United States v. Campbell

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: May 5, 2026
• Docket: 24-5086
• Status: Published

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-5086 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 05/05/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 5, 2026 Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 24-5086

KALIN MARIE CAMPBELL,

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 4:22-CR-00338-SEH-5) _________________________________

Justin A. Lollman, Hofland/Lollman, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant – Appellant.

Steven J. Briden, Assistant United States Attorney (Clinton J. Johnson, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Northern District of Oklahoma, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff – Appellee. _________________________________

Before BACHARACH, MURPHY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. _________________________________

I. INTRODUCTION

The defendant-appellant, Kalin Marie Campbell, appeals her sentence,

challenging the district court’s calculation of her Guidelines range. At issue are her

prior state convictions. Campbell argues those prior state convictions were entered by Appellate Case: 24-5086 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 05/05/2026 Page: 2

courts lacking subject matter jurisdiction, thus rendering them void. She posits the

district court erred in considering these purportedly void state convictions when

calculating her Criminal History Category.

Campbell’s prior state convictions have not been vacated or reversed. Because

her state convictions were not obtained in violation of her right to counsel, she cannot

challenge the validity of those convictions in federal court during a sentencing

hearing for an unrelated federal offense. See Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295,

303 (2005). When calculating a defendant’s Criminal History Category, sentencing

courts are to consider sentences from any outstanding prior conviction unrelated to

the instant offense. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1; 4A1.2 & cmt. 6. The district court did not

err by considering Campbell’s prior convictions when calculating her Criminal

History Category. Therefore, exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)

and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the court affirms the judgment of the district court.

II. BACKGROUND

Campbell is an enrolled member of the Osage Nation. Her criminal record

includes three convictions entered by various Oklahoma state courts. In 2013,

Campbell was charged in Washington County for driving a motor vehicle under the

influence. She pleaded guilty to multiple traffic-related charges and served 139 days

in state prison. Next, in June 2016, Campbell was convicted for possessing

methamphetamine and a loaded firearm while operating a vehicle in Mayes County.

She served a deferred sentence. Finally, in July 2016, Campbell was convicted in

Tulsa County of possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia, as well

2 Appellate Case: 24-5086 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 05/05/2026 Page: 3

as false impersonation of another. For this third conviction, the state court imposed a

three-year sentence. Campbell was represented by counsel in the state criminal

proceedings leading to her convictions. The government does not contest that the

offenses underlying all three convictions were committed within Indian country as

defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151. 1

In 2021, law enforcement began investigating a drug trafficking organization

distributing methamphetamine and heroin. Campbell was identified as one of the

organization’s main distributors in Tulsa. Upon a search of her home, agents from the

Drug Enforcement Administration discovered various quantities of controlled

substances as well as multiple firearms and ammunition. She was indicted in the

Northern District of Oklahoma on a single count of conspiring to distribute controlled

substances. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. She pleaded guilty without entering into a

plea agreement.

In its presentence investigation report (“PSR”), the U.S. Probation Office

proposed an advisory Guidelines range of 360 months to life, reflecting its

underlying calculation of a total offense level at 42 and a Criminal History Category

of III. Campbell objected to the calculations set out in the PSR. She reasoned, inter

alia, none of her prior state convictions should be factored into the calculation of her

Criminal History Category because the relevant Oklahoma state courts lacked

1 Campbell identifies, again without contradiction by the government, Washington County as part of the Cherokee Nation Reservation and Tulsa and Mayes Counties as parts of both the Cherokee and Muskogee (Creek) Reservations.

3 Appellate Case: 24-5086 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 05/05/2026 Page: 4

jurisdiction over criminal conduct of tribal citizens committed on tribal land. During

the sentencing hearing, the district court overruled this objection, observing, in

particular, that the state convictions at issue remained outstanding because no

Oklahoma court had vacated them.

After resolving other objections not relevant to this appeal, the district court

concluded the total offense level was 34 and the Criminal History Category was III, 2

resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months. Campbell was

ultimately sentenced to 188 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of

supervised release. She timely appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

“A sentence must be both procedurally and substantively reasonable.” United

States v. Hanrahan, 508 F.3d 962, 969 (10th Cir. 2007). Campbell challenges the

procedural reasonableness of her sentence, arguing the district court erred in

calculating her Guidelines range. See id. (holding that a procedurally reasonable

sentence is one “calculated utilizing a legitimate method” (quotation omitted)).

Because she has preserved her claim, the standard of review is abuse of discretion,

under which this court reviews the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the

2 The district court first determined Campbell’s total offense level was 39 and her Criminal History Category was III. Thereafter, the district court granted the defendant’s motion for a downward variance, decreasing her total offense level to 34.

4 Appellate Case: 24-5086 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 05/05/2026 Page: 5

guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Gantt, 679

F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2012).

