FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 19, 2009 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker __________________________ Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 08-1156 v. (D.Ct. No. 1:98-CR-00432-EWN-1) (D. Colo.) JAMES CAPADONA,
Defendant-Appellant. ____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BARRETT, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant James Capadona was convicted by a jury of escape from federal
custody, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), and sentenced to thirty months
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. imprisonment and three years supervised release. He now appeals both his
conviction and sentence on grounds the district court erred: (1) by declining to
rule on the sufficiency of his affirmative defense of justification prior to trial,
thereby depriving him of the opportunity to make a reasoned choice whether to
testify or remain silent at trial; and (2) in applying a two-point enhancement for
obstruction of justice based on its finding Mr. Capadona perjured himself at trial.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and affirm Mr. Capadona’s conviction and sentence.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On August 19, 1998, Mr. Capadona walked away from a minimum security
prison camp located at the Florence, Colorado, Federal Correctional Complex
(FCC) after serving approximately one-half of his ninety-seven-month sentence
for a drug-related offense. He remained a fugitive for more than six and one-half
years, from August 1998 until his arrest in San Francisco, California, in March
2005. He was indicted on one count of escape, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a),
and extradited to Colorado to face federal prosecution on the pending charge.
Prior to trial, Mr. Capadona gave notice of his intent to assert the
affirmative defense of “necessity or duress,” pursuant to United States v. Bailey,
444 U.S. 394 (1980), which the parties now refer to as a “justification defense,”
-2- as termed in United States v. Butler, 485 F.3d 569, 572 n.1 (10 th Cir. 2007).
Relying on Bailey, Mr. Capadona advised he would prove the four elements of
such a defense by showing: (1) his life was in imminent danger from: (a) a
member of the prison staff who had threatened him, and (b) a group of prison
guards, referred to as the “Cowboys,” who violently treated inmates; (2) it would
have been futile to raise an outcry; (3) no person was harmed in the course of his
escape; and (4) he had not reached a position of safety during the six and one-half
years following his escape because he believed he would inevitably face
retribution from prison officials if he returned to custody. While Mr. Capadona
stated he recognized that Bailey requires a threshold showing for each of these
elements before a justification defense can properly be submitted to a jury, he
urged the court not to “act as a super-gate keeper” in making a pre-trial
determination as to whether his evidence would be sufficient for jury
consideration and, instead, to let the jury make the determination.
The government filed a response in opposition and moved in limine to
preclude Mr. Capadona’s introduction of evidence in support of the justification
defense at trial, challenging the prima facie threshold sufficiency of such
evidence to meet all the required elements of that defense. Also relying on
Bailey, it asserted Mr. Capadona could not prevail as a matter of law on the fourth
element regarding not being able to reach a position of safety for almost seven
-3- years after his escape, given the Supreme Court’s determination that three months
as a fugitive was too long as a matter of law to succeed on the fourth element.
See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 399, 415. Mr. Capadona replied, arguing the decision on
the viability of his asserted justification defense should be left to the jury, and not
the court, and that a determination on the sufficiency of his proffer prior to trial,
including his own testimony, would deprive him of his right to present a
“complete defense” at trial.
At a status conference, the parties again presented argument on the issue of
the justification defense, and Mr. Capadona’s counsel reiterated the defense’s
position that it would produce sufficient evidence to support the affirmative
defense, which should be an issue for jury determination. He also acknowledged
that proving the fourth element of achieving a position of safety could be a
problem but urged that “if we can’t produce a scintilla of evidence that [Mr.
Capadona] was not in a position of safety, then I can understand the court not
going with the jury instruction to the effect of he was under duress.” R., Vol. 3 at
4-5. Counsel also pointed out a trial would be needed anyway, given Mr.
Capadona’s unwavering position that he would not plead guilty to the charge.
Thereafter, the district court issued an order denying the government’s
motion in limine to preclude the admission of the justification defense evidence at
-4- trial. While the district court acknowledged its authority to determine whether
Mr. Capadona met the minimum standard of proof on each element, it made no
determination on the sufficiency of his evidence supporting his affirmative
defense at that time and announced its intent not to hold a pretrial evidentiary
hearing, stating:
Such a hearing could only lead to one of two results: the defense is either available or unavailable. If it is the former, the parties will be forced to re-argue the evidence before the jury and the court will have wasted scarce judicial resources in conducting duplicative proceedings. If the latter, the court will have wasted resources in an unnecessary proceeding on the eve of trial. Accordingly, [Mr. Capadona] may present his evidence concerning his affirmative defense at trial. This court will serve in its proper capacity as gatekeeper, and will only allow the jury to consider the defense if [he] has adequate evidence to support the elements thereof.
