United States v. Capps

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: July 24, 2025
• Docket: 24-3083
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-3083 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 24, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 24-3083 (D.C. No. 6:21-CR-10073-EFM-1) MICHAEL R. CAPPS, (D. Kan.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, BACHARACH, and EID, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Michael R. Capps seeks to appeal several rulings made in the proceedings to

enforce his restitution order. But the enforcement proceedings remain ongoing.

Without a final decision, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

I

A federal jury convicted Mr. Capps of several crimes. He was ordered to pay

more than $300,000 in restitution.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-3083 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 2

The government began enforcement proceedings to collect the restitution. It

applied for writs of garnishment and referred the restitution debt to the Treasury

Offset Program.1 Mr. Capps filed several motions addressing the enforcement

proceedings. The district court entered an order (1) denying Mr. Capps’s motion for

a declaratory judgment holding that his social security disability benefits are exempt

from garnishment; (2) granting the government’s motion to dismiss the motion for a

declaratory judgment; (3) denying Mr. Capps’s motion to require the government to

apply forfeited funds to the restitution judgment; (4) denying Mr. Capps’s claim that

certain property is exempt from garnishment; and (5) denying Mr. Capps’s motion to

quash the government’s discovery requests and to impose sanctions against the

government.

Mr. Capps appeals from the court’s order.2 The government moves to dismiss

the appeal, arguing that we lack jurisdiction to hear it.

II

Mr. Capps has the burden to establish our jurisdiction because he is the party

invoking it. See In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litigation, 61 F.4th 1126, 1170

(10th Cir. 2023).

1 The Treasury Offset Program helps collect overdue federal debt by withholding money from a federal payment—such as a tax refund or social security benefit—to the debtor. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Offset Program, https://fiscal.treasury.gov/top/how-top-works.html [https://perma.cc/9EGC-A5MU]. 2 Mr. Capps represents himself, so we construe his filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 2 Appellate Case: 24-3083 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 3

We have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district

courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A ‘final decision’ within the meaning of § 1291 is

normally limited to an order that resolves the entire case.” Ritzen Grp., Inc. v.

Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 38 (2020). This definition applies even though

this appeal involves postjudgment proceedings. See Syngenta, 61 F.4th at 1172.

After all, we treat postjudgment “proceedings as standalone litigation units subject to

the same finality rules that apply to prejudgment merits proceedings.” Id.

Not even Mr. Capps disputes that the enforcement proceedings remain ongoing

in district court.3 So we have no decision concluding the enforcement proceedings

and thus giving us jurisdiction.

But § 1291 “encompasses not only judgments that terminate an action, but also

a small class of collateral rulings that, although they do not end the litigation, are

appropriately deemed final.” Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted). This small class “includes only decisions that are

conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that are

effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

3 Mr. Capps implies that the order denying his motion for a declaratory judgment is a final decision because it conclusively resolved whether his social security disability benefits are exempt from garnishment. Granted, the order “disposed of a particular, discrete issue that the district court was unlikely to revisit.” Syngenta, 61 F.4th at 1173. But a final decision will not exist until the district court resolves all issues raised in the enforcement proceedings. See id. at 1172–73.

3 Appellate Case: 24-3083 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 4

Mr. Capps has failed to show that the collateral-order doctrine allows

immediate appeal of the district court’s rulings. We will assume the rulings were

conclusive. Even so, Mr. Capps has not shown they are separate from the merits of

the ongoing proceedings. In fact, he argues only that the rulings “are separate from

the merits of the underlying criminal case.” Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 2. But what

matters is whether the rulings are separate from the merits of the enforcement

proceedings, for it is those proceedings that we treat as the relevant litigation for

purposes of finality. See Syngenta, 61 F.4th at 1172. Moreover, Mr. Capps has

failed to show that the rulings could not be reviewed effectively once the

enforcement proceedings have concluded. He says he will suffer harm from the

continued garnishment of his disability benefits and forced financial disclosures.

To decide if a ruling will be effectively unreviewable later, however, we do not ask

whether immediate review might avert “a particular injustice.” Mohawk, 558 U.S.

at 107 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). We instead ask whether

“delaying review until the entry of final judgment would imperil a substantial public

interest or some particular value of a high order.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). And Mr. Capps identifies no public interest or high-order value at stake.

4 Appellate Case: 24-3083 Document: 57-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 5

III

We grant the government’s motion to dismiss. We dismiss this appeal.

Entered for the Court

Timothy M. Tymkovich Circuit Judge