16‐3473‐cr United States v. Canfield UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of December, two thousand eighteen.
PRESENT: DENNY CHIN, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges, JOHN F. KEENAN, District Judge.* ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,
v. 16‐3473‐cr
RYAN CANFIELD, Defendant‐Appellant.
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FOR APPELLEE: RAJIT S. DOSANJH, Assistant United States Attorney (Wayne A. Myers, Assistant United
* Judge John F. Keenan, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
States Attorney, on the brief), for Grant C. Jaquith, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT: SUSAN C. WOLFE, Law Office of Susan C. Wolfe, New York, New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York (Hurd, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant‐appellant Ryan Canfield appeals from a judgment entered
October 6, 2016, after a jury trial, convicting him of one count of conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute methylone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and
eight counts of use of a communication facility to facilitate commission of a controlled
substance felony, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). He was sentenced principally to 144
monthsʹ imprisonment. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying facts,
procedural history, and issues on appeal.
On appeal, Canfield argues: (1) the trial evidence was insufficient to show
that any coconspirator knew that methylone was a controlled substance; (2) the trial
evidence was insufficient to show that the text messages charged in Counts 2 through 9
(the ʺphone countsʺ) were used to facilitate a drug offense; (3) venue was not proper in
the Northern District of New York (the ʺNDNYʺ) for the phone counts and the trial
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court erred in failing to charge the jury on venue; (4) the communications facility statute
is unconstitutionally vague and the phone counts were multiplicitous; (5) the
government committed misconduct in summation; (6) Canfieldʹs Fourth Amendment
rights were violated by the search and seizure of his automobile and laptops; and (7) his
sentence was procedurally unreasonable. We address each issue in turn.
DISCUSSION
1. Sufficiency of Evidence of Knowledge that Methylone Was a Controlled Substance
Canfield argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that any of his
coconspirators knew that methylone was a controlled substance. In particular, he
contends that at the time of the charged conspiracy, methylone was not illegal under
New York law and it was not added to the federal controlled substance schedules until
October 21, 2011. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(2); 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11; Schedules of Controlled
Substances: Temporary Placement of Three Synthetic Cathinones Into Schedule I, 76
Fed. Reg. 65,371 (Oct. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308). We review a claim
of insufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Geibel, 369 F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir.
2004).1
1 The government contends that plain error review applies to this argument as well as others because Canfield failed to raise the precise issues below. We assume, without deciding, that Canfield preserved for review the issues he raises now on appeal.
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The Controlled Substance Act makes it unlawful for a person ʺknowinglyʺ
to, inter alia, distribute or possess with intent to distribute ʺa controlled substance.ʺ 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In McFadden v. United States, the Supreme Court made clear that the
knowledge requirement is met when the government shows that (1) ʺthe defendant
knew he possessed a substance listed on the schedules, even if he did not know which
substance it was,ʺ or (2) ʺthe defendant knew the identity of the substance he
possessed.ʺ ‐‐‐U.S.‐‐‐, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2304 (2015); see also United States v. Demott, 906
F.3d 231, 240‐44 (2d Cir. 2018).
Canfieldʹs sufficiency challenge fails, for the government presented direct
and circumstantial evidence that his coconspirators, including M.D., Dan Conti, and
John Chin, knew they were trafficking in methylone and that methylone was a
controlled substance. For example, M.D., a cooperator, testified that she and Conti
purchased methylone from Canfield, in December 2011, to resell. M.D. marketed the
methylone to her customers as ecstasy, referring to it as MDMA or ʺMolly.ʺ She
engaged in additional methylone transactions with Canfield in 2012, prior to her
cooperation in August 2012. The government also presented evidence that Canfield
and Chin exchanged emails in October 2011 about the impending ʺbanʺ on methylone,
and that they exchanged further emails in January 2013, after the ban was imposed,
discussing Chinʹs sale of additional methylone to Canfield.
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There was also evidence that M.D., Conti, and Canfield engaged in
convoluted arrangements to receive methylone and used code words in their
communications, showing that they knew it was a controlled substance. See, e.g.,
McFadden, 135 S. Ct. at 2304 n.1 (noting that defendantʹs ʺconcealment of his activitiesʺ
and ʺevasive behavior with respect to law enforcementʺ was circumstantial evidence of
knowledge the substance was controlled); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 828‐29
(2d Cir. 1962) (holding district court properly charged jury that, inter alia, ʺcode wordsʺ
constituted circumstantial evidence that material in question was narcotics).