In reviewing procedural reasonableness, the court “focuses on the manner in

which the sentence was calculated,” United States v. Sanchez-Leon, 764 F.3d 1248,

1261 (10th Cir. 2014), to “ensure that the district court committed no significant

procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the

Guidelines range,” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “Any error in the

Guidelines calculation renders a sentence procedurally unreasonable and, if the error

is not harmless, requires remand.” United States v. Conley, 89 F.4th 815, 820 (10th

Cir. 2023).

A defendant’s Criminal History Category is determined by attributing and

tallying points for their prior sentences. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1; see also id. ch. 5, pt.

A (setting out the sentencing table). The sentencing court is to consider “any sentence

previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt . . . for conduct not part of the instance

offense.” Id. § 4A1.2(a)(1). Excluded from consideration are sentences resulting from

convictions which have been “reversed or vacated” or “have been ruled

constitutionally invalid in a prior case.” Id. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.6; see United States v.

Maloid, 71 F.4th 795, 805 (10th Cir. 2023) (“[Guidelines commentary] governs

unless it runs afoul of the Constitution or a federal statute or is plainly erroneous or

inconsistent with the guideline provision it interprets.” (quotations omitted)). In this

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case, the district court attributed six points in total for Campbell’s three state

convictions, classifying her Criminal History Category as III. 3

Campbell contests this determination in three main steps. First, relying on

McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 894, 898 (2020), she claims Oklahoma state courts

generally lack subject matter jurisdiction over matters concerning conduct of Indian

persons committed in Indian country. Applying this proposition, Campbell asserts her

state convictions—having been entered by state courts for offenses she committed in

Indian country—are void. Second, she argues the validity of her state convictions

may be challenged during her federal sentencing hearing due to their purported

jurisdictional defects. Finally, Campbell concludes the district court committed

procedural error by factoring in these void state convictions when calculating her

Criminal History Category.

At the first step, the defendant makes an erroneous inferential leap. McGirt did

not, by itself, vacate or void existing state convictions. See 591 U.S. at 935 (“The

only question before us . . . concerns the statutory definition of ‘Indian country’ as it

applies in federal criminal law under the [Major Crimes Act].”). In fact, the Supreme

Court made clear that those who, based on McGirt, attempt to challenge existing state

convictions would be subject to the “well-known state and federal limitations on

postconviction review in criminal proceedings.” Id. at 933.

3 The district court adopted the presentence investigation report which attributed 1) two points for her conviction in 2013; 2) one point for her conviction in June 2016; and 3) three points for her conviction in July 2016.

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It has long been established in this court that “the issue of whether a court has

proper jurisdiction is a legal one and, hence, no conviction is ‘void from its

inception’ for lack of jurisdiction until a court with review authority has so declared.”

United States v. Mayfield, 810 F.2d 943, 946 (10th Cir. 1987). During the sentencing

hearing, Campbell explained it had not been “financially feasible” for her to contest

these prior convictions before the appropriate court. ROA Vol. III at 96.

Subsequently, the district court observed that Campbell’s state convictions had not

been reversed or vacated by any Oklahoma court. ROA Vol. III at 100. Thus,

regardless of the merits of her jurisdictional contentions, the court cannot conclude

Campbell’s prior state convictions have been rendered void.

Campbell’s argument at the second step also falls short. By challenging the

validity of her state convictions “in a proceeding other than a direct appeal,”

Campbell is raising a collateral attack. Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 552 (2011)

(italics omitted). In relevant part, the Guidelines commentary provides the following:

With respect to the current sentencing proceeding, this guideline and commentary do not confer upon the defendant any right to attack collaterally a prior conviction or sentence beyond any such rights otherwise recognized in law (e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 851 expressly provides that a defendant may collaterally attack certain prior convictions).

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.6. According to Campbell, longstanding principles and

policies of federal law recognize her right to raise this collateral challenge.

With the “sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to

counsel,” the Supreme Court has recognized no constitutional right “to collaterally

attack prior convictions” during federal sentencing proceedings. Daniels v. United

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States, 532 U.S. 374, 378 (2001). McGirt did not expand upon this exception, see 591

U.S. at 935, and this court has not otherwise permitted the type of collateral

challenge Campbell seeks to pursue, see United States v. Garcia, 42 F.3d 573, 581

(10th Cir. 1994) (identifying “collateral attack based on the complete denial of

counsel” as the sole exception to the rule against collateral attacks of prior

convictions in sentencing proceedings). 4 The record confirms Campbell was

represented by counsel in each prior state criminal proceeding that resulted in a

conviction.

Campbell cites to Custis v. United States, in which the Supreme Court refused

to allow collateral attacks which did not rise “to the level of a jurisdictional defect

resulting from the failure to appoint counsel at all.” 511 U.S. 485, 496 (1994). From

the quoted language, she theorizes that, in addition to convictions obtained in

complete denial of counsel, judgments with jurisdictional defects may also be subject

to collateral challenges. This assertion, however, is at odds with both subsequent

decisions of the Supreme Court and the rationale underpinning the narrow exception

to the rule prohibiting collateral challenges.

4 While the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has affirmatively held McGirt does not apply retroactively, this court has not yet settled that question under federal law. Compare State ex rel. Matloff v. Wallace, 497 P.3d 686, 689 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021) (“[W]e now hold that McGirt. . . shall not apply retroactively to void a conviction that was final when McGirt was decided.”), with Pacheco v. Habti, 62 F.4th 1233, 1246 (10th Cir. 2023) (holding “McGirt announced no new constitutional right” but not addressing retroactivity). Because Campbell could not challenge the validity of her state convictions in this posture even if McGirt did apply retroactively, we need not address, and state no opinion on, McGirt’s retroactivity. 8 Appellate Case: 24-5086 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 05/05/2026 Page: 9

In Johnson, a case decided more than a decade after Custis, the Supreme Court

explicitly “recognized only one exception to th[e] rule that collateral attacks were

off-limits, [which was] for challenges to state convictions allegedly obtained in

violation of the right to appointed counsel.” 544 U.S. at 303. Johnson was in keeping

with Daniels, which similarly held that collateral attacks during federal sentencing

proceedings may only be directed against state convictions obtained in complete

violation of the right to counsel. See 532 U.S. at 378. Notably, both Johnson, 544

U.S. at 303, and Daniels, 532 U.S. at 378, relied on, but did not interpret as broadly

as does Campbell, the holding of Custis. This court has not expanded upon the scope

of Custis either. In Garcia, this court, “applying Custis,” identified “collateral attack

based on the complete denial of counsel” as the sole exception to the general rule

against collateral challenges. 42 F.3d at 581.

Furthermore, Campbell’s position cannot be squared with the underlying

justifications for the narrow exception to the rule against collateral challenges to

prior convictions in federal sentencing proceedings. Custis offered two

considerations which militated against “extend[ing] the right to attack collaterally

prior convictions . . . beyond the right to have appointed counsel.” 511 U.S. at 496.

These considerations were “[e]ase of administration” and “[t]he interest in promoting

the finality of judgments.” Id. at 496-97. As to the former, Custis explained that

whereas “failure to appoint counsel at all will generally [be apparent] from the

judgment . . . itself,” other types of collateral challenges will likely “require

sentencing courts to rummage through frequently nonexistent or difficult to obtain

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state-court transcripts or records.” Id. at 496. As to the latter, the Supreme Court

expressed concern that “allowing collateral attacks would inevitably delay and impair

the orderly administration of justice and deprive the state-court judgment of its

normal force and effect.” Daniels, 532 U.S. at 378 (quoting Custis, 511 U.S. at 497).

Although there is no discernable dispute as to the circumstances of Campbell’s

prior convictions, as a general matter, establishing federal jurisdiction over criminal

conduct in Indian country may present complicated factual and legal issues. See, e.g.,

United States v. Hatley, 153 F.4th 1112, 1123-29 (10th Cir. 2025) (addressing

arguments disputing “fact of the defendant’s Indian status”); McGirt, 591 U.S. at

899-937 (interpreting, through extensive historical and legislative analysis, the

statutory definition of “Indian country” and whether the Creek Reservation could be

so classified). While district courts are fully capable of assessing such fact-intensive

jurisdictional claims, doing so might require meticulous review of records not so

easily accessible. See Daniels, 532 U.S. at 379. Interest in ease of administration

therefore weighs against permitting the type of collateral challenge Campbell seeks

to pursue.

As for the interest in preserving finality, states retain “a strong interest in

preserving the convictions it has obtained” even after the defendant has fully served

the sentence. Id. at 379. Although Campbell has served her sentence for all three

convictions, “if a state conviction were determined to be sufficiently unreliable that it

could not be used to enhance a federal sentence, the State’s ability to use that

judgment subsequently for its own purposes would be, at the very least, greatly

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undermined.” Id. at 380. Therefore, Oklahoma, which obtained the underlying

convictions, maintains “real and continuing interest in the integrity of its judgments.”

Id. Accordingly, allowing Campbell’s collateral challenge would be contrary to the

interest in preserving finality of state convictions.

In the end, Campbell fails to establish the sentences she served for her prior

state convictions fall outside of the scope of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a). The district court

therefore did not err in considering her prior convictions when calculating her

Criminal History Category. The resulting Guidelines range does not reflect an abuse

of discretion.

IV. CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion and its judgment is affirmed.