R., Vol. 1, Doc. 62 at 5-6.
At the pretrial motions hearing, the district court addressed the justification
defense issue again, questioning the sufficiency of Mr. Capadona’s proof and his
need to lay a foundation, including a nexus between himself and the Cowboys. It
also questioned how he intended to prove the fourth element regarding reaching a
position of safety. Counsel responded by explaining Mr. Capadona would testify
as to each element in support of his affirmative defense. The district court
warned Mr. Capadona that the justification defense was “so implausible on its
face” that it could not “ever conceive of a jury buying into it” but indicated its
-5- inclination to allow the defense to be presented to the jury nevertheless.
At trial, the district court permitted Mr. Capadona to present evidence in
support of the justification defense. Mr. Capadona’s first witness, an FBI
investigator, testified: (1) the “Cowboys” Mr. Capadona complained about as
threatening and retaliatory had worked at the Special Housing Unit (SHU), which
is a different Florence FCC facility than where Mr. Capadona was held; (2) an
investigation into the brutality of the guards known as the Cowboys was prompted
by complaints received from inmates; and (3) their reign of violence ended almost
a year before Mr. Capadona’s August 1998 escape. Mr. Capadona now admits
this testimony rebutted his claims about the Cowboys and the futility of inmates
complaining about prison staff.
Following the FBI investigator’s testimony, Mr. Capadona testified
concerning his fear of the Cowboys based on what he had heard about them but
admitted he could not name any individual who was a Cowboy, he did not have
physical contact with them, and they were not at the same facility where he was
housed or worked. However, he also testified with respect to the particular guard
he claimed threatened him. Specifically, he explained he worked in the kitchen
outside of his camp at another prison facility – the Administrative Maximum
Facility (ADX) – where he and a staff member known as “Crockett” developed a
-6- hostile relationship but that the situation improved after he raised the issue with
kitchen administrators named “Garcia” and “Scofield.” He stated hostilities again
resumed, reaching a climax on the day of his escape, when, at the end of his shift,
Mr. Crockett escorted him to the back of the kitchen to a sally port, slammed him
against a wall, choked him, and goaded him to fight. When he refused to fight, he
testified, Mr. Crockett advised him to “check in” to protective custody, but that if
he did, Mr. Crockett had “something for [his] ass then.” According to Mr.
Capadona, Mr. Crockett’s last words to him were that he (Mr. Capadona) was not
leaving prison. He admitted that during this altercation, other people were
“there” and “all grouped up doing things” but stated that no one actually
witnessed the altercation. After the incident, Mr. Capadona testified, Mr.
Crockett stayed at the ADX while he left the kitchen and took the bus back to his
minimum security camp.
Based on these events, Mr. Capadona testified, he believed his life was in
immediate danger, consulted with fellow inmates about the matter; and, a few
hours later, escaped by walking away from the camp. He also testified he
believed it would have been futile to report Mr. Crockett’s actions to authorities
and that he later did not take any action to report the matter to local, state, or
federal agencies. While he offered that decent police officers existed, he testified
that he did not trust them enough to report the matter. In addition, he
-7- acknowledged he achieved a temporary position of safety from the immediate
threat just a day or so after his escape and consulted with attorneys about the
possibility of surrender but, despite their advice, never turned himself in because
he was afraid of going back. He also testified that after his instant arrest, he did
not tell the arresting officer or any of the California authorities that he feared for
his life if returned to the Bureau of Prisons.
Following Mr. Capadona’s testimony, a former inmate testified on his
behalf, offering testimony Mr. Capadona confided in him about being threatened
by a guard who pushed him against a wall on the day of his escape. However,
this witness also testified that he had advised Mr. Capadona to report the incident
to his case manager and counselor and admitted to previously stating that he
believed another motive for Mr. Capadona’s escape was his anger at the length of
his sentence.
At the close of evidence, the government moved to strike the affirmative
defense of justification on grounds Mr. Capadona failed to meet all but the third
element of the justification defense – that no person was harmed during his
escape. The district court agreed, finding Mr. Capadona failed to satisfy the other
three contested elements in support of his affirmative defense. With regard to the
first element, regarding an imminent threat, the district court determined even if
-8- Mr. Capadona’s version of events with Mr. Crockett was true, it amounted to a
vague threat and an assault without injury, which was insufficient to show his life
was in imminent danger, especially in comparison to other cases where the danger
was far more pressing, extreme, and serious than what he faced. The district
court also noted that after the assault, Mr. Capadona took a bus back to his
minimum security camp and away from the officer, who was located at a different
facility and a person distinct from his counselors or advisors, and that Mr.
