USCA4 Appeal: 24-4029 Doc: 57 Filed: 08/18/2025 Pg: 1 of 16
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4029
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff − Appellee,
v.
CEDRIC LEE BENTON,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 24-4030
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:22−cr−00253−RJC−DCK−3; 3:05−cr−00105−RJC−2)
Argued: March 18, 2025 Decided: August 18, 2025
Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and WYNN and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4029 Doc: 57 Filed: 08/18/2025 Pg: 2 of 16
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Chief Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wynn and Judge Benjamin joined.
ARGUED: Ann Loraine Hester, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Julia Kay Wood, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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DIAZ, Chief Judge:
Cedric Lee Benton challenges the consecutive sentences the district court imposed
for his wire fraud offenses and supervised release violations. Benton argues that the district
court procedurally erred by failing to address his mitigating arguments in support of lower
sentences.
But even if the district court committed procedural error, we conclude that such
errors were harmless. We thus affirm.
I.
A.
In 2007, after Benton pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to
distribute, the district court sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment and 10 years’
supervised release. At the time, Benton had twenty-one criminal convictions that began in
1996; his state probation had been revoked once; he was on state probation for passing
counterfeit bills; and he’d been out of prison on state drug charges for fewer than two years
when he committed the federal drug conspiracy offense.
While in prison on the drug conspiracy charge, officials cited him for fourteen
infractions. Those infractions included (among others) using drugs and alcohol, refusing
to obey an order, and indecent exposure.
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In 2021, the district court applied the First Step Act 1 to reduce Benton’s sentence to
time served—208 months’ imprisonment—and 4 years of supervised release.
About three months after his release, Benton—with the help of several co-
conspirators—submitted two fraudulent loan applications under the Paycheck Protection
Program (“PPP”), a federal program intended to support small businesses during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
In the applications, Benton certified that he operated a trucking business in 2019—
when he was, in fact, incarcerated—and that he would use the loan proceeds to retain
(nonexistent) employees. As part of the scheme, Benton submitted false tax forms. Benton
received loans totaling $41,666, which he used for personal expenses.
Several months later, Benton’s probation officer saw Benton pour liquid from a
plastic bag into his urine collection cup during a mandatory drug screening.
Because of the fraudulent loan application and suspected drug testing violations, the
probation office recommended that the district court revoke Benton’s supervised release.
The probation office ultimately calculated a guidelines range of 33 to 36 months’
imprisonment for the loan fraud offense.
A federal grand jury then indicted Benton and two co-conspirators on fraud charges
related to the PPP loan applications. Benton pleaded guilty to three charges—one for wire-
fraud conspiracy and two for wire fraud—without a plea agreement.
1 Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018).
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B.
1.
The probation office prepared a presentence report for the three fraud convictions.
The report calculated a base offense level of seven. The report then added six levels based
on a loss amount over $40,000 but subtracted two levels for Benton’s acceptance of
responsibility, for a total offense level of eleven.
The report assigned Benton a criminal history category of II, which had dropped
substantially since his last conviction. Many of his prior convictions had taken place too
long ago to add criminal history points now, even though Benton was incarcerated on the
federal drug conspiracy charge when the convictions had “aged out.”
Finally, the report mentioned that Benton committed multiple infractions while
incarcerated and on supervised release, that he had a ten-month-old daughter, and that he
had received substance abuse treatment in the past that he wanted to continue through the
Bureau of Prisons.
2.
The district court held a joint sentencing and revocation hearing, and began with the
fraud offenses.
The parties agreed that the guidelines ranged from ten to sixteen months’
imprisonment. Benton requested a low-end ten-month term. He argued that he “was a
very small part of a much larger scheme,” and that he “wouldn’t even have known how to
fill out the forms, what to do with the forms, [or] where to file [them].” J.A. 59–60. Rather,
he insisted that his co-conspirators led the charge in executing the fraudulent scheme.
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Benton also contended that a longer sentence could result in a potential sentencing
disparity with an unindicted co-conspirator in the loan fraud scheme who received a 44-
month revocation sentence. The co-conspirator (who was sentenced by a different district
judge) received a sentence that was seven months below his guidelines range.
