United States v. Charles Chatman, III
This text of United States v. Charles Chatman, III (United States v. Charles Chatman, III) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 15 2018 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-16571
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. Nos. 3:16-cv-02550-CRB 3:14-cr-00552-CRB v.
CHARLES CHESTER CHATMAN III, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 12, 2018**
Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Federal prisoner Charles Chester Chatman, III, appeals from the district
court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Reviewing de novo, see United States v.
Reves, 774 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 2014), we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). In his section 2255 motion, Chatman argued that, in light of Johnson v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), his California conviction for inflicting
corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant is no longer a crime of violence for
purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). The district court denied this claim citing
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017), which, as Chatman concedes,
forecloses this argument. On appeal, Chatman contends that the government’s pre-
Beckles concession that Johnson’s holding applies to the Guidelines steered him
away from raising the additional argument that he is actually innocent of the
sentencing enhancement. He further argues that the district court’s allegedly
premature dismissal of his section 2255 motion prevented him from developing
that alternative argument.
To the extent the government conceded that Johnson’s holding applies to the
Guidelines, neither the district court nor this court is bound by that concession.
See United States v. Ogles, 440 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“We are
not bound by a party’s concession as to the meaning of the law[.]”). We disagree
with Chatman that his challenge to the district court’s processing of his section
2255 motion is encompassed within the certificate of appealability and treat his
briefing of this issue as a motion to expand the certificate of appealability. So
2 17-16571 treated, the motion is denied. See 9th Cir. R. 22-1(e); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d
1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1999).
Chatman’s claim that the district court misapprehended that the state court
would impose a concurrent sentence lacks merit. The mere hope that the state
court would consider the length of Chatman’s federal sentence is not a basis for
relief because section 2255 does not extend to “claims based not on any objectively
ascertainable error but on the frustration of the subjective intent of the sentencing
judge.” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 187 (1979).
AFFIRMED.
3 17-16571
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