NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 29 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-4599 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:21-cr-046-MMD-CSD v. MEMORANDUM*
JAMES PATRICK BURNS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 10, 2025 Las Vegas, Nevada
Before: BENNETT, SANCHEZ, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
James Patrick Burns was convicted of sexually exploiting eight minor
victims. Evidence linked Burns to the exploitation of many other unidentifiable
minor victims. Burns now appeals his conviction on 21 counts under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2251(a), (d)(1)(A), and (e); 18 U.S.C. § 2242(b); and 18 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. §§ 2252A(a)(2), (a)(5)(B), (b)(1), and (b)(2). He also appeals his 65-year sentence
and supervised release conditions. We affirm.
1. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings, denial of a Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) subpoena request, and denial of a trial
continuance motion for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Jackson, 845 F.2d
880, 884 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. MacKey, 647 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir.
1981) (per curiam); United States v. de Cruz, 82 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 1996).
We review de novo the asserted violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights
to compulsory process and to present a defense. United States v. Bahamonde, 445
F.3d 1225, 1228 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding
errant Snapchat records as “not [] relevant” and prejudicial under Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 401 and 403. The district court’s ruling did not rest on the
authenticity of the records, but rather on whether Snapchat’s initial production,
which Snapchat later determined to have been made in error, would confuse or
mislead the jury. The court reasonably determined that the erroneous records
would be “too confusing to the jury,” and were no longer “relevant based on
[Snapchat’s] amended response.”
2. We find no abuse of discretion with the district court’s denials of
Burns’s subpoena and trial continuance requests. The district court thoroughly
2 24-4599 considered the evidence raised by Burns on multiple occasions and reasonably
concluded that his subpoena requests lacked the requisite specificity. Rule 17(c) is
“not intended” to function “as a discovery device,” United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d
570, 577 (9th Cir. 1984), “or to allow a blind fishing expedition seeking unknown
evidence,” MacKey, 647 F.2d at 901.
Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the Flynt
factors weighed against granting a trial continuance. See United States v. Flynt,
756 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1985)). The district court reasonably determined
that a trial continuance was unlikely to be useful given the lack of factual support
for Burns’s Norway theory, the minor victims’ potential to suffer further hardship,
and Burns’s lack of prejudice since he was unable to successfully subpoena one of
the minor victim’s devices even after repeated attempts. Burns does not explain
how he would have further tailored his subpoena request to satisfy Rule 17(c)’s
requirements, and his inability to obtain the subpoena before trial did not prejudice
him as he had over two years to attempt to uncover “traces” of involvement by
another person.
3. Burns was not denied his Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory
process and to present a complete defense when the district court excluded the
errant Snapchat records and denied his requests for a subpoena and a trial
continuance. Burns was not denied a defense. The district court permitted Burns
3 24-4599 to call and question Snapchat’s custodian of records at trial, but he declined to do
so. Burns was able to advance his alternate perpetrator argument through other
evidence, cross-examination of government witnesses, and closing statements.
Because there was no underlying error and Burns advanced his defense with other
evidence, Burns cannot satisfy the threshold for showing constitutional injury. See
Cudjo v. Ayers, 698 F.3d 752, 763 (9th Cir. 2012).
4. Burns contends that the district court abused its discretion when it did
not replace jurors who became emotional during trial testimony. See United States
v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1485 (9th Cir. 1995). We disagree. The district court
credited a juror’s statement that she would be able to follow the testimony and
evidence and could continue to serve as a fair and impartial juror. Burns identifies
no evidence in the record that suggests any juror could not be impartial.
5. We find no merit to Burns’s assertion of other trial errors committed
by the district court. Because Burns has no expectation of privacy in the third-
party subscriber information he voluntarily provided to TikTok, and this
information provided the basis to search his home, the district court did not err in
declining to suppress search warrant evidence. United States v. Rosenow, 50 F.4th
715, 738 (9th Cir. 2022).
