NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0338n.06
No. 25-5720
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Jul 28, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR v. ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ) TENNESSEE CHRISTOPHER M. CLOUGH, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )
Before: CLAY, MURPHY, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Tennessee law requires sex offenders to register a new
“primary” residence within 48 hours. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-203(a)(1). It defines “primary
residence” as a place where a person “abides, lodges, resides or establishes any other living
accommodations” for five days in a row. Id. § 40-39-202(12). The district court in this case
revoked Christopher Clough’s supervised release because it found that Clough violated this state
law by living at a man’s apartment for two weeks without registering the address.
On appeal, Clough argues that the court may not have understood Tennessee law because
the parties misrepresented that law at the revocation hearing. And he argues that the government
did not present enough evidence to prove that he resided at the man’s apartment for at least five
days. Yet the parties’ legal mistakes do not matter given the court’s factual finding that Clough
lived at the apartment for two weeks. That finding undisputedly shows a violation of Tennessee No. 25-5720, United States v. Clough
law. And plenty of evidence supported the finding, including statements from the man who let
Clough live at the apartment along with corroborating physical evidence. We affirm.
I
In September 2010, Clough raped a young woman in Spokane, Washington. While
pretending to be a police officer, he approached this woman, told her that she was in a bad
neighborhood, and offered her a ride home. When Clough reached the victim’s residence, though,
he accused her of drinking while underage and put her in handcuffs. She thought he was arresting
her. Clough instead took her to a park and told her: “I am not going to take you to jail, if you give
me a piece of you.” Rep., R.18, at 12. Fearful for her life, the woman complied with his demands.
Clough removed her clothes, raped her, and drove away alone. She made it to a nearby business
to call 911. Authorities soon caught Clough.
A Washington state court convicted him of, among other crimes, third-degree rape. The
court sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment for this crime. Clough’s rape conviction also
made him a designated sex offender. The court alerted him that he would have to register as a sex
offender when he got out of prison and notify the authorities when he changed his address.
Once Clough served his sentence, the State of Washington transferred him to Montana’s
custody because of preexisting theft charges tied to his issuance of bad checks. But once Montana
released Clough from prison, he did not register as a sex offender. He instead became a fugitive
from justice, relocating to Johnson City, Tennessee, in 2018.
That year, the federal government indicted Clough for violating the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act by traveling in interstate commerce and knowingly failing to
register as a sex offender. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Clough pleaded guilty in a Tennessee district
2 No. 25-5720, United States v. Clough
court. The court sentenced him to 37 months’ imprisonment, followed by 240 months of
supervised release.
Clough completed this prison term in May 2022. Within six months, however, he had
violated several of his supervised-release conditions. Among other things, he did not register his
home address or his place of employment and failed to communicate with his probation officer.
The district court thus sentenced Clough to 20 more months in prison followed by 220 more
months of supervised release.
On July 3, 2024, Clough began his second round of supervised release. He contacted his
probation officer within the three-day window for reporting. At this time, he registered himself as
homeless. So his probation officer told him to report his location three times a week. He reported
as required over the next couple of weeks, continuing to claim that he did not have a home.
Yet the Johnson City police came to suspect Clough of lying. Around 1:00 a.m. on July
24, Clough called the police from the small studio apartment of a man named Mark Phipps. Clough
asked to have a woman removed from this apartment because she had been harassing him. An
officer visited the apartment around 1:50 a.m. The woman had also been staying there, and the
officer allowed her to gather her belongings. Clough later claimed that she had stolen his laptop.
The officer’s body camera recorded his interactions with Clough at the front door. When they
finished their conversation, Clough closed the door and remained inside.
Clough’s call to the police drew the interest of Joseph Casey, a police investigator
responsible for enforcing Tennessee’s sex-offender registry. After watching the officer’s body-
cam footage showing his interaction with Clough at Phipps’s apartment, Casey decided to travel
there for a “compliance check” of Clough. Tr., R.67, PageID 728–30, 745. Casey and other
officers visited Phipps’s home on July 25. Phipps answered the door and told Casey that Clough
3 No. 25-5720, United States v. Clough
had gone to “the doctor’s office.” Video, Hr’g Ex. 2 at 0:03–:05. When Casey asked more about
Clough, Phipps stated that Clough had been “living” at his apartment for a “couple weeks.” Id. at
0:06–:14.