Benton urged that a low-end sentence on the fraud charges was appropriate because
he was “looking at so much time on the supervised release violation,” which had a
guidelines range of “three times as much” as the fraud charges. J.A. 63. And he
highlighted that he had a young child who he “want[ed] to get back to” and “want[ed] to
be able to provide for.” J.A. 64.
The district court dismissed Benton’s concern about the sentencing disparity,
explaining that criminal history wasn’t “a real helpful area for Mr. Benton” because his
criminal history was so lengthy. J.A. 60. The court expressed frustration that fifteen of
the convictions that received criminal history points when Benton was sentenced for the
drug conspiracy charge no longer counted toward his criminal history. “It appears,” said
the district court, “that this advisory range is grossly inadequate to reflect the actual
criminal conduct over time.” J.A. 62.
Benton’s arguments to the contrary didn’t move the district court. The court noted
that Benton “alleg[ed] to the federal government, to steal money from the PPP program,
that he was running a business,” even though he had been incarcerated at the time. J.A. 63.
The district court added that the loan program was “put in place to aid people suffering
during a pandemic” and that Benton “robbed” the program by “claiming to be running a
trucking business while actually being imprisoned on a drug-trafficking conviction.”
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J.A. 68. Not mincing words, the court commented that “there may be worse crimes in the
world, but that’s a pretty heinous crime.” J.A. 68.
The government requested a total sentence of forty-eight months—fourteen months
on the fraud charges and thirty-four months on the supervised release violation. The
government argued that the fourteen-month sentence wouldn’t create a sentencing disparity
because comparing the co-conspirator’s supervised release sentence to Benton’s fraud
sentence was comparing “apples and oranges.” J.A. 66. The government also noted
Benton’s “abysmal” conduct while imprisoned. J.A. 67.
The district court sentenced Benton to thirty-two months on the fraud charges after
“consider[ing] the information in the presentence report,” “consult[ing] the advisory
guidelines,” “hear[ing] the arguments of the attorneys,” and “read[ing] the letter of
support” filed on Benton’s behalf. J.A. 68. The court also considered the “extremely
serious” nature of the PPP fraud. J.A. 68. It remarked that “though Mr. Benton was only
one player in a multi-conspiracy crime, stealing $40,000 from a [g]overnment fund
designed to help people suffering from a pandemic, claiming to be a business owner when,
in fact, serving a lengthy drug-trafficking conviction” was, to the court, “fraud upon fraud
in a way that just mocks the law, doesn’t respect it.” J.A. 68–69.
The district court next explained that Benton’s “criminal history [was] just
staggering,” “go[ing] back to the early ’90s” with “very serious offenses.” J.A. 69. The
court again reviewed the multiple “zero-point convictions,” which left “the current
treatment” of Benton’s criminal history “just a joke.” J.A. 69. That treatment “[didn’t]
meet any [§] 3553(a) purposes at all,” in part because Benton was “someone who shows
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no signs of being rehabilitated, even though he got the benefits of the First Step Act[] [and]
got the benefit of criminal history points disappearing just because time moves on while
he’s in prison, not because there’s a cessation of criminal activity.” J.A. 69–70.
The court found that “the criminal history category [of II] [didn’t] in any way, shape,
or form reflect[] the seriousness of Mr. Benton’s criminal history.” J.A. 70. Likewise,
opined the district court, “[i]t doesn’t do anything to protect the public from further crimes
of Mr. Benton that are like the criminal conduct in the instant case.” J.A. 70.
The district court didn’t think either Benton’s recommended sentence of ten months’
imprisonment or the government’s request of fourteen months’ imprisonment “[came]
anywhere close to accomplishing the [§] 3553(a) factors applicable in this case.” J.A. 70.