Capadona did not escape until four hours later – again, failing to demonstrate an
imminent threat of death or danger, unlike other cases where the officer had a gun
or knife or was pursuing the defendant.
As to the second element, regarding the futility of complaining or reporting
any threats, the district court noted inmate reports on the Cowboys’ violence were
investigated and the guards were prosecuted and convicted, resulting in Mr.
Capadona’s assertions falling “far short” of showing that reporting his situation
would have been futile. The district court also noted Mr. Capadona had pursued
his legal rights repeatedly, both in its court and the Bureau of Prisons, and the
fact that he did not always prevail did not mean that his situation would have
been futile. As to the fourth element, it found that not only had Mr. Capadona
reached a position of safety when he reached his camp away from Mr. Crockett,
but he achieved a position of safety “very shortly” after his escape and
-9- nevertheless failed to turn himself in or report the incident to anyone, even
though he acknowledged police officers and guards existed who did not subscribe
to guard-on-inmate violence. It further found Mr. Capadona’s assertion he
satisfied the fourth element regarding being unable to reach a position of safety
for the six and one-half years following his escape “simply frivolous.”
Consequently, the district court ruled the justification defense could not be
considered by the jury. After closing arguments, the jury found Mr. Capadona
guilty of the charge of escape.
Prior to sentencing, the government sought a two-point enhancement for
obstruction of justice under United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or
“U.S.S.G.”) § 3C1.1 based, in part, on Mr. Capadona’s false pretrial assertions
and trial testimony that prison staff assaulted him. Mr. Capadona objected,
claiming his testimony concerning the threats against him constituted credible
evidence and played no role in the trial, given the jury did not consider his
affirmative defense. At a hearing on the issue, the government presented the
testimony of Rene Garcia, the former food service administrator at the ADX, who
was also Mr. Crockett’s supervisor. Mr. Garcia testified: (1) he was unaware of
any kind of altercation, argument, or anything of that nature occurring between
Mr. Crockett and Mr. Capadona; (2) no complaints had ever been received from
Mr. Capadona or any other inmate regarding Mr. Crockett, whom he described as
-10- “an excellent supervisor” with “excellent reports”; and (3) if his deputy, Mr.
Scofield, had received such a complaint, he would have told Mr. Garcia and they
would have turned the matter in for investigation. He also testified he reviewed
Mr. Capadona’s file and it contained no complaint or request for transfer out of
the kitchen and that inmates were not usually reluctant to complain about staff
members.
Mr. Crockett also testified on behalf of the government and explained he
had been a cook supervisor in the kitchen at Mr. Capadona’s facility. Mr.
Crockett stated that in his thirteen years as a cook supervisor with the Bureau of
Prisons, supervising over a thousand inmates, no complaints had ever been filed
against him by either staff or inmates, that he received nine performance awards,
and all of his yearly performance reviews had been either “outstanding” or
“exceeds.” He testified that from the time Mr. Capadona began working in the
kitchen in April 1997 until his escape in August 1998 he only supervised him
twelve or thirteen times and had a vague recollection of who he was, what he
looked like, and that he was a cook on the “p.m. shift.” He also stated he did not
recall any problems or anything out of the ordinary with Mr. Capadona; did not
threaten or assault him or any other inmate; and, specifically, did not grab Mr.
Capadona’s neck, push him against a wall, or tell him he would not get out of the
prison camp alive.
-11- After the parties presented argument on the obstruction of justice issue, the
district court found Mr. Capadona offered material and intentional false testimony
with respect to the alleged threats and assault he received from Mr. Crockett,
which it determined was “accompanied by a wilful intent to commit perjury, as
opposed to mistake, accident, or faulty memory.” It explained that it made this
determination based on its finding Mr. Capadona lacked credibility, the fact the
threats and assault were directly contradicted by Mr. Crockett and no complaint
had ever been made against him during his entire employment with the Bureau of
Prisons, and the unlikelihood that individuals present at the alleged assault would
have continued to stand around and talk without taking action or reporting it,
which it found was “simply incredible.” As a result, the district court applied the
two-point obstruction of justice enhancement to Mr. Capadona’s base offense
level of thirteen, for a total offense level of fifteen, which, together with a
criminal history category of IV, resulted in a Guidelines range of thirty to thirty-
seven months imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Tbl.). After
considering the parties’ arguments, the applicable Guidelines, and the sentencing
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court sentenced Mr. Capadona at
the low end of the Guidelines range to thirty months imprisonment.