Phipps continued to talk to Casey inside the apartment. During the conversation, Phipps
explained that he had met Clough about “two weeks ago” and that Clough had told him he “was
homeless” and “needed a place to stay.” Phipps Statement, Hr’g Ex. 4. Clough claimed that “his
family” had kicked him out of his parents’ home after they died. Id. Phipps had “back issues and
needed help around the apartment,” so Clough “would clean and cook for” him and “get groceries”
at the store. Id. Phipps also let Clough “sleep on the bed” because Phipps’s health problems forced
him to sleep on the couch. Tr., R.67, PageID 736–37.
While talking to Phipps, Casey examined the area around the bed. He found several bags.
Some contained clothes; another contained a spiral notebook. Casey presumed that somebody
other than Phipps was living at the apartment because Phipps appeared to store his belongings in
a “make-shift closet” by the front door. Id., PageID 742–43. And one of the notebook pages
referred to cities where Clough had lived: “Billings” (in Montana) and “Spokane” (in Washington).
Notebook, Hr’g Ex. 6.
Clough soon learned of Investigator Casey’s visit to Phipps’s home. Later that day, he
asked his probation officer in a text message why the police were looking for him. A text exchange
followed. His probation officer asked whether he had registered. Clough said that he had done so
with the caveat: “I slept at a guys house a couple of times to get out of the rain but that’s it.” Text
Messages, Hr’g Ex. 8 at 1. Clough then listed Phipps’s address. His probation officer noted that
this address was not “registry compliant” because it had “a bunch of stuff around it.” Id. at 1–2.
A day-care center and church were close by. Clough suggested he did not know he had to register
4 No. 25-5720, United States v. Clough
a “place” that he “slept at” only “2 times” (but not “back to back”). Id. at 1. He said he did not
“want to go to jail for something” that he had not done, explaining that he had only “dropped [his]
stuff off” at Phipps’s home while he was at the doctor. Id. at 3. He then reiterated: “I cook for
this guy he’s old I leave every night around 10 to 11.” Id. at 4. But he again suggested that he had
“only stayed like 2 nights” at Phipps’s apartment (“[b]ut not in a row”). Id. Ultimately, Clough’s
probation officer recommended that he clear things up by visiting the Johnson City Police
Department. Clough agreed to do so.
As Clough made his way to the police department the next morning, officers arrested him
for violating Tennessee’s sex-offender registration requirements. Yet state prosecutors later
dismissed these state charges against Clough because Phipps died before trial.
In the meantime, Clough’s probation officer petitioned the district court to revoke his
supervised release a second time. The probation officer asserted that Clough violated five
supervised-release conditions. The officer alleged that Clough had violated two mandatory
conditions by infringing both federal and state sex-offender registration laws. And the officer
alleged that Clough had violated three standard supervised-release conditions by lying to the
officer, by living at an unapproved location, and by effectively barring the officer from visiting
him at this undisclosed residence.
The parties debated the validity of these allegations at a revocation hearing. The
government presented substantial evidence. Investigator Casey and Clough’s probation officer
testified. The government also introduced body-cam footage from the officer’s late-night visit to
Phipps’s apartment on July 24 and from Casey’s visit the next day. And it admitted a photo of the
notebook page that referred to Billings and Spokane and the text messages between Clough and
his probation officer. Lastly, the government produced a written statement that Phipps signed at
5 No. 25-5720, United States v. Clough
his apartment. In response, Clough introduced no evidence. Instead, his counsel argued that
Clough may not have been living at Phipps’s apartment longer than the two nonconsecutive nights
that he admitted to in the text messages.
The district court concluded that Clough violated all five conditions. Its decision largely
rested on the same general factual finding. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence
that Clough had been living at Phipps’s apartment for “two weeks” without alerting his probation
officer or registering this address with Tennessee officials. Tr., R.67, PageID 794–95. The court
revoked Clough’s supervised release and sentenced him to another 24 months in prison and 200
II
Tennessee law requires a sex offender to register a new “primary” or “secondary” residence
with the proper state officials within 48 hours of “establishing” or “changing” this residence:
“Within forty-eight (48) hours of establishing or changing a primary or secondary
residence . . . , the offender shall register or report in person, as required by this part.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-39-203(a)(1). The law defines “primary residence” as “a place where the person abides,
lodges, resides or establishes any other living accommodations . . . for five (5) consecutive
days[.]” Id. § 40-39-202(12). The law defines “secondary residence” as (among other things) “a
place where the person abides, lodges, [or] resides” for “fourteen (14) or more days in” a year or
“four (4) or more” days in a month (so long as this place is not the person’s primary residence).
