions (A) through (C).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1). A
prisoner’s rehabilitation is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason
warranting a sentence reduction. Id., comment. (n.3).
In Bryant, we concluded that § 1B1.13 is applicable to all motions filed
under § 3582(c)(1)(A), including those filed by prisoners. 996 F.3d at 1251-59. We
thus held that § 1B1.13 continues to constrain a district court’s ability to evaluate
whether extraordinary and compelling reasons are present to warrant a sentence
reduction. Id. at 1252. Next, we held that the catch-all provision in Application
Note 1(D) “does not grant discretion to courts to develop ‘other reasons’ that might
justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence.” Id. at 1248, 1263-65. Finally, we
held that, because Bryant’s motion did not fall within any of the reasons that
§ 1B1.13 identified as extraordinary or compelling, the district court correctly
denied his motion for a reduction in sentence. Id. at 1265.
In Cook, we held that a district court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider
all applicable § 3553(a) factors before granting or denying a motion for
compassionate release. 998 F.3d at 1184-86. A district court must explain its
decision sufficiently to allow for meaningful appellate review, i.e., to allow the court
of appeals to determine whether the district court considered the applicable factors.
Id. at 1184-85. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for the district court to state on the
4 USCA11 Case: 20-14840 Date Filed: 08/11/2021 Page: 5 of 7
record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss
each of them. See United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).
A sentence may be affirmed if the record indicates that the court considered a
number of the factors. See United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir.
2007) (concluding that, while the district court did not specifically state that it had
considered the factors, it necessarily considered a number of them by entertaining
the defendant’s objections and motion for a downward departure). The weight given
to any of the § 3553(a) factors is committed to the sound discretion of the district
court. United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016).
Under § 3553(a), a district court’s sentence must be sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to achieve the goals of sentencing, which are: reflecting the
seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, providing just punishment,
deterring future criminal conduct, protecting the public, and providing the defendant
with any needed training or treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Section 3553(a) also
requires district courts to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the
defendant’s history and characteristics, the kinds of sentences available, the
Sentencing Guidelines, any pertinent policy statement, the need to avoid disparate
sentences for defendants with similar records, and the need to provide restitution to
any victims. Id.
5 USCA11 Case: 20-14840 Date Filed: 08/11/2021 Page: 6 of 7
Here, the district court did not err in denying Jackson’s motion for
compassionate release because he was not eligible for a sentence reduction. While
the court did not make a finding whether Jackson had shown extraordinary and
compelling reasons, Bryant forecloses his argument that the sentencing disparity
caused by the amendment to § 924(c)’s stacking provision or his age when he
committed his crimes constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant a
sentence reduction. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248, 1263-65 (holding that the catch-
all provision in Application Note 1(D) “does not grant discretion to courts to develop
‘other reasons’ that might justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence”). Further,
the court correctly found that Jackson’s rehabilitation by itself was not an
extraordinary and compelling reason that warranted a sentence reduction. See
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, comment. (n.3).
Next, consistent with Cook, the district court’s order sufficiently addressed
the § 3553(a) factors and explained its decision to allow for meaningful appellate
review. The court’s order noted that it was required to consider the § 3553(a) factors
and noted several circumstances related to those factors, including: the nature and
circumstances of the offense, Jackson’s history and characteristics, promoting
respect for the law, and deterring future criminal conduct. While the court’s order
cited § 3142(g) in discussing those factors, it necessarily considered the § 3553(a)
factors because most of the § 3142(g) factors are also § 3553(a) factors. Compare
6 USCA11 Case: 20-14840 Date Filed: 08/11/2021 Page: 7 of 7
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Moreover, while Jackson disagrees
with the factors it explicitly considered and the weight given to those factors, the
court was not required to state that it considered each of the § 3553(a) factors and
had discretion to give more weight to certain factors. See Kuhlman, 711 F.3d at
1326; Croteau, 819 F.3d at 1309. The court’s discussion of the facts surrounding
Jackson’s offenses and plea, as well as his criminal history and characteristics, in
explaining its reason for denying relief allows for meaningful appellate review. See
Cook, 998 F.3d at 1184-85.
Accordingly, because Jackson was not eligible for a reduction in sentence
under § 3582(c)(1)(A) and the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and
sufficiently explained its reasoning, the court did not err or abuse its discretion in
denying his compassionate release motion.
AFFIRMED.