The district court reasonably determined that Detective Harris had the
qualifications to be a forensics expert in light of his specialized training and the
4 24-4599 verification procedures he employs. Harris testified to the multiple certificates he
holds in operating investigative tools, the industry-standard certification he holds
in forensic examinations, and the methods he employs to verify the results of each
tool. Ample evidence thus supported Detective Harris’s qualifications.
We review Burns’s contention of prosecutorial misconduct in closing
argument for plain error. See United States v. Toro-Barboza, 673 F.3d 1136, 1152
(9th Cir. 2012). Relying on testimony from Burns’s ex-wife that she had never
known Burns to be interested in fishing, the prosecutor speculated in closing about
the meaning of Burns’s computer password, “Fishing007.” We find no plain error
in the district court allowing this argument. See United States v. Sayetsitty, 107
F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he prosecution is allowed to argue reasonable
inferences based on the evidence”).
6. As for cumulative error and sufficiency of the evidence, Burns has not
shown any error and thus is not entitled to relief. Ample evidence at trial
supported Burns’s conviction for his offenses. The government presented
extensive evidence recovered from Burns’s computers; testimony from forensic
analysts who examined Burns’s devices; and testimony from six of the minor
victims.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 29 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-4599 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:21-cr-046-MMD-CSD v. MEMORANDUM*
JAMES PATRICK BURNS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 10, 2025 Las Vegas, Nevada
Before: BENNETT, SANCHEZ, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
James Patrick Burns was convicted of sexually exploiting eight minor
victims. Evidence linked Burns to the exploitation of many other unidentifiable
minor victims. Burns now appeals his conviction on 21 counts under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2251(a), (d)(1)(A), and (e); 18 U.S.C. § 2242(b); and 18 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. §§ 2252A(a)(2), (a)(5)(B), (b)(1), and (b)(2). He also appeals his 65-year sentence
and supervised release conditions. We affirm.
1. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings, denial of a Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) subpoena request, and denial of a trial
continuance motion for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Jackson, 845 F.2d
880, 884 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. MacKey, 647 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir.
1981) (per curiam); United States v. de Cruz, 82 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 1996).
We review de novo the asserted violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights
to compulsory process and to present a defense. United States v. Bahamonde, 445
F.3d 1225, 1228 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding
errant Snapchat records as “not [] relevant” and prejudicial under Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 401 and 403. The district court’s ruling did not rest on the
authenticity of the records, but rather on whether Snapchat’s initial production,
which Snapchat later determined to have been made in error, would confuse or
mislead the jury. The court reasonably determined that the erroneous records
would be “too confusing to the jury,” and were no longer “relevant based on
[Snapchat’s] amended response.”
2. We find no abuse of discretion with the district court’s denials of
Burns’s subpoena and trial continuance requests. The district court thoroughly
2 24-4599 considered the evidence raised by Burns on multiple occasions and reasonably
concluded that his subpoena requests lacked the requisite specificity. Rule 17(c) is
“not intended” to function “as a discovery device,” United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d
570, 577 (9th Cir. 1984), “or to allow a blind fishing expedition seeking unknown
evidence,” MacKey, 647 F.2d at 901.
Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the Flynt
factors weighed against granting a trial continuance. See United States v. Flynt,
756 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1985)). The district court reasonably determined
that a trial continuance was unlikely to be useful given the lack of factual support
for Burns’s Norway theory, the minor victims’ potential to suffer further hardship,
and Burns’s lack of prejudice since he was unable to successfully subpoena one of
the minor victim’s devices even after repeated attempts. Burns does not explain
how he would have further tailored his subpoena request to satisfy Rule 17(c)’s
requirements, and his inability to obtain the subpoena before trial did not prejudice
him as he had over two years to attempt to uncover “traces” of involvement by
another person.
3. Burns was not denied his Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory
process and to present a complete defense when the district court excluded the
errant Snapchat records and denied his requests for a subpoena and a trial
continuance. Burns was not denied a defense. The district court permitted Burns
3 24-4599 to call and question Snapchat’s custodian of records at trial, but he declined to do
so. Burns was able to advance his alternate perpetrator argument through other
evidence, cross-examination of government witnesses, and closing statements.