Id. § 40-39-202(18). And the law makes clear that the 48-hour window to register excludes
“Saturdays, Sundays or federal or state holidays.” Id. § 40-39-202(32).
Here, the district court found that Clough violated § 40-39-203(a)(1) (and thus his
supervised-release conditions) because he had been “staying” or “living” at Phipps’s apartment for
6 No. 25-5720, United States v. Clough
“two weeks” without registering this address. Tr., R.67, PageID 793–95. We review the court’s
general decision to revoke Clough’s supervised release for an abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Kontrol, 554 F.3d 1089, 1091 (6th Cir. 2009). Yet we review any underlying legal
conclusions de novo and any underlying factual findings for clear error. Id. at 1091–92.
Clough claims that the district court committed both a legal mistake and a factual one when
holding that he violated § 40-39-203(a)(1). We start with his legal argument. According to
Clough, the parties left the district court with a misimpression of Tennessee law. He is right that
the parties did a poor job describing that law. Neither side cited § 40-39-203(a)(1)’s language or
discussed the definitions for a home to qualify as a “primary residence” under § 40-39-202(12) or
a “secondary residence” under § 40-39-202(18). And some of the parties’ statements suggested
that they may not have understood the law. For example, Clough’s own counsel “read[] . . . the
law” to require Clough to “report if he establishes a residence for more than 48 hours.” Tr., R.67,
PageID 786. But the primary-residence definition requires a person to stay at a location for five
days (not two). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202(12). Similarly, when discussing secondary
residences, Investigator Casey suggested that Clough could not stay at Phipps’s apartment even
for a day because of its proximity to a “day care” (among other sensitive places). Tr., R.67, PageID
757. But the secondary-residence definition requires a person to reside at a location for multiple
days. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202(18).
Ultimately, we find this argument beside the point. Any potential legal misunderstanding
would have been harmless because it would not have affected the outcome. See United States v.
Agrawal, 97 F.4th 421, 429 (6th Cir. 2024). The court did not rest its conclusion on the (mistaken)
legal ground that Clough could establish a primary residence by living at Phipps’s apartment for
just two days. Rather, it rested its conclusion on the factual ground that Clough had been “staying”
7 No. 25-5720, United States v. Clough
(or “living”) at Phipps’s home for “two weeks” without registering the address. Tr., R.67, PageID
793–95. And all agree on appeal that Phipps’s apartment became Clough’s “primary residence”
once he stayed there for five straight days. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202(12). From that
point, Clough had “forty-eight (48) hours” to register this address (excluding weekends and
holidays). Id. § 40-39-203(a)(1); see id. § 40-39-202(32). So Clough had, at most, nine days to
register—five days to establish a primary residence plus four days to report (assuming that the fifth
day of residency fell on a Thursday or Friday). Because Clough remained at Phipps’s apartment
for two weeks without registering, he violated § 40-39-203(a)(1).
Clough’s factual argument fares no better. He asserts that the government did not introduce
enough evidence to prove that he resided at Phipps’s apartment for the five consecutive days
required to make it his primary residence. But he cannot overcome the deferential clear-error
standard of review that applies to this factual claim. Under that standard, we must uphold the
district court’s factual findings so long as those findings represent a “plausible” reading of the
record. United States v. Estrada-Gonzalez, 32 F.4th 607, 614 (6th Cir. 2022). And we may reverse
only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that” the court made a factual mistake.
Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 309 (2017) (citation omitted).
This standard dooms Clough’s claim. The district court plausibly found that Clough lived
at Phipps’s apartment for two weeks. Of most weight, Phipps said in his written statement and
during a recorded interview that Clough had been living with him for two weeks. These statements
were “absolutely reliable” because Phipps had “no reason to make stuff up.” Tr., R.67, PageID
794. In any event, plenty of evidence “corroborated” Phipps’s account. Id., PageID 795. Among
other things, Clough called the police from Phipps’s apartment at 1:00 a.m. on July 24, and a police
officer interacted with him there a short time later. Next, Casey found what appeared to be
8 No. 25-5720, United States v. Clough
Clough’s notebook next to the bed where Phipps said Clough slept. In text messages to his
probation officer, Clough even admitted that the police had searched his “stuff” in the apartment
while he was at a “mental health” appointment. Text Messages, Hr’g Ex. 8 at 3. He also admitted
that he had spent two (nonconsecutive) nights at the house.
