United States v. Cantrall

762 F. Supp. 875, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4971, 1991 WL 55401
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedMarch 21, 1991
DocketCrim. A. 90-10030-01, 02, 03
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 762 F. Supp. 875 (United States v. Cantrall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Cantrall, 762 F. Supp. 875, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4971, 1991 WL 55401 (D. Kan. 1991).

Opinion

*877 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THEIS, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on several pretrial motions filed by the defendants. The court held a hearing on Friday, March I. 1991. The court has received the post-hearing submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule.

The defendants, brothers Rick, Terry and Kenny Cantrall, are charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and attempt to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute. Superseding Indictment, Counts I and II. Rick and Terry Cantrall are charged with using extortionate means to attempt to collect an extension of credit. Id. Count

III. Rick, Terry and Kenny Cantrall are charged with the unlawful carrying or use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Id. Count IV.

I. Discovery Motions

A. Rick Cantrall’s motion for discovery (Doc. U)

Defendants Kenny Cantrall (Doc. 51) and Terry Cantrall (Doc. 70) joined in this motion. The court has previously held a hearing on this motion, which sought certain information regarding the Sedgwick County Drug Detection Dog, Wenka. Following the hearing, the court granted in part and denied in part the discovery requests. The court did not enter a written order at that time.

B. Motion to compel discovery (Doc. 82)

All three defendants seek disclosure of information regarding confidential informants. In response, the government states that it knows of no informants in this case. The motion shall therefore be denied.

C. Motion for Brady and Rule 16 evidence (Doc. 85)

The government responds that it is aware of no Brady material and it has disclosed all Rule 16 material. The motion shall be granted to the extent it seeks the Rule 16 material already provided.

II. Motion to Suppress (Doc. 77, filed by Rick Cantrall; Doc. 79, filed by Kenny Cantrall; Doc. 80, filed by Terry Cant-rall)

Defendant Rick Cantrall moves to suppress the contents of the Express Mail package addressed to him and intercepted by the United States Postal Inspection Service on March 30, 1990. Rick Cantrall further seeks suppression of all physical evidence seized from the search of his residence at 1737 North Colorado, Wichita, Kansas on March 30,1990. Defendant Terry Cantrall moves to suppress all evidence resulting from the search of the residence located at 1737 North Colorado. Defendant Kenny Cantrall moves to suppress both the contents of the Express Mail package mailed to his brother and all evidence seized from the residence located at 1737 North Colorado. All defendants seek a Franks hearing. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978).

A. Standing
1. Rick Cantrall

Rick Cantrall argued in his motion that he has standing to object to the seizure of the items, since he was the addressee of the package and was leasing the residence at 1737 North Colorado on the date of the search. The government did not address Rick’s standing in its response brief and did not challenge Rick’s standing at the hearing. The court finds that Rick does have standing to challenge the search of the package and the residence.

2. Terry Cantrall

Terry Cantrall argues that he has standing to object to the search of the residence where he lived with his brother. Terry’s motion to suppress is aimed at the search of the residence. Terry is not challenging the search of the package per se; however, the detention of the package, the canine sniff, and search of the package bear on the information contained in the application for search warrant for the residence. The government argued that Terry has no standing to challenge the search of the package which was sent to his brother. *878 The government did not specifically challenge Terry’s standing to object to the search of the residence. The court finds that Terry does have standing to challenge the search of the residence where he lived.

3. Kenny Cantrall

Kenny Cantrall moves to suppress all evidence resulting from the search of the Express Mail package and the residence located at 1737 North Colorado. Kenny Cantrall did not address the issue of standing in his motion. The government argued that Kenny has no standing to challenge the search of the Express Mail package of which he was neither sender nor addressee. The government argued that Kenny must show that he had a proprietary or possessory interest in the package while in the United States mails; that he had exclusive control over the package; or that he took precautions to evince a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Fourth amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures are personal and may not be asserted vicariously. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 424-25, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). A defendant may not challenge a search or seizure unless he demonstrates that his own constitutional rights have been infringed. United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir.1990). Even if the fourth amendment rights of a third party have been violated, a court may not suppress evidence unless the defendant has met his burden of proving that he had a personal fourth amendment interest that was implicated by the search. Id.; United States v. Rascon, 922 F.2d 584, 586 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir.1989).

The existence of a personal fourth amendment right depends on whether the individual has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy and whether that subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979); United States v. Rascon, 922 F.2d at 586; United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d at 1274. To decide whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the court should consider concepts of property law, bearing in mind that “arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to control.” United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 445 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
762 F. Supp. 875, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4971, 1991 WL 55401, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-cantrall-ksd-1991.