Accordingly, Canfieldʹs sufficiency challenge to his conviction on Count 1
fails.
2. Sufficiency of Evidence as to the Phone Counts
Canfield contends that the government failed to prove that the eight text
messages charged in the phone counts were sent to facilitate a federal drug trafficking
felony in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).2 In particular, he argues that the texts were
between Canfield and M.D., and that because M.D. was cooperating with the
2 Section 843(b) makes it a crime for any person to ʺknowingly or intentionally . . . use any communication facilityʺ to facilitate a controlled substance crime. 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). It provides that ʺ[e]ach separate use of a communication facility shall be a separate offense under this subsection.ʺ Id. It defines a ʺcommunication facilityʺ to include ʺany and all public and private instrumentalities used or useful in the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds of all kinds and includes mail, telephone, wire, radio, and all other means of communication.ʺ Id.
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government, the text messages were not in furtherance of the conspiracy. We are not
persuaded, for we agree with the government that even though M.D. was a
government informant at the time the text messages were exchanged, a reasonable jury
could have found that the text messages facilitated Canfieldʹs ongoing methylone
trafficking with others, including Conti, Chin, and an individual using the email
address beginning ʺbish0p9.ʺ
The evidence established that Canfield was using the text messages to set
up a meeting with M.D. (in Connecticut) on January 3, 2013, in part so that she could
pay him money she owed him for a lost shipment of methylone and to sell her
additional methylone. Indeed, at the meeting Canfield gave her a beer can containing
methylone. Even assuming that Canfield could not have conspired with M.D. that day
because she was acting at the behest of the government, the text messages facilitated
his ongoing dealings with other coconspirators as the meeting provided him with an
opportunity to sell additional methylone, which he obtained from his suppliers, and
money to purchase yet more methylone. See United States v. Miranda‐Ortiz, 926 F.2d
172, 175 (2d Cir. 1991) (ʺSince the essence of any conspiracy is agreement, rather than
the success of the venture, a defendant may be convicted of conspiracy even if the
intended substantive crime could not occur because the person he and his
coconspirators thought would participate in it was actually an agent of the
government.ʺ) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Valencia, 226 F. Supp. 2d 503,
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511‐12 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (convicting defendant of narcotics conspiracy where he sold
drugs to government cooperator, where evidence established that defendant conspired
with others, including suppliers), affʹd, 100 F. Appʹx 17 (2d Cir. 2004). Even assuming
Canfield could not conspire with M.D. on January 3, 2013, the meeting was still in
furtherance of his ongoing narcotics trafficking with others.
3. Venue
Canfield raises two issues relating to venue with respect to the phone
counts: he argues that, first, venue did not lie in the NDNY; and, second, the trial court
erred in failing to give a venue instruction to the jury. Both arguments fail.
First, venue was proper in the NDNY. Venue need be proven by only a
preponderance of the evidence, United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2007),
and ʺa telephone call placed by a government actor within a district to a conspirator
outside the district can establish venue within the district provided the conspirator
uses the call to further the conspiracy,ʺ id. at 122; see also United States v. Kirk Tang Yuk,
885 F.3d 57, 71 (2d Cir. 2018) (ʺA telephone call placed by someone within the Southern
District of New York ‐‐ even a person acting at the governmentʹs direction ‐‐ to a co‐
conspirator outside the Southern District can render venue proper as to the out‐of‐
district co‐conspirator so long as that co‐conspirator ʹuses the call to further the
conspiracy.ʹʺ) (quoting Rommy, 506 F.3d at 122). Here, M.D. was in the NDNY when
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she exchanged the texts with Canfield, and Canfield knew that she lived in the Albany
area, which is in the NDNY.
Second, Canfield waived his claim that the district court erred in not
charging venue. He did not propose a venue instruction in his requests to charge.
Although he did raise the issue at the close of the governmentʹs case, he did not object,
after the district court completed its charge, to the absence of a jury instruction on
venue. In any event, venue is not an element of the crime, Kirk Tang Yuk, 885 F.3d at
71, and any error in not charging the jury on venue would be harmless, see Rommy, 506
F.3d at 123‐24 & n.10 (finding harmless error in district courtʹs failure to instruct jury as
to foreseeability of venue in the Southern District of New York, and observing that
ʺharmless error analysis can be applied to a possible charging omission with respect to
venue, which is not an element of the crime and requires only proof by a
preponderance of the evidenceʺ).
