United States v. Chavez-Chavez

205 F.3d 145, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2528, 2000 WL 205081
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 22, 2000
Docket99-40072
StatusPublished
Cited by39 cases

This text of 205 F.3d 145 (United States v. Chavez-Chavez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Chavez-Chavez, 205 F.3d 145, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2528, 2000 WL 205081 (5th Cir. 2000).

Opinion

REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 29, 1998, at approximately 8:00 in the morning, Border Patrol Agents Ron Torralba, an agent with six years experience, and Neil Heideman, an agent with three and a half years experience, stopped a van traveling on Highway 286 because they suspected that it contained illegal aliens. In fact, the van contained eight undocumented immigrants from Guatemala. Five were sitting in the van’s front and rear seats, and three were not visible to anyone outside of the van. Chavez-Chavez (Chavez) was the driver of the van.

Highway 77 is a major highway leading from Brownsville, Texas to Corpus Christi, Texas. Highway 286 is an alternate highway leading to Corpus Christi from the south. Alien smugglers are known to use *147 Highway 286 to circumvent the more heavily patrolled Highway 77. The local Nueces County Sheriff - 1 occasionally requests the Border Patrol’s assistance with traffic stops on Highway 286 involving suspected illegal aliens.

After following the van in question for a mile or two, the agents stopped it on Highway 286 roughly 150 to 160 miles from the Texas-Mexico border and about 50 miles north from the Sarita Border Patrol checkpoint, which is on Highway 77. Agent Heideman testified that it is common for illegal aliens to get out of their vehicles before the Sarita checkpoint, walk around it through the surrounding brush country, and meet their ride on the other side. The agents also testified, however, that they had received no specific information that the van was carrying undocumented immigrants or that it had recently come from the border.

Agent Heideman testified that 8:00 a.m. is a common time for vehicles transporting illegal aliens to pass through that particular area of Highway 286. He testified that as the van drove past the parked Border Patrol automobile, the driver of the van glanced back at the agents, and continued to look back at the agents several times as they followed the van. Agent Heideman testified that the passengers appeared “very rigid” and that they looked straight forward and “appeared to be making an effort not to. look anywhere else.” Agent Torralba testified that the passengers sat straight and that the four adults on-the rear bench seemed uncomfortable, which the agents considered typical of smuggled illegal aliens. However, the van was not speeding, and the passengers did not attempt to hide when the van passed the patrol car.

The agents testified that the van’s suspension appeared rigid, which indicated that it had been modified so that it would not appear low or weighted down. They testified that such a modified suspension was common in vehicles used to transport illegal aliens. The agents further testified that the passengers’ clothes and the passengers themselves appeared very dirty and unkept. 2

On October 1, 1998, after conducting a suppression hearing, the district court denied Chavez’s motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that the initial stop had been supported by reasonable suspicion and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The next day Chavez pled guilty to transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(II), but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court sentenced Chavez to fifteen months’ imprisonment and a three-year supervised release term. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Appellate courts review a district court’s ruling that a stop was reasonable de novo. See United States v. Morales, 191 F.3d 602, 603 (5th Cir.1999). Suppression hearing evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. See id.

To temporarily detain a vehicle for investigatory purposes, a Border Patrol agent on roving patrol must be aware of “specific articulable facts” together with rational inferences from those facts, that warrant a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is involved in illegal activities, such as transporting undocumented immigrants. See United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 722 (5th Cir.1984); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). When deciding whether to make an inves *148 tigatory stop, Border Patrol agents may consider several relevant factors, including: (1) characteristics of the area where the vehicle is encountered; (2) proximity to the border; (3). the usual traffic pattern on the road; (4) previous experience with criminal activity; (5) information about recent criminal activity in the area; (6) the driver’s behavior; (7) the appearance of the vehicle, its type and whether it appears loaded; and (8) the number, appearance and behavior of the passengers. United States v. Morales, 191 F.3d 602, 604 (5th Cir.1999); Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722. No single factor is determinative; rather, this Court examines each case based on “the totality of the circumstances known to the agent, and the agent’s experience in evaluating such circumstances.” Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the totality of the circumstances supports a reasonable suspicion that the van in question was involved in alien smuggling. First, we consider characteristics of the area where the vehicle was encountered. Border Patrol Agents Torralba and Heideman, each with several years experience, were well aware that smugglers frequently use Highway 286 to circumvent the Sarita checkpoint and the more heavily patrolled Highway 77. Highway 286 is also legitimately used, however, by thousands of people who live in South Texas and travel to Corpus Christi, and the fact that a road has been used by alien smugglers is alone insufficient to justify a stop. See United States v. Diaz, 977 F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir.1992). Yet, that smugglers regularly use the road is relevant to the totality of the circumstances evaluation, especially given that local law enforcement officials have, on numerous occasions, requested assistance from Border Patrol Agents Torralba and Heideman in this area in pursuing suspected illegal aliens fleeing into the brush after a traffic stop.

Second, we examine the stop’s proximity to the border. The stop occurred 150 to 160 miles north of the border, a substantial distance from the border. See Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722 n. 7. Thus, the proximity element is not present in this ease. However, the author of Inocencio and the instant opinion did not contemplate establishing that any stop more than 50 miles from the border was illegal. In

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Bluebook (online)
205 F.3d 145, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2528, 2000 WL 205081, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-chavez-chavez-ca5-2000.