-12- II. Discussion
A. Conviction
Mr. Capadona, now represented by different counsel than during his trial,
appeals his conviction on grounds the district court erred in declining to rule prior
to trial on the sufficiency of his affirmative defense of justification, thereby
depriving him of the opportunity to make a reasoned choice on whether to testify
or remain silent at his trial. He not only suggests that “deficiencies in proof”
concerning his justification defense “were revealed early on in the trial” when the
FBI investigator testified, rebutting his contentions concerning the Cowboys, but
that it was clear, even prior to trial, that he could not establish as a matter of law
the fourth element of his affirmative defense because no case existed in state or
federal law that supported the justification defense when a defendant had
remained at large for years without making an attempt to surrender to authorities.
Because the deficiencies in his justification defense were so readily apparent, he
asserts the district court should have ruled on the sufficiency of his evidence prior
to trial and intimates that, at the very least, the district court should have ruled on
it prior to his trial testimony, thereby sparing him from two days of trial on an
obviously deficient defense which resulted in a negative finding he committed
perjury, which, in turn, lengthened his sentence.
In making these assertions, Mr. Capadona suggests his arguments never
-13- induced or swayed the district court to defer its ruling on the sufficiency of his
justification defense, but, instead, the district court deferred its ruling based
solely on its concern over wasting scarce judicial resources. He admits, however,
that his position on appeal is “seemingly at loggerheads with his position below”
and further concedes he never made an objection to the district court’s decision to
defer its sufficiency ruling, which he now asserts requires us to apply a standard
of review of “plain error.”
In opposing the appeal, the government argues Mr. Capadona invited or
induced the district court to take the action it did when he asked it to allow him to
present evidence on his affirmative defense, which the district court allowed him
to do. As a result, the government asserts, Mr. Capadona waived any objection as
to the timing of the district court’s sufficiency ruling.
“[T]he invited-error doctrine precludes a party from arguing that the district
court erred in adopting a proposition that the party had urged the district court to
adopt.” United States v. Deberry, 430 F.3d 1294, 1302 (10 th Cir. 2005). Invited
error is a form of intentional relinquishment of a known right, constituting
waiver, which is not entitled to appellate relief, unlike forfeiture of a known right
through neglect, which may be reviewed for plain error. See United States v.
Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10 th Cir. 2007).
-14- Under the circumstances presented, we conclude the invited error doctrine
applies because any error Mr. Capadona now complains of was invited. This is
because Mr. Capadona affirmatively urged the district court to allow him to
present evidence in support of his affirmative defense, including his testimony,
rather than rule on his affirmative defense as a matter of law, as the government
requested.
To begin, when the government argued early on that Mr. Capadona’s
affirmative defense on the fourth element should fail as a matter of law, or when
the district court initially indicated the deficiencies in Mr. Capadona’s proffer of
evidence, Mr. Capadona argued he had sufficient evidence to prove the elements
of his defense which he should be allowed to present. In fact, when the district
court warned Mr. Capadona of the difficulties and unlikelihood of being able to
meet the requirements of his affirmative defense and otherwise questioned the
adequacy of his justification defense, Mr. Capadona insisted he should be able to
present evidence, including his testimony, to establish the required elements,
arguing it was necessary to present a complete defense to the charge against him.
He also suggested that if he could not produce sufficient evidence, then his
affirmative defense should not be considered. It is for this reason the district
court elected, however reluctantly, to defer its ruling on the justification defense
until such evidence was presented, rather than make a determination, as the
-15- government requested, as a matter of law. Incredulously, on appeal, Mr.
Capadona now argues the district court should have ruled on his affirmative
defense as a matter of law on the fourth element, rather than allow him to present
his evidence in support thereof – the very thing against which he argued at the
trial level. Accordingly, Mr. Capadona invited the alleged error of which he now
complains.
In addition, contrary to Mr. Capadona’s contentions, it is also clear the
district court’s concern about wasting judicial resources in having a hearing in
advance of trial was secondary to Mr. Capadona’s repeated pleas to allow him to
present his justification defense evidence before making any ruling as a matter of
law. In addition, we note that if the district court had required Mr. Capadona to
present his evidence at a hearing rather than at trial, Mr. Capadona has not shown
the district court would have ruled differently on his affirmative defense, he
would not have perjured himself at that proceeding, or that such perjured
testimony would not have been used to lengthen his sentence. See United States
v. Hawthorne, 316 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10 th Cir. 2003) (holding § 3C1.1 for
obstruction of justice is not limited to perjury committed at trial, but extends to
any judicial proceeding). As the government suggests, Mr. Capadona is, in effect,
arguing the district court should have “saved him from himself” by ruling on his
affirmative defense before hearing the evidence he sought to proffer.
