United States v. Carrillo

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: December 6, 2021
• Docket: 21-1153
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 21-1153 Document: 010110614722 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 6, 2021 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 21-1153 (D.C. No. 1:99-CR-00300-MSK-1) MANUEL GUILLERMO CARRILLO, (D. Colo.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before McHUGH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

In 2001, Manuel Guillermo Carrillo was convicted of seventeen drug-related

counts involving the large-scale distribution of methamphetamine, cocaine, and

cocaine base (i.e., crack cocaine). He was sentenced to concurrent sentences on all

charges, with sixty-year sentences imposed for Count 1 (conspiracy to distribute

cocaine, methamphetamine, and crack cocaine) and Count 17 (possession with intent

to distribute crack cocaine), and shorter sentences for the other counts.

After Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, Carrillo filed a motion for

sentencing relief under the Act, requesting a reduced sentence on Counts 1 and 17.

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 21-1153 Document: 010110614722 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 2

The district court concluded the Count 1 sentence was eligible for sentencing relief,

but the court declined to exercise its discretion to reduce this sentence, noting, inter

alia, that the advisory guidelines range remained the same due to the large amount of

methamphetamine involved in the offense. After rejecting Carrillo’s request for a

reduction on Count 1, the court declined to consider Carrillo’s request for a reduction

of his sentence on Count 17. In support of this decision, the district court cited to our

holding in United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145, 1153 (10th Cir. 2020), that “a

live controversy is not present, and the court does not have jurisdiction” under

Article III, if a requested sentence reduction will “not have the effect of actually

reducing the offender’s length of incarceration” due to the existence of a coextensive,

concurrent sentence on another count. The district court then concluded: “If and

when Mr. Carrillo is in a position to obtain a sentence reduction on Count One, the

Court could address any reduction in the sentence on Count Seventeen under the First

Step Act at that time.”

On appeal, Carrillo does not challenge the district court’s denial of his request

for a sentence reduction on Count 1, but he argues the court erred in declining to

consider Count 17. He contends Mannie is distinguishable because the district court

in Mannie lacked the authority to reduce the total length of the defendant’s sentence

from the onset of the case, see 971 F.3d at 1154, but here the district court had

jurisdiction to reduce both of his sixty-year concurrent sentences and simply declined

to do so.

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The district court did not err in declining to consider Carrillo’s Count 17

argument. Unlike the defendant in Mannie, Carrillo initially had standing to bring a

First Step Act motion to challenge both of his sixty-year sentences. Once the district

court denied relief on Count 1, however, Carrillo was in the same situation as the

defendant in Mannie—the requested reduction of the Count 17 sentence would “not

have the effect of actually reducing [his] length of incarceration,” and thus his

alleged injury was no longer redressable as required by Article III. Id. at 1153. The

distinction Carrillo highlights between Mannie and his case is the difference between

standing and mootness, but this difference does not affect Mannie’s jurisdictional

import. Standing and mootness are “closely related doctrines” that both address the

question of Article III standing by asking whether the party seeking relief has

suffered a concrete injury that can “be redressed by action of the court.” Utah

Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1263 (10th Cir. 2004)

(McConnell, J., concurring). “The Supreme Court has described the doctrine of

mootness as ‘the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal

interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must

continue throughout its existence (mootness).’” Id. (McConnell, J., concurring)

(quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997)). If

it becomes impossible at any point for a court to grant effective relief, then the injury

is no longer redressable, and the court loses jurisdiction over the claim. Abdulhaseeb

v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1311 (10th Cir. 2010).

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Carrillo argues the district court could not deprive itself of jurisdiction by

resolving one issue in a manner that mooted the other issue. However, he cites no

authority for this proposition, and we note that courts regularly decline to address

issues mooted by the disposition of different issues. See, e.g., Sharp v. CGG Land

(U.S.) Inc., 840 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Because we affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of CGG, Employees’ argument that CGG

waived its other affirmative defenses is moot and we refrain from addressing that

argument.”); Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Techs., Inc., 935 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir.

1991) (“Having reached the conclusion that the district court did not err in holding

Coherent failed to establish the likelihood of confusion, the remaining issues

presented for review are moot.”); Navarro v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 2:16-cv-

1180-JMC-CG, 2018 WL 2770134, at *3 (D.N.M. June 8, 2018) (exercising

discretion to grant motion to amend, then denying motions for summary judgment as

moot based on that discretionary decision).

Carrillo also argues the district court’s decision is improper because it will bar

him from ever obtaining review of his Count 17 sentence under the First Step Act,

which provides that a prisoner is not eligible for a sentence reduction if “a previous

motion made under this section to reduce the sentence was, after the date of

enactment of this Act, denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits.”

Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(c), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). This concern is

unfounded: the district court made clear that it was declining to consider Carrillo’s

Count 17 argument, and thus his motion for a reduction of his Count 17 sentence was

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not “denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits.” Id. Additionally,

Mannie clarifies that the dismissal of a First Step Act request for a sentence reduction

based on the existence of a concurrent sentence “is without prejudice because [it is a]

ruling on a jurisdictional point rather than on the merits of [the] claim.” 971 F.3d at

1154 n.12. Thus, as the district court stated, “[i]f and when Mr. Carrillo is in a

position to obtain a sentence reduction on Count One, the Court could address any

reduction in the sentence on Count Seventeen under the First Step Act at that time.”

We therefore affirm the district court’s disposition of Carrillo’s First Step Act

motion.

Entered for the Court

Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge