United States v. Castro-Camacho

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 4, 2025
• Docket: 24-6145
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-6145 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:21-cr-05335-RJB-1 v. MEMORANDUM* IOVANNY CASTRO-CAMACHO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 8, 2025 Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, CLIFTON, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Iovanny Castro-Camacho appeals from the district court’s denial of his

motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and for

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision on a motion for

a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) and a motion for compassionate release

under § 3582(c)(1). United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021) (per

curiam). We review de novo the interpretation and application of the Sentencing

Guidelines. United States v. D.M., 869 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2017).

1. When the U.S. Sentencing Commission amends the Guidelines and

makes it retroactive, a district court can reduce a defendant’s sentence based on

that amended provision, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Dillon v. United

States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010). Any reduction, however, must be consistent

with the policy statement at U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual

(U.S.S.G.) § 1B1.10. Id. It permits district courts to modify a sentence to be

within the newly applicable range, but only if the new term would not be “less than

the minimum of the amended guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A).1

That policy statement precludes a reduction of Castro-Camacho’s sentence.

After his sentencing, the Commission enacted the zero-point offender reduction,

which permits a two-level reduction for certain defendants—like Castro-

Camacho—without criminal-history points. See id. § 4C1.1; see also

1 The only time a court may depart below the amended range is if a defendant offered “substantial assistance to authorities.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). That exception is inapplicable here.

2 24-6145 id. § 1B1.10(d) & cmt. n.7 (explaining that the zero-point offender reduction can

be retroactively applied). Had that provision been in effect at the time of Castro-

Camacho’s sentencing, his offense level would have been lowered by two, from 28

to 26, and his Guidelines range would have been 63 to 78 months. But the district

court here imposed a sentence of 60 months—a term already three months below

the amended range. Any further reduction would drop the sentence to “less than

the minimum of the amended guideline range,” violating the policy statement. Id.

§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(A).

Castro-Camacho argues that § 3582(c)(2) requires the district court to

correct its earlier error, namely, the omission of a two-level deduction for Castro-

Camacho’s minor role under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). As the policy statement makes

clear, however, the district court “shall substitute only the amendments” that are

retroactively applicable, “leav[ing] all other guideline application decisions

unaffected.” Id. § 1B1.10(b)(1) (emphases added). Indeed, in Dillon v. United

States, the Supreme Court rejected a similar attempt by a defendant to use a

§ 3582(c)(2) motion to “correct two mistakes in his original sentence.” 560 U.S. at

831. The Court observed that § 3582(c)(2) authorized not a “plenary resentencing”

but “a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence.” Id. at 826. Like in

Dillon, “the aspects of his sentence that [Castro-Camacho] seeks to correct . . . are

3 24-6145 outside the scope of the proceeding authorized by § 3582(c)(2), and the District

Court properly declined to address them.” Id. at 831.

2. On a compassionate-release motion brought under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a

district court may reduce a sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons”

that are consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement in U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.13. United States v. Bryant, No. 24-3093, 2025 WL 2026172, at *1–2 (9th

Cir. July 21, 2025). That policy statement identifies specific circumstances that

satisfy the “extraordinary and compelling” bar, like when the defendant has a

terminal illness, has certain serious family circumstances, or is a victim of abuse by

a prison official. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). “[A]ny other circumstance” may also

qualify for relief, but only if it is “similar in gravity” to those delineated. Id.

§ 1B1.13(b)(5). It is this catch-all exception that Castro-Camacho relies on.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Castro-

Camacho did not qualify for relief under that exception. The court reasonably

concluded that its sentencing error, while unfortunate, was not of the same gravity

as the circumstances delineated in the policy statement.

For purposes of his compassionate-release motion, it is irrelevant that

Castro-Camacho would now qualify for the zero-point offender reduction. The

policy statement explains that changes in law “shall not be considered for purposes

of determining whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists,” id.

4 24-6145 § 1B1.13(c), unless the defendant received an “unusually long sentence” and has

served at least ten years, id. § 1B1.13(b)(6). Castro-Camacho—whose entire

sentence is five years—does not qualify.

Because we conclude that Castro-Camacho does not qualify for a sentence

reduction or for compassionate release, we do not reach the § 3553(a) factors. See

Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826 (explaining that, on § 3582(c)(2) motions, courts must

consider the Commission’s policy statements before weighing the § 3553(a)

factors); United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam)

(explaining that courts denying “compassionate release need not evaluate each

step”).

AFFIRMED.

5 24-6145