The court then addressed the sentencing disparity between Benton and his
unindicted co-conspirator, saying that it didn’t “think there [was] any comparison between
the criminal history of Mr. Benton” and the co-conspirator. J.A. 70–71. With Benton’s
criminal history, the court found that it had “a duty . . . to protect the public from someone
who shows such disrespect for the law as this case reflects.” J.A. 71.
The § 3553(a) factors thus “compel[led] [the court] to sentence above the guideline
range.” J.A. 71. The district court “var[ied] to a criminal history category [of VI]” and
imposed a sentence of thirty-two months on each of the three fraud counts to be served
concurrently. J.A. 71.
Even that sentence, said the court, didn’t “adequately protect[] the public from this
kind of criminal recidivism, but it result[ed] in a sentence that is twice the upper end of the
guideline range with a logical explanation for doing it.” J.A. 71. In pronouncing its
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sentence, the district court recommended that Benton be allowed to participate in
substance-abuse programs. And the court “call[ed] to the attention of the custodial
authorities that he has a history of mental-health issues,” so it also recommended that “he
be allowed to participate in any available mental-health programs.” J.A. 72.
3.
The district court then turned to Benton’s revocation sentence.
Benton requested a twenty-six-month sentence to run concurrently with his fraud
sentence. He noted once more the possibility of a sentencing disparity with the unindicted
co-conspirator and explained that a twenty-six-month sentence would account for the fact
that his co-conspirator received a revocation sentence that was seven months below his
guideline range.
Benton next explained that his father died while he was in custody and he had to
attend his father’s funeral over Zoom, “which was traumatic.” J.A. 77. Similarly, Benton
explained that his mother was “70 years old” and “in hospice care.” J.A. 77. Benton’s
“biggest fear” was that she was “going to die while he[] [was] in prison” and that he’d
“have to possibly attend her funeral over Zoom.” J.A. 77. Lastly, Benton pointed out that
he had “a drug problem he need[ed] treatment for.” J.A. 78.
The government, meanwhile, requested “a guideline sentence of 34 months.”
J.A. 78. The government recounted that “the [c]ourt[] [had] already gone over the prior
history of this defendant” during the fraud sentencing, including “his behavior while in
custody.” J.A. 78. But the government noted that Benton’s second supervised release
violation wasn’t “in any way applicable” to Benton’s co-conspirator’s, given Benton’s
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“contemptuous” and “devious” falsification of his drug tests. J.A. 78–79. Before
concluding, the government identified the guidelines range as thirty-three to forty-one
months but explained that “because of the statutory provisions, [the range is] limited to
[thirty-six] months and [is], in fact, capped.” J.A. 79.
The court first observed that Benton’s violations “constitute[d] a breach of trust with
the probation office” and “show[ed] utter contempt” for the original district judge’s
supervised release order. J.A. 80. The court continued that “the fraud conspiracy in
violation of law, and the submission of false urine samples shows an attitude towards the
law that requires the [c]ourt’s sentence to deter and to protect among the other [§] 3553(a)
factors.” 2 J.A. 80. So, “to meet that breach of trust” and “to accomplish the [§] 3553(a)
factors,” the court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of thirty-four months’
imprisonment, to be served consecutive to the fraud sentence. J.A. 80.
This appeal followed.
2 The Supreme Court recently held in Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025), that district courts may not “account for the need to exact retribution for the defendant’s underlying crime” under § 3553(a)(2)(A) when deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised release. Id. at 2040. Instead, only the “forward-looking” factors enumerated in § 3583(e) are permissible. Id. at 2041; see id. at 2045. Benton hasn’t alleged that the district court impermissibly considered § 3553(a)(2)(A) at his revocation hearing. In any event, the district court didn’t violate Esteras. The court revoked Benton’s supervised release to “meet [his] breach of trust” while on supervised release and to “deter and to . . . protect” as outlined by the other § 3553(a) factors made applicable to supervised release violations through § 3583(e). J.A. 80. In short, the court’s determination comports with what Esteras expressly outlines as permissible—the “forward-looking ends of sentencing” rather than the “backward-looking purpose of retribution.” 145 S. Ct. at 2041.
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II.