Clough counters that the district court’s finding that Clough had “stayed” at the apartment
for two weeks could not establish the apartment as his primary residence. Appellant’s Br. 26.
Clough points out that the primary-residence definition uses the words “abides, lodges, resides or
establishes any other living accommodations,” not the word “stays.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-
202(12). And he reads the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d
436 (Tenn. 2010), as holding “that general terms like ‘moved’ and ‘living at’ . . . are insufficient
to” establish a home as a primary residence. Appellant’s Br. 26–27.
This argument has several problems. To start, Phelps addressed a different issue. There,
the defendant registered his primary and secondary residences in Shelbyville and Murfreesboro,
Tennessee. 329 S.W.3d at 439. But he later began regularly visiting his ill father in a different
city, spending the night at his father’s house “probably once.” Id. at 442. Prosecutors charged
him with failing to register this house in violation of § 40-39-203(a)(1). Id. at 439–40. He initially
pleaded guilty. Id. at 440. But he later moved to withdraw his guilty plea because he had only
been visiting his ill father. Id. at 441. Although the trial court denied this motion, the Tennessee
Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 442–43, 452. The court reasoned that the trial court and prosecutor
had given only an “imprecise and abbreviated explanation” of § 40-39-203(a)(1) and that the
defendant had made only “ambiguous statements” that he was guilty. Id. at 450. The trial court
had told the defendant that he was charged with having “moved without filling out the proper
forms,” and the prosecutor had told him that he was charged with “living” at his father’s home for
9 No. 25-5720, United States v. Clough
about two weeks. Id. Yet they never disclosed the “language of the statute” or its requirements.
Id. The defendant also “expressed his confusion” about the nature of the charge and thought he
was “pleading guilty to visiting his father” (not to residing at his father’s home). Id. In short,
Phelps held that the defendant might not have understood the nature of the crime. Id. at 449–50.
Phelps thus says nothing about what evidence plausibly shows that a defendant has
“abide[d], lodge[d], reside[d] or establishe[d] any other living accommodations” at a home. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-39-202(12). And the evidence in this case far surpasses the evidence in Phelps.
The district court could reasonably find that Clough was not simply “visiting” Phipps (like the
defendant in Phelps). Rather, Phipps stated that Clough had been “living” at his apartment for two
weeks. Video, Hr’g Ex. 2 at 0:01–:16. And Phipps did not just make this conclusory claim. He
also listed the activities that Clough had engaged in during this time. For example, Phipps said
that Clough “would sleep at [his] apartment” and “would sleep in the bed while [Phipps] slept on
the couch.” Phipps Statement, Hr’g Ex. 4. And he said that Clough would “clean and cook” and
“get groceries” for them to consume. Id. Clough himself admitted that he would “cook” for Phipps
and keep his “stuff” at the apartment. Text Messages, Hr’g Ex. 8 at 3–4. On these facts, it is at
least “plausible” that Clough had abided, lodged, resided, or established living accommodations
at the apartment for at least five days in a row. Estrada-Gonzalez, 32 F.4th at 614.
Nor do we read Phelps as establishing a “magic words” requirement for courts that conduct
bench trials on charges under § 40-39-203(a)(1). So Clough gets nowhere with his criticism that
the district court stated only that he “stayed” at Phipps’s apartment for two weeks. Tr., R.67,
PageID 794. This finding adequately conveyed that Clough violated the law. Indeed, the word
“stay” means to “continue to be in a place” (as in “stay home”) or to “remain or sojourn as a guest
or lodger” (as in “stayed at a motel”). American Heritage Dictionary 1708 (5th ed. 2011).
10 No. 25-5720, United States v. Clough
Either way, it is largely a synonym for the verbs in the statute. To “abide” is to “dwell or reside”
at a place or “remain” there. Id. at 3. To “lodge” is to “live” “temporarily” in the place. Id. at
1031. And to “reside” is to “live” “permanently or for an extended period” there. Id. at 1493. The
court’s finding encompassed the key idea: Clough used Phipps’s apartment as his lodging for at
least five days. Besides, the district court also stated that “the evidence” showed that Clough was
“living” at the apartment. Tr., R.67, PageID 795. So it found that he had established new “living
accommodations” there. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202(12) (emphasis added).
Clough’s remaining factual arguments also lack merit. He notes that the district court
thought that the woman at the center of Clough’s call to the police had “confirmed” that he “had
been staying” at Phipps’s apartment. Tr., R.67, PageID 796. Clough is right that the court
mistakenly recalled the record because no evidence suggests that this woman said anything about
Clough’s residency. But that error also did not affect the outcome. See Agrawal, 97 F.4th at 429.
The other evidence more than sufficed to plausibly establish Clough’s residency at Phipps’s home
for two weeks. See Estrada-Gonzalez, 32 F.4th at 614. And the court mentioned this woman only
as an afterthought. Tr., R.67, PageID 796. So the record leaves no doubt that the court’s finding
that Clough had lived with Phipps for two weeks did not rest on this mistake.
Lastly, even if the record justifies the finding that Clough stayed with Phipps for two
weeks, Clough argues that he did not “knowingly” violate § 40-39-203(a)(1). Appellant’s Br. 32–
33. True, Tennessee’s sex-offender registration laws make it an “offense for an offender to
knowingly” fail to “timely register” a residence change. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-208(a)(1)
(emphasis added). Clough interprets this provision as requiring the government to show that he
“knew” that “he had ‘established a residence’” at Phipps’s apartment and had “to report the location
within 48 hours.” Reply Br. 2–3 (citation omitted). We may assume that Clough reads the law
11 No. 25-5720, United States v. Clough
correctly. Still, whether he “acted ‘knowingly’” is a factual question that we review for clear error.
State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 205 (Tenn. 2013); see Kontrol, 554 F.3d at 1091–92.
And we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction” that Clough lacked the required
knowledge. Cooper, 581 U.S. at 309. Start with the evidence that Clough knew of his general
reporting obligations. In 2019, he pleaded guilty to “knowingly fail[ing] to register or update [his]
registration as a convicted sex offender as required by Tennessee law.” Factual Basis, R.14,
PageID 27; cf. United States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 621, 626–27 (6th Cir. 2012). As part of this guilty
plea, he conceded that he had “stayed” at a church for “approximately two weeks” without
registering. Factual Basis, R.14, PageID 26. Next, Clough continued to violate his reporting
requirements after he completed his prison sentence. In 2023, he admitted that he had violated
Tennessee’s requirement to “update the sex offender registry” within “48 hours of changing
residence.” Pet., R.45, PageID 309; Judgment, R.50, PageID 317. This time, he failed to update
his registration after leaving a motel. Pet., R.45, PageID 309.
Turn to the evidence that he knew he had to register Phipps’s apartment. It is apparent that
Clough lied to his probation officer when he said that he had “only stayed like 2 nights” there.
Text Messages, Hr’g Ex. 8 at 4. As the district court put it: “How about like two weeks because
that’s what . . . is established here.” Tr., R.67, PageID 794. Clough’s “efforts to conceal” his
living arrangements offers a reasonable basis to “infer[]” his knowledge that he was violating the
law by living at Phipps’s apartment. United States v. Davis, 490 F.3d 541, 549 (6th Cir. 2007)
(citation omitted).
Clough responds by pointing to evidence suggesting that he innocently overlooked his duty
to report Phipps’s apartment. At some point, for example, he had asked Investigator Casey if he
must report a place that he was “coming and going from,” and Casey responded in the negative.
12 No. 25-5720, United States v. Clough
Tr., R.67, PageID 754. Similarly, he called the police from Phipps’s apartment on July 24 (and
seemingly incriminated himself). He also “voluntarily” tried to check in with the police after he
learned they were investigating him. Reply Br. 7–8. All this said, the record plausibly supported
the district court’s contrary inference: that he knowingly tried to conceal his residence at Phipps’s
apartment. And where there are “‘two permissible’—because two ‘plausible’—‘views of the
evidence,’” we must defer to the district court’s choice. Cooper, 581 U.S. at 299 (citation omitted).
We affirm.