-16- Other weaknesses in Mr. Capadona’s argument are further illustrated by the
fact that while the FBI investigator may have dispelled Mr. Capadona’s claims
regarding the Cowboys early in the trial, Mr. Capadona’s primary claim
concerning Mr. Crockett’s alleged threats and assault still remained and was not
in any way dispelled or rebutted by the FBI investigator’s testimony, leading us to
believe Mr. Capadona elected to testify, in part, to present evidence on his
altercation with Mr. Crockett in support of his affirmative defense. However,
even if Mr. Capadona and his counsel felt his case suffered “deficiencies in
proof” with respect to the FBI investigator’s testimony or in regard to any other
aspect of his case, it was up to him and his counsel to make a tactical decision
before or even at trial as to whether he should testify, especially after the district
court repeatedly warned about the apparent deficiencies in his offers of proof. To
now argue, in essence, that he might not have testified had he known the outcome
of the district court’s ruling is disingenuous. For these reasons, we conclude the
error, if any, of which Mr. Capadona now complains was invited, 1 requiring no
further review on appeal.
1 Because we have determined the error, if any, was invited, we need not specifically determine whether it was improper for the district court to decline to rule as a matter of law on his affirmative defense or to allow the jury to hear evidence on it before making a ruling.
-17- B. Sentence
Mr. Capadona also appeals his sentence, claiming the district court erred in
applying the two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice based on its finding
Mr. Capadona perjured himself at trial. On appeal, he claims the district court’s
finding he perjured himself at trial was based “on a clearly erroneous rendition of
[his] testimony,” as evidenced by the district court’s finding the assault occurred
in the presence of witnesses who incredibly did not see or hear it. To refute this
description of his testimony, Mr. Capadona points out he never stated the
altercation was loud enough to be heard by others and that he testified he was
being choked and it occurred out of the kitchen in a sally port, where no one
witnessed it. He further asserts any arguable inconsistencies in his testimony
were based on the almost ten years between the altercation and the trial, implying
that his memory may have been confused, mistaken, or faulty due to the passage
of time.
Guidelines § 3C1.1 mandates a two-level increase if “the defendant
willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the instant offense ....” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. “[C]ommitting,
suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury” is sufficient to trigger the obstruction
of justice enhancement. Id. at cmt. n.4. Perjury occurs when “[a] witness
-18- testifying under oath or affirmation ... gives false testimony concerning a material
matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of
confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87,
94 (1993), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482
(1997). This court has held the district court must “be explicit about which
representations by the defendant constitute perjury.” Hawthorne, 316 F.3d at
1146. We review the district court’s factual findings in regard to obstruction of
justice issues under the clearly erroneous standard, while reviewing its legal
interpretations de novo. See id. at 1145. In order for a district court’s factual
findings to be clearly erroneous, we must conclude they lack factual support in
the record, or, after reviewing all the evidence, we are left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. United States v. Martinez, 512
F.3d 1268, 1276 (10 th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2461 (2008). We give
deference to the district court’s credibility determinations and will not disturb
such credibility determinations on appeal. See United States v. Burson, 531 F.3d
1254, 1259 n.4 (10 th Cir. 2008). This includes credibility determinations in
sentencing proceedings for the purpose of applying an enhancement for
obstruction of justice. See United States v. Cook, 949 F.2d 289, 296-97 (10 th Cir.
1991).
In this case, the district court found Mr. Capadona offered material and
-19- intentional false testimony with respect to the alleged threats and assault he
received from Mr. Crockett which it determined was “accompanied by a wilful
intent to commit perjury, as opposed to mistake, accident, or faulty memory.”
The district court explained that it made its determination based on its finding Mr.
Capadona’s testimony about the threats and assault was not credible and directly
contradicted by Mr. Crockett, who had never received a complaint against him
during his entire employment with the Bureau of Prisons, as well as the
unlikelihood individuals present at such an assault would continue to stand around
and talk without taking action or reporting it.
Under these circumstances, even if, as Mr. Capadona contends, the district
court made its perjury determination, in part, on an erroneous rendition of his
testimony as to whether the assault occurred in the presence of witnesses, its
ruling was also based on a credibility determination when it credited, over Mr.
Capadona’s testimony, Mr. Crockett’s contradictory testimony that no threats or
assault ever occurred. Given the deference we must afford district court
credibility findings, we cannot say it committed clear error in applying the
obstruction of justice enhancement. In other words, we are not persuaded, based
on this credibility determination, that the district court’s application of the
obstruction of justice enhancement lacks factual support in the record, nor, after
reviewing all the evidence, are we left with the definite and firm conviction that a
-20- mistake has been made.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Capadona’s conviction and sentence.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY United States Circuit Judge
-21-