Benton argues that the district court procedurally erred in imposing both the fraud
and revocation sentences. “We review a district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion.”
United States v. Webb, 965 F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 2020).
Benton contends that his fraud sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the
district court failed to address his nonfrivolous mitigating arguments for a low-end
sentence of ten months. Benton claims that the district court didn’t address his arguments
that (1) “he was a low-level participant in the conspiracy,” Appellant’s Br. at 14, and (2)
he had an infant child for whom he wanted to provide, id. at 15.
Benton also asserts that his revocation sentence is plainly procedurally unreasonable
because the district court ignored his nonfrivolous mitigating arguments and failed to
consider the applicable guidelines range. There, Benton claims that the district court didn’t
address his arguments that (1) he should get “the same ‘seven months off’” as his
unindicted co-conspirator, id. at 19, (2) he “was unable to attend his father’s funeral in
person and that [his] mother [was] 70 years old,” id. at 21, and (3) he had a drug problem,
id.
Because both sets of alleged errors are harmless, we address them together.
When reviewing a sentence for procedural reasonableness, we consider—among
other requirements—whether the district court has “place[d] on the record an
individualized assessment based on the particularized facts of the case before it.” Webb,
965 F.3d at 270 (cleaned up). “[A] district court must address or consider all non-frivolous
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reasons presented for imposing a different sentence and explain why it has rejected those
arguments.” Id. (cleaned up).
But a procedural error doesn’t automatically compel reversal. Rather, such errors
are subject to harmless error review. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th
Cir. 2010). To show harmlessness in this context, the government must prove “with fair
assurance that the district court’s explicit consideration of the defendant’s [mitigating]
arguments would not have affected the sentence imposed.” United States v. Boulware, 604
F.3d 832, 838–39 (4th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). In other words, a procedural error is
harmless only when the government establishes that “the error did not have a substantial
or injurious effect or influence the result.” United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 745 (4th
Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).
A reviewing court may find an error harmless where the defendant’s non-frivolous
arguments are weak—either in fact or in presentation—when compared to the district
court’s reasons for imposing its chosen sentence. See Boulware, 604 F.3d at 839–40. In
this context, a weak mitigating argument may “not [be] particularly compelling when
juxtaposed with [a defendant’s] lengthy criminal history and the circumstances
surrounding the instant offense.” United States v. Bourque, No. 21-4481, 2023 WL
2158367, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 22, 2023) (per curiam).
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Here, we assume without deciding that the district court erred in failing to explicitly
address Benton’s mitigating arguments for his fraud and revocation sentences. 3 But we
find any assumed error harmless because we can say with “fair assurance” on this record
“that the district court’s explicit consideration of [Benton’s] arguments would not have
affected the sentence imposed.” Boulware, 604 F.3d at 838 (cleaned up).
The district court grounded Benton’s fraud sentence in the required § 3553(a)
factors and, in doing so, explained why a lower sentence would fall short of accomplishing
those statutory goals. The court zeroed in on the “extremely serious” nature of Benton’s
fraud offense. J.A. 68. Although the court acknowledged that Benton “was only one player
in a multi-conspiracy crime,” it was troubled that Benton would steal “from a [g]overnment
fund designed to help people suffering from a pandemic” and “claim[] to be a business
owner when, in fact, [he was] serving a lengthy drug-trafficking conviction.” J.A. 68–69.
This “fraud upon fraud,” said the court, “just mocks the law.” J.A. 69.
The district court likewise focused on what was, in its view, Benton’s
“underrepresented,” J.A. 61, yet “staggering,” J.A. 69, criminal history. It remarked that
“the current treatment” of Benton’s criminal history was “just a joke,” and didn’t “meet
any [§] 3553(a) purposes at all.” J.A. 69. Benton, according to the district court, was
3 The government argues that the district court didn’t procedurally err in imposing either of Benton’s sentences because it addressed the “central thesis” of his mitigating arguments. Appellee’s Br. at 22. But because we find any alleged error was harmless, we don’t reach the government’s argument.
