F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS August 9, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-3422 v. (D.Ct. No. 06-CR-20091-CM ) (D . Kan.) M AR IO A LBERTO BU ENO -M AR TINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TA CH A, Chief Circuit Judge, and BARRETT and BROR BY, Senior Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant M ario Bueno-M artinez pled guilty to one count of illegal reentry
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. of a deported alien previously convicted of an aggravated felony in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1) and (2) and (b)(2). 1 He now appeals his sentence, arguing it
is unreasonable under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. In support of
his appeal, he claims the district court’s application of the sixteen-level
enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or
“U.S.S.G.”) § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii), for his prior felony smuggling offense, was
unduly harsh based on his minimal participation or conduct during that offense.
W e exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and affirm M r. Bueno-M artinez’s sentence.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
M r. Bueno-M artinez is a citizen of M exico whom government authorities
previously arrested on November 8, 1997, for transporting illegal aliens in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1324. During that incident, authorities stopped M r.
Bueno-M artinez, who was driving a 1984 Oldsmobile Delta 88, for a defective
tail light and discovered that his ten passengers, three of whom were in the trunk,
were illegal aliens. M r. Bueno-M artinez claimed he drove the vehicle for a
reduction in his own transportation fee. M r. Bueno-M artinez was convicted and
1 The crime of smuggling aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1324, which is the statute under which M r. Bueno-M artinez was previously convicted, is an aggravated felony. See United States v. M artinez-Candejas, 347 F.3d 853, 857 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Heredia-Cruz, 328 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Salas-Mendoza, 237 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 2001).
-2- sentenced to seven months imprisonment and two years supervised release. On
June 19, 1998, approximately ten days after he was released from prison, the
government deported M r. Bueno-M artinez to M exico.
Eight years later, on June 12, 2006, government authorities arrested M r.
Bueno-M artinez in the United States for illegal reentry of a deported alien
previously convicted of an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)
and (b)(2), which is a Class C felony. Following M r. Bueno-M artinez’s guilty
plea, a probation officer prepared a presentence report calculating his sentence
under the applicable Guidelines. The probation officer set M r. Bueno-M artinez’s
base offense level at eight pursuant to U .S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a) and increased his base
level sixteen levels pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because he possessed a prior
felony conviction for the 1998 alien smuggling offense, resulting in a total
offense level of twenty-two. The presentence report also set M r. Bueno-
M artinez’s criminal history category at III, which, together with an offense level
of twenty-two, resulted in a recommended Guidelines sentencing range of fifty-
one to sixty-three months imprisonment.
M r. Bueno-M artinez objected to the use of the sixteen-level enhancement,
arguing it was unduly harsh and exceeded the purposes underlying the sentencing
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because it penalized him for his minimal
-3- participation in the crime of alien smuggling, during which he was one of the
individuals being smuggled into the country. He renewed his claim he drove the
car transporting the other illegal immigrants to avoid paying a transportation fee.
He suggested the United States Sentencing Commission’s statement in
Amendment 658, explaining the amendment to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 was intended to
apply to only the most serious of alien smuggling offenses, invited the court to
adjust his sentence to avoid an unduly harsh result. 2 He also contended
application of the sixteen-level enhancement would unfairly give him the same
sentence enhancement as other individuals convicted of illegal reentry who had
more serious prior convictions for murder, rape, forcible sex offenses, robbery,
arson, child pornography, or sexual abuse of a minor.
At the sentencing hearing, M r. Bueno-M artinez renewed his contention
2 Specifically, the amendment removes reference to smuggling comm itted for profit. In the Sentencing Commission’s reasons for amending, it states the removal of “for profit” allows the definition of “alien smuggling offense” to exclude:
“a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien’s spouse, child, or parent (and no other person)”. This definition generally is consistent with the guideline’s previous terminology of “alien smuggling offense committed for profit,” and results in a 16 level increase only for the most serious of such offenses.
U.S.S.G. App. C, Vol. II, Amend. 658.
-4- concerning the harshness of the application of a sixteen-level enhancement. He
argued the mitigating circumstances of his participation in transporting himself
and other illegal immigrants warranted a “variance,” resulting in an eighteen-
month sentence. During his argument, M r. Bueno-M artinez also requested a
“departure downward” based, in part, on the circumstances of his prior smuggling
offense and family circumstance, given his wife and children are all United States
citizens and he was in this country because of his family.
In opposing a lower sentence, the government pointed out M r. Bueno-
M artinez moved to the United States in 1995 and married his wife, a United
States citizen, in 1996, yet claimed he was being smuggled into the country in
1997 when he was arrested. It also noted the main issue in opposing a variance
was deterrence given M r. Bueno-M artinez illegally reentered the United States
only three months after his 1998 deportation, concealed himself for the purpose of
remaining in the United States, and failed to pay taxes on his income. In
response, M r. Bueno-M artinez’s counsel explained any prior violation of the law
for illegal reentry was for family and economic reasons, which should not place
M r. Bueno-M artinez in the same category for sentencing as one who comm itted a
violent crime.
In sentencing M r. Bueno-M artinez, the district court noted it had
-5- considered the advisory Guidelines, which help provide uniformity in sentencing,
together with the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), for the purpose of
providing a sentence sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with its
sentencing purposes. It explicitly noted it considered the nature and
circumstances of M r. Bueno-M artinez’s illegal reentry offense as w ell as his
history and characteristics. In so doing, it explained it “[s]pecifically ...
considered the nature of [M r. Bueno-M artinez’s] prior transportation of illegal
aliens offense.” R., Vol. 3 at 22. It also stated it had considered the facts he had
no other convictions and illegally reentered the country only three months after
his deportation and noted it reviewed letters written on M r. Bueno-M artinez’s
behalf and his reasons for living in the United States to provide economic and
educational benefits for his children. The district court further explained it
balanced M r. Bueno-M artinez’s lack of a violent background with the issue of
deterrence and his illegal reentry into the United States shortly after his
deportation. It also noted his family circumstance did not take him outside the
heartland of other cases as no exceptional reasons existed to change his sentence.
It did, however, state it believed a variance of one offense level was warranted
given M r. Bueno-M artinez timely entered a guilty plea. Based on these reasons,
it found a term of forty-six months 3 was “a harsh sentence,” but one under the law
3 The one-level offense variance resulted in an advisory Guidelines range of forty-six to fifty-seven months imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (continued...)
-6- that was “just and reasonable,” “appropriate,” “adequate” to deter him from
criminal conduct, and “sufficient but not greater than necessary to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, [and] provide just
punishment for the offense.” R., Vol. 3 at 26-27.
II. Discussion
M r. Bueno-M artinez now appeals his sentence, arguing his sentence is
unreasonable because the district court improperly viewed his request for a
reduced sentence solely as a departure based on his family circumstances instead
of a variance based on the nature of his prior alien smuggling offense in which he
m erely drove the vehicle transporting illegal aliens to cover his own
transportation fee. He suggests the district court did not consider his variance
argument because it merely stated, “[s]pecifically, the court has considered the
nature of [M r. Bueno-M artinez’s] prior transportation of illegal aliens offense.”
Apt. Br. at 10-11. As a result, he claims the district court failed to “address the
incongruity between [his] actual conduct in the prior alien smuggling case and the
16 level increase mandated by the guidelines.” Id. at 13. In making this
argument, he relies extensively on our decision in United States v. Sanchez-
Juarez, in w hich w e remanded the case with instructions to vacate the defendant’s
3 (...continued) (Sentencing Table).
-7- sentence and resentence him because the district court failed to consider his
request for a below-Guidelines-range sentence under § 3553(a) based on an
alleged incongruity between the actual conduct involved in his prior alien
smuggling conviction and the sixteen-level enhancement. See 446 F.3d 1109,
1117-18 (10th Cir. 2006) (Sanchez-Juarez I), aff’d after remand, 2007 W L
1874235 (10th Cir. June 29, 2007) (unpublished op.) (Sanchez-Juarez II). He also
continues to suggest his prior smuggling offense is not a serious smuggling
offense because the commentary to Amendment 658 to U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii) explains a sixteen-level increase is “only for the most
serious” alien smuggling offenses.
W e begin our discussion by clarifying that a sentence above or below the
recommended Guidelines range based on an application of Chapters Four or Five
of the Guidelines is referred to as a “departure,” while a sentence above or below
the recommended Guidelines range through application of the sentencing factors
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 4 is called a “variance.” United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d
4 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provides, in part, the court shall consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed-- (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (continued...)
-8- 1099, 1101 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007). M r. Bueno-M artinez previously requested a
downward departure based both on his family circumstance and the conduct
underlying his prior smuggling offense and also requested a variance under the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors based on his claim his participation in the prior
smuggling offense did not warrant a sixteen-level enhancement. It is the variance
issue he now appeals.
W e review for reasonableness the sentence’s length, as guided by the
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053
(10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). These factors “include the nature of the offense
and characteristics of the defendant, as well as the need for the sentence to reflect
the seriousness of the crime, to provide adequate deterrence, to protect the public,
and to provide the defendant with needed training or treatment ....” Id. W e
require reasonableness in two respects: “the length of the sentence, as well as the
4 (...continued) (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; .... (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
-9- method by which the sentence was calculated.” Id. at 1055 (emphasis omitted).
In order to be reasonable, a sentence must be both procedurally and substantively
sound. See United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 591 (10th Cir. 2006). A
procedurally reasonable sentence is one that is “calculated utilizing a legitimate
method.” Id. “Even if a sentence is calculated properly, i.e. the G uidelines were
properly applied and the district court clearly considered the § 3553(a) factors and
explained its reasoning, a sentence can yet be unreasonable.” Id. A sentence is
substantively reasonable so long as the district court did not abuse its discretion.
See Rita v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007).
On appellate review a presumption of reasonableness attaches to a sentence
which is within the correctly-calculated Guidelines range. See id.; Kristl, 437
F.3d at 1053-54. If the district court “properly considers the relevant Guidelines
range and sentences the defendant within that range, the sentence is
presumptively reasonable,” but “[t]he defendant may rebut this presumption by
demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the other sentencing
factors laid out in § 3553(a).” Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055. W e have also held that a
decision to impose a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range may be read
as a functional rejection of the defendant’s arguments based on any of the
§ 3553(a) factors. See Sanchez-Juarez I, 446 F.3d at 1115.
-10- In addition, “[w]hen the defendant has not raised any substantial
contentions concerning non-Guidelines § 3553(a) factors and the district court
imposes a sentence within the Guideline range, our post-Booker precedents do not
require the court to explain on the record how the § 3553(a) factors justify the
sentence.” United States v. Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3043 (2007). In contrast, in certain circumstances, we
have held that:
[W ]here a defendant has raised a nonfrivolous argument that the § 3553(a) factors warrant a below-Guidelines sentence and has expressly requested such a sentence, we must be able to discern from the record that the sentencing judge did not rest on the guidelines alone, but considered whether the guidelines sentence actually conforms, in the circumstances, to the statutory factors.
Sanchez-Juarez I, 446 F.3d at 1117 (quotation marks, alterations, and citation
omitted). “[A]lthough the district court is not obligated to expressly weigh on the
record each of the factors set out in § 3553(a), it must state its reasons for
imposing a given sentence.” Id. at 1116 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
W hile “we will not demand that the district court recite any magic w ords” to
support its conclusions, neither will we “presume the district court weighed a
party’s arguments in light of the § 3553(a) factors where the record provides no
indication that it did so and no clear explanation of the sentence imposed.” Id. at
1115-16 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In determining whether the
district court properly considered the applicable Guidelines, we review its legal
-11- conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Kristl, 437 F.3d at
1054.
On appeal, M r. Bueno-M artinez appears to be arguing his sentence is both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district court applied the
sixteen-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii) for his alien smuggling
offense without addressing the conduct underlying that offense (procedural claim)
and failing to consider his request for a reduction of his sentence based on his
allegedly less serious conduct during that offense (substantive claim). See
Sanchez-Juarez II, 2007 W L 1874235, at *2 (indicating the defendant, who raised
similar claims, challenged both the procedural and substantive unreasonableness
of his sentence). 5 In either case, he is essentially asking the court to consider the
underlying facts of his smuggling offense to determine the reasonableness of his
sentence. He contends the district court failed to do this, as evidenced by its
failure to explicitly address his argument.
In addressing M r. Bueno-M artinez’s contentions, it is helpful to understand
5 As previously noted, M r. Bueno-M artinez relies extensively on Sanchez- Juarez I in support of his appeal. However, equally instructive to our review is Sanchez-Juarez II, which involves the same case on appeal following remand. Such unpublished precedent has persuasive value with respect to the same material issue raised here and assists with our disposition of this appeal. See United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1194 (2006).
-12- that when considering whether to apply an enhancement for a prior offense, courts
generally employ a categorical approach, looking only to the fact of conviction
and the statutory definition or elements of the prior offense, and not to the
particular facts of the crime. 6 See Martinez-Candejas, 347 F.3d at 858-59
(relying on Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990)). However, with
regard to the sixteen-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii) for alien
smuggling offenses, which is at issue here, we have held the categorical approach
of considering only the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior
offense does not apply. See Martinez-Candejas, 347 F.3d at 859-60. In other
words, a district court may look at the facts of the prior sm uggling offense to
determine whether, in certain circumstances, the sixteen-level enhancement is
applicable. See id. This is because the alien smuggling offense is not defined in
terms of specific elements or offenses, and certain exceptions may apply,
including when a defendant affirmatively shows he committed the offense for the
purpose of smuggling family members. See id. at 859.
Thus, the district court in this case could look to the underlying facts or
nature of M r. Bueno-M artinez’s smuggling conviction to determine if the sixteen-
6 As previously noted, the crime of smuggling aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1324, which is the statute under w hich M r. Bueno-M artinez was previously convicted, is an aggravated felony. See Martinez-Candejas, 347 F.3d at 857; Heredia-Cruz, 328 F.3d at 1290; Salas-M endoza, 237 F.3d at 1248.
-13- level enhancement applied or if a sentence below the advisory Guidelines range
was otherwise warranted. In addition, in Sanchez-Juarez I, we determined the
defendant, like here, raised a nonfrivolous argument in claiming an incongruity
existed between his prior alien smuggling offense (for which he only served 194
days) and other illegal reentry defendants who had convictions for crimes of
violence or repeated serious drug offenses and received the same contested
sixteen-level enhancement. 446 F.3d at 1112, 1117-18. Because M r. Bueno-
M artinez raises the same argument, we will treat it as nonfrivolous for the
purpose of this appeal and consider it in conjunction with our decisions in
Sanchez-Juarez I and II and other applicable precedent.
In Sanchez-Juarez I, like here, the district court allowed the parties to argue
whether certain sentencing factors, in conjunction with the defendant’s prior alien
smuggling offense, warranted a below-Guidelines-range sentence. 446 F.3d at
1115. However, unlike here, the district court in that case imposed the advisory
Guidelines sentence without citing its reasons for imposing such a sentence or
referring to the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See id. at 1112, 1115.
Instead, it only noted it reviewed the presentence report’s factual findings and
considered the Guidelines applications. See id. at 1115. As a result, this court
remanded for resentencing in conjunction with consideration of the § 3553(a)
factors. See id. at 1117-18. On appeal following remand, we again addressed the
-14- same issue concerning whether the district court adequately stated on the record,
with reference to the § 3553(a) factors, its reasons for rejecting the request for a
sentence below the advisory Guidelines range. Sanchez-Juarez II, 2007 W L
1874235, at *2. W e determined such a procedural reasonableness claim was
resolved in United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1199-1200, 1202 (10th
Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed (M ay 24, 2007) (No. 06-11540), in which we
held that where a district court imposes a sentence within the advisory Guidelines
range, like here, only a general statement of reasons is required, and not a specific
discussion of the § 3553(a) factors. See Sanchez-Juarez II, 2007 W L 1874235, at
*2.
In this case, the district court imposed a sentence within the applicable
Guidelines range. In addition, it not only listened to the parties’ arguments
regarding M r. Bueno-M artinez’s alleged minimal conduct in the prior smuggling
offense, but it explicitly noted it considered the § 3553(a) factors in rendering his
sentence and stated it “[s]pecifically ... considered the nature of [M r. Bueno-
M artinez’s] prior transportation of illegal aliens offense.” R., Vol. 3 at 22. Thus,
unlike the court in Sanchez-Juarez I, it is evident the district court considered the
nature and underlying facts of M r. Bueno-M artinez’s conduct in the prior
smuggling offense, in conjunction with both its application of the sixteen-level
enhancement and the requisite § 3353(a) factors, and concluded his conduct during
-15- that offense did not warrant a lesser sentence. M oreover, in considering the
§ 3553(a) factors and providing its reasons for a forty-six-month sentence, the
district court stated it had considered the nature and circumstances of M r. Bueno-
M artinez’s illegal reentry offense and the fact he reentered the country only three
months after his deportation and had balanced M r. Bueno-M artinez’s lack of a
violent background with the issue of deterrence regarding his illegal reentry into
the United States shortly after his deportation. Thus, the district court indicated
its reasons for the sentence and noted that while a forty-six-month sentence was
“harsh,” it was “sufficient but not greater than necessary” under § 3553(a) “to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, [and] provide
just punishment for the offense.” R., Vol. 3 at 26-27.
For these reasons, as in the case of Ruiz-Terrazas, it is evident the district
court entertained extensive arguments relating to the § 3553(a) factors, specifically
noted it considered M r. Bueno-M artinez’s smuggling offense argument for a
below-Guidelines sentence, indicated on the record it considered the § 3553(a)
factors, explained its reliance on the advisory Guidelines, and ultimately imposed
a sentence within the advisory and properly-calculated Guidelines range. See 477
F.3d at 1202-03. See also Sanchez-Juarez II , 2007 W L 1874235, at *2
(addressing same issue on appeal after remand). Like Ruiz-Terrazas, we conclude
the process employed in imposing M r. Bueno-M artinez’s sentence was reasonable,
-16- resulting in a procedurally reasonable sentence. See Sanchez-Juarez II, 2007 W L
1874235, at *2.
M r. Bueno-M artinez also mis-characterizes what occurred at the sentencing
hearing when he claims the district court improperly viewed his request for a
reduced sentence solely as a departure based on his family circumstances instead
of a variance based on the nature of his prior alien smuggling offense. A review
of the hearing transcript discloses M r. Bueno-M artinez requested a downward
departure based both on the circumstances of his prior alien smuggling offense and
his family circumstances and also requested a variance based solely on his prior
alien smuggling offense. A fair reading of the hearing transcript shows the district
court addressed both requests and did not improperly view M r. Bueno-M artinez’s
request for a reduced sentence solely as a departure request based on his family
circumstances.
Finally, for primarily the same reasons asserted in his claim his sentence is
procedurally unreasonable, M r. Bueno-M artinez suggests his sentence is also
substantively unreasonable. In so doing, he claims the underlying conduct of his
smuggling offense was not as serious as other smuggling offenses or prior violent
crimes committed by other illegal reentry defendants. However, because the
district court imposed a sentence w ithin the properly-calculated advisory
-17- Guidelines range, the sentence is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness,
which M r. Bueno-M artinez has not rebutted. M ost notably, M r. Bueno-M artinez
has not shown the sixteen-level increase to his offense level under
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii) for his prior alien smuggling offense overstates the
seriousness of his prior crime, given the record discloses he actively participated
in transporting a total of ten illegal aliens into this country – all of w hom were
transported in an automobile he agreed to drive, regardless of whether he avoided
paying his ow n transportation fee. Unlike the exception for smuggling one’s ow n
family members, M r. Bueno-M artinez has not shown the circumstances involved in
his situation warrant a lesser sentence. W hile M r. Bueno-M artinez points to the
United States Sentencing Commission’s statement in Amendment 658, explaining
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 was intended to apply to only the most serious of alien
smuggling offenses, we note the Guidelines and commentary are advisory and, as
he correctly stated, merely invite the court to adjust a sentence to avoid an unduly
harsh result. He has not shown the district court abused its discretion in
determining his conduct in the transportation of ten illegal aliens did not warrant a
reduction of his Guidelines sentence. For these reasons, we cannot say his forty-
six-month sentence is substantively unreasonable.
-18- III. Conclusion
For the these reasons, we AFFIRM M r. Bueno-M artinez’s sentence.
Entered by the C ourt:
W ADE BRO RBY United States Circuit Judge
-19-