4. The Communication Facility Statute
Next, Canfield argues that the communication facility statute is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to text messages and, relatedly, that the phone
counts fail because they are multiplicitous. He argues that the statute is vague because
it does not define ʺuseʺ of a communication device, and notes that text messaging did
not exist when the statute was enacted. He also contends that the eight phone counts
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charge a single offense multiple times, as the various messages purportedly are part of
one continuing conversation.
The Due Process Clause ʺrequires that a penal statute define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct
is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.ʺ Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citations omitted). Ordinary
people would surely understand that § 843(b) prohibits the use of a cellular telephone
to send or receive text messages to further narcotics trafficking. Numerous federal
criminal statutes employ the word ʺuseʺ without defining it, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),
and where a statute does not define the term ʺuse,ʺ we ʺsupply it with its ordinary
meaning,ʺ United States v. Desposito, 704 F.3d 221, 226‐27 (2d Cir. 2013) (ʺThe verb ʹuseʹ
means ʹto put into action or service,ʹ ʹto avail oneself of,ʹ or ʹto carry out a purpose or
action by means of.ʹʺ (quoting Merriam‐Websterʹs Collegiate Dictionary 1378 (11th ed.
2004))). The statute also defines ʺcommunication facilityʺ to include a ʺtelephone,ʺ and
it encompasses ʺthe transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds of all
kinds.ʺ 21 U.S.C. § 843(b); see United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533, 544 (7th Cir. 1985)
(ʺSection 843(b) is no more, and possibly less, vague than other broadly‐phrased
federal criminal statutes that we have consistently upheld over vagueness and
overbreadth challenges.ʺ).
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The multiplicitousness argument presents a somewhat closer call, as some
counts charge what appear to be different parts of the same conversation (Counts 2
and 3, Counts 4 and 5) and one count is based on a one‐word text (Count 3: ʺOk.ʺ).
But we are not persuaded. The statute explicitly provides that ʺ[e]ach separate use of a
communication facility shall be a separate offense,ʺ 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), and the
government charged here each transmission ‐‐ whether it was one word (Count 3) or
thirty‐two words (Count 8) ‐‐ as a ʺuseʺ of a telephone and a separate count, with the
exception that certain transmissions that occurred at the same time were included in
one count (Counts 6 and 7). Indeed, except for the transmissions combined into
Counts 6 and 7, the transmissions occurred minutes if not hours apart. We have
upheld charges of separate counts under § 843(b) for each telephone call made or
placed by a defendant, see, e.g., United States v. Jaramillo‐Montoya, 834 F.2d 276, 279 (2d
Cir. 1987) (ʺUnder 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), each telephone call is a separate offense
punishable by a sentence of four yearsʹ imprisonment.ʺ), and courts have held that
ʺnondescript conversationʺ and even ʺhanging up after a busy signalʺ can be
communications facilitating a drug transaction, United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 519
(10th Cir. 1993).
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5. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Canfield argues that the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct
by referencing his incarceration and commenting on the credibility of M.D. in closing
arguments. The arguments are rejected.
The reference to Canfieldʹs incarceration was clearly inadvertent, as the
prosecutor simply referred in rebuttal summation to Canfieldʹs ʺletter from 2014 when
he was in jail.ʺ Appʹx 115. Defense counsel did not object, and at the conclusion of the
argument, the prosecutor himself brought the matter to the attention of the district
court, saying: ʺI regret it and I didnʹt realize it until after the fact, I mentioned, I believe,
that the letter sent by the defendant was, I think the words I used were, while he was
in jail.ʺ Appʹx 116. Defense counsel declined a limiting instruction. The single,
inadvertent remark did not so substantially prejudice Canfield as to deny him a fair
trial. See United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 227 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Shareef,
190 F.3d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 1999).
Nor did the prosecutorʹs comments on M.D.ʹs credibility cross the line.
Obviously, M.D. was a critical witness, and both sides addressed her credibility at
various points in the trial. See United States v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 1998)
(ʺProsecutors have greater leeway in commenting on the credibility of their witnesses
when the defense has attacked that credibility.ʺ). The prosecutorʹs comments, if they
were improper at all, did not rise to the level of ʺflagrant abuse,ʺ United States v.
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Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 1998), nor did they cause Canfield ʺsubstantial
prejudice,ʺ Carr, 424 F.3d at 227.
6. The Automobile and Laptop Searches
Canfield raises several issues related to the seizure and search of his
automobile, when he was arrested by Drug Enforcement Administration (ʺDEAʺ)
agents on April 11, 2013, and the subsequent seizure and search of two laptops found
in the car. After Canfield moved to suppress, the district court held an evidentiary
hearing and issued a written decision on July 23, 2014, denying the motion. We review
the district courtʹs legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.
United States v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2015).
On the day of his arrest, Canfield had traveled alone in a Connecticut‐
registered car to a motel in Latham, New York. After he was arrested, the car was
sitting in the motel parking lot. Canfield was not registered as a guest and had not
sought permission to leave the car in the motel parking lot. In the circumstances of this
case, it was appropriate for the agents to seize the vehicle for safekeeping. See South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (law enforcement officials may seize and
impound vehicles of arrested individuals, without a warrant, ʺ[i]n the interests of
public safety and as part of . . . ʹcommunity caretaking functionsʹʺ (quoting Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973))); United States v. Lopez, 547 F.3d 364, 366‐67, 372
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(2d Cir. 2008) (arrest of both occupants of car ʺcalled for the impoundmentʺ of car,
which was parked on city street).
Once the vehicle was taken into custody, the agents were permitted to
ʺsearch the vehicle and make an inventory of its contents without need for a search
warrant and without regard to whether there is probable cause.ʺ Lopez, 547 F.3d at 369‐
70. As the district court found, the inventory search here complied with DEA written
policy. See United States v. Thompson, 29 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (law enforcement
agents must act in accordance with ʺstandardizedʺ procedures in conducting inventory
searches).
As for the laptops found in the car, the DEA agents obtained a warrant to
perform a forensic analysis of them. We discern no error in the district courtʹs findings
or conclusions with respect to the search of the laptops.
7. Sentencing Issues
Finally, Canfield raises two claims of procedural error in his sentence: he
contends that, first, the record does not establish that the district court knew it had
authority to vary from the applicable 500:1 ratio for marijuana equivalency; and,
second, the district court failed to resolve the issue of drug quantity.
We review a sentence for procedural reasonableness under a ʺdeferential
abuse‐of‐discretion standard.ʺ United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir.
2014) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). A sentence is procedurally
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unreasonable if the district court ʺfails to calculate (or improperly calculates) the
Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, fails to
consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous
facts, or fails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.ʺ United States v. Chu, 714 F.3d
742, 746 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As for the first claim of procedural error, there is nothing in the record to
suggest that the experienced district judge failed to understand that he had discretion
to reject the 500:1 ratio based on policy grounds. It has been well established since
2007 that district judges may reject a drug ratio in a guidelines calculation based on a
policy disagreement. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109‐10 (2007); see also
Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265 (2009) (ʺA sentencing judge who is given the
power to reject the disparity created by the crack‐to‐powder ratio must also possess the
power to apply a different ratio which, in his judgment, corrects the disparity.ʺ). We
have held that ʺwe are ʹentitled to assume that the sentencing judge understood all the
available sentencing options, including whatever departure authority existed in the
circumstances of the case,ʹʺ unless the district courtʹs sentencing remarks ʺcreate
ambiguity as to whether the judge correctly understood an available [sentencing]
option.ʺ United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, 665 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted and
alternation in the original). No ambiguity exists here, where the parties argued the
issue and both sides cited cases recognizing that district courts have authority to
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depart based on disagreements with the applicability of equivalency ratios. See United
States v. Kamper, 748 F.3d 728, 740‐41 (6th Cir. 2014). Significantly, in the end, Canfield
was sentenced to 144 monthsʹ imprisonment, which was substantially below the
recommended 360‐744 months guidelines range.
As for the second claim of procedural error, the district court expressly
adopted the factual findings of the presentence report as well as its guidelines
calculations. Hence, the district court adopted the Probation Officeʹs finding that
Canfield was responsible for 13.4596 kilograms of methylone. See Thompson, 76 F.3d at
456 (district courtʹs adoption of presentence report at sentencing satisfies requirement
to make factual findings). There was no procedural error.
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We have considered Canfieldʹs remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk
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