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“someone who show[ed] no sign of being rehabilitated” despite receiving “the benefits of
the First Step Act,” so his assigned criminal history category didn’t “in any way, shape, or
form reflect[] the seriousness of [his] criminal history.” J.A. 69–70.
The court believed it had a “duty . . . to protect the public from someone who
show[ed] such disrespect for the law,” so the § 3553(a) factors “compel[led] it to sentence
[Benton] above the guidelines range” on the fraud offense. J.A. 71. But even that sentence
(said the court) didn’t “adequately protect[] the public from this kind of criminal
recidivism.” J.A. 71.
Similarly, the district court observed that Benton’s supervised release violations
“show[ed] an attitude towards the law that require[d] the [c]ourt’s sentence to deter and to
protect among the other [§] 3553(a) factors.” J.A. 80; see supra note 1. The court thus
imposed a consecutive within-guidelines sentence “to meet that breach of trust” and
“accomplish the [§] 3553(a) factors.” J.A. 80.
We draw several conclusions from this record.
First, we have “no doubt that the district court considered [Benton’s] [mitigating]
argument[s] in the context of applying the § 3553(a) factors,” even if the court didn’t
explain why it rejected each of those arguments. Boulware, 604 F.3d at 839.
For the fraud sentence, the court “considered the information in the presentence
report” and the “arguments of the attorneys,” which addressed Benton’s criminal history,
lesser participation in the fraud scheme, the relevant guidelines ranges, and the fact that
Benton had a young child. J.A. 68. The district court also reviewed the letter of support
filed on Benton’s behalf.
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As for Benton’s revocation sentence, the presentence report addressed Benton’s
substance-abuse problems and his request for “further treatment through the Bureau of
Prisons,” J.A. 67, and the district court separately confirmed that it had “consulted the
advisory guidelines,” 4 J.A. 68. The court also discussed but dismissed (in the fraud
context) concerns about any potential sentencing disparities with Benton’s co-conspirators 5
and tailored Benton’s sentence to provide substance-abuse treatment.
Second, Benton’s mitigating arguments were “relatively weak . . . when balanced
against the district court’s explanation for the sentence imposed.” United States v.
Barefield, 714 F. App’x 237, 239 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); see also Boulware, 604 F.3d
at 839–40. That Benton had a young child, for example, didn’t undercut the district court’s
focus on Benton’s long criminal history and troubling criminal conduct, particularly where
Benton offered no evidence of what care he’d been providing the child, or the care that
would be provided in his absence. See Boulware, 604 F.3d at 840 (finding assumed
procedural error harmless where defendant didn’t offer evidence that “in her absence there
would be no one else available to support her children . . . or care for her mother”).
4 The district court didn’t repeat in the revocation portion of the hearing that it had reviewed the presentence report before rendering Benton’s sentence. But we’re satisfied that the court did so because it heard arguments on both the fraud and revocation sentences in a combined hearing. See Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 118–19 (2018). 5 The district court likewise didn’t repeat in the revocation portion of the hearing that it was rejecting Benton’s sentencing-disparity argument. But again, because the hearings were combined, we’re satisfied that the district court at least heard and considered that argument for the revocation sentence. See Chavez-Meza, 585 U.S. at 118–19.
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The same is true for Benton’s mitigating arguments for his revocation sentence. See
id. The arguments he made in passing about his other family circumstances surely did little
to sway the district court when measured against its focus on the permissible sentencing
factors. And Benton’s remaining arguments—that he was less involved in the fraud, that
his co-conspirator received a lesser sentence, and that he suffered from substance-abuse
problems—are too weak to tip the statutory scale.
What’s more, the district court’s comment that it didn’t find even the upwardly-
varied fraud sentence sufficient to “adequately protect[] the public” from Benton’s
“criminal recidivism” undercuts whatever limited force his mitigating arguments wielded.
J.A. 71. The district court, in its own words, imposed its sentence “with a logical
explanation for doing [so],” given the sentencing factors and the parties’ arguments.
J.A. 71. Terse, to be sure, but adequate (or, at the very least, harmless).
* * *
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED