United States v. Christin Didier

668 F. App'x 775

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 2, 2016
• Docket: 15-30060
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Defendant-Appellant Christin Dianne Didier was convicted by a jury of her peers for seven counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The district court sentenced Didier to pay $213,163.25 in restitution.'We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the legality of an order of restitution. United States v. Luis, 765 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014). We review the restitution order itself for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

1. The district court did not err in ordering Didier to pay restitution. Didier, through fraud, committed a crime against property, and caused losses to a victim: Pacific Indemnity Company, Chubb Group of Insurance Companies (“Chubb”). The Mandatory Victim1 Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, “requires a district court, in sentencing a defendant convicted of ... an offense against property committed by fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(l)(A)(ii), to order restitution to each victim ‘in the full amount of each victim’s losses.’” United States v. Rizk, 660 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A)).

2. The district court did not err in determining that the civil settlement agreement Didier and Chubb signed pursuant to a bankruptcy suit, releasing each party from liability, did not absolve Didier of any obligation to pay criminal restitution. A civil release of liability does not preclude further criminal liability for an offense, and civil settlements and criminal restitution orders serve largely different interests. Rizk, 660 F.3d at 1136-37. For example, a bankruptcy settlement allows “the trustee and the creditors to avoid the expenses and burdens associated with litigating sharply contested and dubious claims,” United States v. Edwards, 595 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re A & C Props., 784 F.’2d 1377, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1986)), whereas “a purpose of criminal restitution is to penalize,” Rizk, 660 F.3d at 1137, and to make the victim whole. See United States v. Nosal, 828 F.3d 865, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2016).

3.The district court did not err when it included in the restitution order the investigative costs and attorney’s fees Chubb expended to investigate Didier’s fraud. The inclusion of such costs is not an abuse of discretion, so long as the costs are a “ ‘direct and foreseeable result’ of the defendant’s wrongful conduct,” Gordon, 393 F.3d at 1057 (quoting United States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 863 (9th Cir. 2004)), and are reasonably spent to determine the extent of the crime. See United States v. Waknine, 543 F.3d 546, 556-59 (9th Cir. 2008) (vacating restitution award and remanding for determination that investigative costs and attorney’s fees were incurred in aid of the investigation rather than to impermissibly shield others from prosecution). Chubb’s investigative costs, which included inspections, travel, personnel costs, and attorney’s fees, were reason ably spent to determine the extent of its losses, and were incurred as a direct result of Didier’s fraudulent conduct.

4. Didier makes a cursory argument that any restitution payments she is required to make should be paid to the Crime Victim’s Fund rather than to Chubb. Chubb was not compensated by the Crime Victim’s Fund for Didier’s fraud, and this argument is not supported by legal authority. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(l) (authorizing restitution payments to a third party only where: (1) the third party directly compensated the victim for crime-related losses; and (2) the victim has received full compensation).

AFFIRMED.

*** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.