United States v. Chamberlin

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 14, 2024
• Docket: 23-969
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 14 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-969 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:22-cr-00036-MWF-1 v. MEMORANDUM* RICHARD ROYDEN CHAMBERLIN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 11, 2024 Pasadena, California

Before: TASHIMA, CHRISTEN, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Richard Royden Chamberlin appeals the district court’s sentence of 30

months’ imprisonment in connection with his shooting at a Planned Parenthood

clinic. Chamberlin pleaded guilty to one count of forcible interference and

attempted forcible interference with the obtaining and provision of reproductive

health services, in violation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE)

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1), and one count of being a felon in possession of a

firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Because the parties are familiar

with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines

de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Gasca-Ruiz,

852 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017). We review for abuse of discretion the district

court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts of the case. Id. We affirm in part

and vacate and remand for resentencing in part.

1. We reverse imposition of the hate crime enhancement. United States

Sentencing Guidelines § 3A1.1(a) requires a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that the defendant intentionally targeted his victim because of a protected

characteristic such as gender. U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.)

§ 3A1.1(a) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2023); see United States v. Armstrong, 620 F.3d

1172, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2010). The district court stated at sentencing that there

was “no evidence” that “this really was just based solely on misogyny.” The

district court instead imposed the enhancement after alluding to a disparate impact

theory, suggesting that because the majority of the clinic’s patients are women, the

effects of Chamberlin’s intimidation tactics would fall disproportionately upon

women. The district court’s findings rule out the possibility that Chamberlin

intentionally selected victims because of their gender. Thus, the district court’s

2 23-969 findings do not support the hate crime enhancement.

2. We affirm the district court’s ruling that the base offense level for the

FACE Act offense is 14, consistent with aggravated assault pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2A2.2, and not simple assault pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A2.3. The most serious

conduct that fits into the Guideline for simple assault is the threatened use of a

dangerous weapon. 1 See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.3(a). Here, Chamberlin actually fired his

weapon, and he did so in the direction of the doors and windows of a building in

which people were working, receiving treatment, and/or waiting as and for

patients, as well as in the direction of the bench outside where a woman was

sitting. The district court acknowledged that Chamberlin does not appear to have

been aiming at any particular person, but we reject Chamberlin’s argument that

shooting into a crowd without aiming would constitute only simple assault. The

district court did not err by concluding that aggravated assault was the appropriate

match for Chamberlin’s conduct.

3. Concerning the imposition of the obstruction enhancement under

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, we affirm the district court’s finding that the transcript shows

Chamberlin was lying or at least attempting to mislead the FBI. But false

1 The clear inapplicability of § 2A2.3 to Chamberlin’s crime leaves no ambiguity that would require deference to the commentary for § 2A2.2. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 573 (2019); United States v. Castillo, 69 F.4th 648, 655– 56 (9th Cir. 2023).

3 23-969 statements to law enforcement constitute obstruction only when “a defendant’s

conduct has a material effect on the government’s investigative efforts” or “if the

government has lost time, manpower and money because it was laboring under a

misbelief.” United States v. Lofton, 905 F.2d 1315, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal

quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted); see also U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt.

n.4(G) & 5(B). 2 Because the district court made no findings on materiality, or on

whether the conduct significantly obstructed or impeded the investigation, we

remand for the district court to address materiality and obstruction on a closed

record.

AFFIRMED in part and VACATED and REMANDED in part.

2 The Government agrees that Chamberlin’s false statements must be material.

4 23-969