Because there was no underlying error and Burns advanced his defense with other
evidence, Burns cannot satisfy the threshold for showing constitutional injury. See
Cudjo v. Ayers, 698 F.3d 752, 763 (9th Cir. 2012).
4. Burns contends that the district court abused its discretion when it did
not replace jurors who became emotional during trial testimony. See United States
v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1485 (9th Cir. 1995). We disagree. The district court
credited a juror’s statement that she would be able to follow the testimony and
evidence and could continue to serve as a fair and impartial juror. Burns identifies
no evidence in the record that suggests any juror could not be impartial.
5. We find no merit to Burns’s assertion of other trial errors committed
by the district court. Because Burns has no expectation of privacy in the third-
party subscriber information he voluntarily provided to TikTok, and this
information provided the basis to search his home, the district court did not err in
declining to suppress search warrant evidence. United States v. Rosenow, 50 F.4th
715, 738 (9th Cir. 2022).
The district court reasonably determined that Detective Harris had the
qualifications to be a forensics expert in light of his specialized training and the
4 24-4599 verification procedures he employs. Harris testified to the multiple certificates he
holds in operating investigative tools, the industry-standard certification he holds
in forensic examinations, and the methods he employs to verify the results of each
tool. Ample evidence thus supported Detective Harris’s qualifications.
We review Burns’s contention of prosecutorial misconduct in closing
argument for plain error. See United States v. Toro-Barboza, 673 F.3d 1136, 1152
(9th Cir. 2012). Relying on testimony from Burns’s ex-wife that she had never
known Burns to be interested in fishing, the prosecutor speculated in closing about
the meaning of Burns’s computer password, “Fishing007.” We find no plain error
in the district court allowing this argument. See United States v. Sayetsitty, 107
F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he prosecution is allowed to argue reasonable
inferences based on the evidence”).
6. As for cumulative error and sufficiency of the evidence, Burns has not
shown any error and thus is not entitled to relief. Ample evidence at trial
supported Burns’s conviction for his offenses. The government presented
extensive evidence recovered from Burns’s computers; testimony from forensic
analysts who examined Burns’s devices; and testimony from six of the minor
victims. Trial evidence showed that Burns’s password-protected devices had child
sexual abuse material, that Burns’s IP address was connected to the perpetrator’s
TikTok account during the relevant periods of abuse, and that the user of Burns’s
5 24-4599 devices edited and uploaded videos received from the minor victims. The
government is not required “to rebut all reasonable interpretations of the evidence
that would establish the defendant’s innocence, or ‘rule out every hypothesis
except that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d
1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
326 (1979)). We find that the jury had more than enough evidence to convict
Burns.
7. Finally, Burns challenges his sentence and supervised release
conditions. We review Burns’s sentence for abuse of discretion, Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 56 (2007), and the constitutionality of supervised release
conditions de novo, United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2009).
We conclude the district court did not err when it imposed a below-guidelines
sentence of 65 years and computer monitoring supervised release conditions.
Burns’s below-guidelines sentence is presumptively substantively
reasonable. Gall, 552 U.S. 38 at 51. The comparator cases cited by Burns are
distinguishable because those defendants either had no criminal history, showed
contrition, were far younger than Burns, or cooperated with the government. The
district court described Burns’s case as “an outlier case,” and sentenced Burns
accordingly.
6 24-4599 Burns’s sentence was also procedurally reasonable. The district court’s
“duty to explain,” United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 2014), and
duty to address “nonfrivolous argument[s],” United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984,
992–93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), were discharged when it explained its reasons
for Burns’s sentence.
Finally, we find no merit to Burns’s challenge to his supervised release
conditions. Unlike the conditions in United States v. Wells, 29 F.4th 580 (9th Cir.
2022), Burns’s conditions pertain only to devices on which a probation officer can
install computer monitoring software, thereby limiting their reach. See id. at 588–
89. Accordingly, Burns’s supervised release conditions are not vague and were
lawfully imposed.
AFFIRMED.
7 24-4599