United States v. Carr

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: 25-1346
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-1346 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:24-cr-00002-LEK-1 v. MEMORANDUM* NATHANIEL CARR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 12, 2026** Honolulu, Hawaii

Before: BYBEE, R. NELSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellant Nathaniel Carr was sentenced to 63 months in prison,

followed by a term of supervised release for unlawful possession of a firearm. Carr

violated his original conditions of release, and in this appeal he challenges a

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). condition that was imposed when he was sentenced on his supervised-release

violation. The condition at issue excluded him from Hawai‘i Island, Hawai‘i, where

he was living with family. We review the legality of a supervised-release condition

de novo. See United States v. Nishida, 53 F.4th 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2022). Because

Carr objected to the condition at sentencing, “we review the district court’s decision

to impose it for abuse of discretion.” United States v. LaCoste, 821 F.3d 1187, 1192

(9th Cir. 2016).

“The only sentence that is legally cognizable is the actual oral pronouncement

in the presence of the defendant.” United States v. Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253,

256 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). Thus, “if there is a conflict between the sentence

orally imposed and written judgment, the oral pronouncement, as correctly reported,

controls.” United States v. Montoya, 82 F.4th 640, 648 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting

United States v. Aguirre, 214 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2000)).

The parties agree that there are two conflicts between the condition as orally

announced and as written. First, where the district court’s oral pronouncement

permitted Carr to live anywhere but Hawai‘i Island, the written condition required

that he reside on Oahu. Second, where the oral condition categorically prohibited

Carr from entering Hawai‘i Island, the written judgment allowed Carr to return to

that island with the court’s permission. Because the written condition differs from

the oral pronouncement, the supervised-release condition as imposed orally at Carr’s

2 25-1346 sentencing controls.

Carr argues that the district court’s orally pronounced geographical restriction

is unjustified because the district court’s concern about potential violence toward his

family members was resolved by a separate condition prohibiting him from having

any contact with his family members and total exclusion from the island is otherwise

unreasonable. We disagree.

“[C]onditions are permissible if they are reasonably related to the goals of

deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the offender, taking into

account the offender’s history and personal characteristics, and involve no greater

deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of supervised

release.” United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United

States v. Goddard, 537 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008)). A “so-called ‘banishment’

condition[]” may be reasonably necessary where a “defendant’s ties to a particular

area . . . increas[e] the likelihood that he will re-offend if he returns.” LaCoste, 821

F.3d at 1193 (collecting cases). Banishment may be upheld where the offender

violated his supervised release in the prohibited area and temporary removal will

either separate the offender from negative influences or interrupt a destructive

behavioral pattern. See United States v. Many White Horses, 964 F.3d 825, 830–31

(9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Alexander, 509 F.3d 253, 256–57 (6th Cir. 2007);

United States v. Sicher, 239 F.3d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 2000). Likewise, banishment may

3 25-1346 be appropriate where it will protect the affected community from future harm,

Alexander, 509 F.3d at 257, and where the defendant’s personality traits make him

more likely to recidivate, see United States v. Cothran, 855 F.2d 749, 750–51 (11th

Cir. 1988).

Here, Carr violated his supervised-release conditions while he was on Hawai‘i

Island and was in “a downward spiral” that the district court sought to halt. The

banishment condition “responded directly” to Carr’s history of violence against

family members, his present conflict with the family members that he had been

living with, and his failure to tell his probation officer when he moved out of his

family’s residence. Alexander, 509 F.3d at 257. The geographic restriction was

intended to protect Carr’s family members, as well as the broader community, from

future harm. The district court repeatedly noted that Carr presented as capable and

intelligent at his sentencing hearing, and the court further expressed concern about

Carr’s potential manipulation of the system. We conclude that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in imposing the geographical restriction.

That said, a condition that affects a fundamental liberty interest, like a

banishment condition, “merits careful review.” Many White Horses, 964 F.3d at 830.

Here, the record is unclear whether the district court intended to categorically

exclude Carr from visiting Hawai‘i Island during his supervised release, and

permitting him to visit the island with court approval would “help[] to mitigate the

4 25-1346 severity of the limitation.” Id. at 831 (quoting Watson, 582 F.3d at 984). As such,

we remand with instructions for the district court to clarify its intent regarding the

geographical restriction and address whether Carr is allowed to visit Hawai‘i Island

during his supervised-release term with the court’s permission.

VACATED and REMANDED for resentencing.

5 25-1346